smp: Fix long SMP_Trace_* log messages (8ee921fb) · Commits · e / os / android_packages_modules_Bluetooth

system/stack/smp/smp_act.cc

+38 −42

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -154,8 +154,8 @@ void smp_send_app_cback(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
		}

		SMP_TRACE_WARNING(
		"rcvd auth_req: 0x%02x, io_cap: %d \
		loc_oob_flag: %d loc_enc_size: %d,"
		"rcvd auth_req: 0x%02x, io_cap: %d "
		"loc_oob_flag: %d loc_enc_size: %d, "
		"local_i_key: 0x%02x, local_r_key: 0x%02x",
		p_cb->loc_auth_req, p_cb->local_io_capability, p_cb->loc_oob_flag,
		p_cb->loc_enc_size, p_cb->local_i_key, p_cb->local_r_key);
		@@ -193,8 +193,8 @@ void smp_send_app_cback(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
		p_cb->local_r_key &= ~SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_LK;

		SMP_TRACE_WARNING(
		"for SMP over BR max_key_size: 0x%02x,\
		local_i_key: 0x%02x, local_r_key: 0x%02x, p_cb->loc_auth_req: 0x%02x",
		"for SMP over BR max_key_size: 0x%02x, local_i_key: 0x%02x, "
		"local_r_key: 0x%02x, p_cb->loc_auth_req: 0x%02x",
		p_cb->loc_enc_size, p_cb->local_i_key, p_cb->local_r_key,
		p_cb->loc_auth_req);

		@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ void smp_send_app_cback(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
		smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_DISCARD_SEC_REQ_EVT, NULL);
		}

		SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s return", __func__);
		SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: return", __func__);
		}

		/*******************************************************************************
		@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ void smp_send_pair_fail(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
		p_cb->status = (uint8_t)p_data;
		p_cb->failure = (uint8_t)p_data;

		SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s status=%d failure=%d ", __func__, p_cb->status,
		SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: status=%d failure=%d ", __func__, p_cb->status,
		p_cb->failure);

		if (p_cb->status <= SMP_MAX_FAIL_RSN_PER_SPEC &&
		@@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ void smp_send_keypress_notification(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
		void smp_send_enc_info(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
		tBTM_LE_LENC_KEYS le_key;

		SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s p_cb->loc_enc_size = %d", __func__, p_cb->loc_enc_size);
		SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: p_cb->loc_enc_size = %d", __func__, p_cb->loc_enc_size);
		smp_update_key_mask(p_cb, SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_ENC, false);

		smp_send_cmd(SMP_OPCODE_ENCRYPT_INFO, p_cb);
		@@ -415,17 +415,17 @@ void smp_proc_sec_req(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
		tBTM_BLE_SEC_REQ_ACT sec_req_act;
		uint8_t reason;

		SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s auth_req=0x%x", __func__, auth_req);
		SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: auth_req=0x%x", __func__, auth_req);

		p_cb->cb_evt = 0;

		btm_ble_link_sec_check(p_cb->pairing_bda, auth_req, &sec_req_act);

		SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s sec_req_act=0x%x", __func__, sec_req_act);
		SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: sec_req_act=0x%x", __func__, sec_req_act);

		switch (sec_req_act) {
		case BTM_BLE_SEC_REQ_ACT_ENCRYPT:
		SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s BTM_BLE_SEC_REQ_ACT_ENCRYPT", __func__);
		SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: BTM_BLE_SEC_REQ_ACT_ENCRYPT", __func__);
		smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_ENC_REQ_EVT, NULL);
		break;

