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Commit 48e40e2c authored by Pawan Gupta's avatar Pawan Gupta Committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
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x86/speculation/srbds: Update SRBDS mitigation selection



commit 22cac9c677c95f3ac5c9244f8ca0afdc7c8afb19 upstream

Currently, Linux disables SRBDS mitigation on CPUs not affected by
MDS and have the TSX feature disabled. On such CPUs, secrets cannot
be extracted from CPU fill buffers using MDS or TAA. Without SRBDS
mitigation, Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities can be used to
extract RDRAND, RDSEED, and EGETKEY data.

Do not disable SRBDS mitigation by default when CPU is also affected by
Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities.

Signed-off-by: default avatarPawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: default avatarThadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
parent 8acd4bf9
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