		@@ -535,7 +535,7 @@ void smp_proc_pair_cmd(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
		(p_cb->selected_association_model ==
		SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS))) {
		SMP_TRACE_ERROR(
		"%s pairing failed - slave requires secure connection only mode",
		"%s: pairing failed - slave requires secure connection only mode",
		__func__);
		reason = SMP_PAIR_AUTH_FAIL;
		smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
		@@ -556,8 +556,8 @@ void smp_proc_pair_cmd(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
		(!(p_cb->le_secure_connections_mode_is_used) \|\|
		(p_cb->selected_association_model == SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS))) {
		SMP_TRACE_ERROR(
		"Master requires secure connection only mode \
		but it can't be provided -> Master fails pairing");
		"Master requires secure connection only mode "
		"but it can't be provided -> Master fails pairing");
		reason = SMP_PAIR_AUTH_FAIL;
		smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
		return;
		@@ -772,8 +772,8 @@ void smp_br_process_pairing_command(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
		p_dev_rec->new_encryption_key_is_p256 = false;
		/* shortcut to skip Security Grant step */
		p_cb->cb_evt = SMP_BR_KEYS_REQ_EVT;
		} else /* Master receives pairing response */
		{
		} else {
		/* Master receives pairing response */
		SMP_TRACE_DEBUG(
		"%s master rcvs valid PAIRING RESPONSE."
		" Supposed to move to key distribution phase. ",
		@@ -795,9 +795,8 @@ void smp_br_process_security_grant(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
		SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
		if (res != SMP_SUCCESS) {
		smp_br_state_machine_event(p_cb, SMP_BR_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, p_data);
		} else /otherwise, start pairing /
		{
		/* send IO request callback */
		} else {
		/* otherwise, start pairing; send IO request callback */
		p_cb->cb_evt = SMP_BR_KEYS_REQ_EVT;
		}
		}
		@@ -810,9 +809,7 @@ void smp_br_process_security_grant(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
		void smp_br_check_authorization_request(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
		uint8_t reason = SMP_SUCCESS;

		SMP_TRACE_DEBUG(
		"%s rcvs i_keys=0x%x r_keys=0x%x "
		"(i-initiator r-responder)",
		SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s rcvs i_keys=0x%x r_keys=0x%x (i-initiator r-responder)",
		__func__, p_cb->local_i_key, p_cb->local_r_key);

		/* In LE SC mode LK field is ignored when BR/EDR transport is used */
		@@ -833,8 +830,7 @@ void smp_br_check_authorization_request(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
		SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: use h7 = %d", __func__, p_cb->key_derivation_h7_used);

		SMP_TRACE_DEBUG(
		"%s rcvs upgrades: i_keys=0x%x r_keys=0x%x "
		"(i-initiator r-responder)",
		"%s rcvs upgrades: i_keys=0x%x r_keys=0x%x (i-initiator r-responder)",
		__func__, p_cb->local_i_key, p_cb->local_r_key);

		if (/*((p_cb->peer_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BOND) \|\|
		@@ -967,9 +963,12 @@ void smp_proc_srk_info(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {

		/* save CSRK to security record */
		le_key.sec_level = p_cb->sec_level;
		maybe_non_aligned_memcpy(le_key.csrk, p_data,
		BT_OCTET16_LEN); /* get peer CSRK */
		le_key.counter = 0; /* initialize the peer counter */

		/* get peer CSRK */
		maybe_non_aligned_memcpy(le_key.csrk, p_data, BT_OCTET16_LEN);

		/* initialize the peer counter */
		le_key.counter = 0;

		if ((p_cb->peer_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BOND) &&
		(p_cb->loc_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BOND))
		@@ -1075,8 +1074,7 @@ void smp_check_auth_req(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
		uint8_t reason = enc_enable ? SMP_SUCCESS : SMP_ENC_FAIL;

		SMP_TRACE_DEBUG(
		"%s rcvs enc_enable=%d i_keys=0x%x r_keys=0x%x "
		"(i-initiator r-responder)",
		"%s rcvs enc_enable=%d i_keys=0x%x r_keys=0x%x (i-initiator r-responder)",
		__func__, enc_enable, p_cb->local_i_key, p_cb->local_r_key);
		if (enc_enable == 1) {
		if (p_cb->le_secure_connections_mode_is_used) {
		@@ -1103,8 +1101,7 @@ void smp_check_auth_req(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
		p_cb->local_r_key &= ~SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_LK;
		}
		SMP_TRACE_DEBUG(
		"%s rcvs upgrades: i_keys=0x%x r_keys=0x%x "
		"(i-initiator r-responder)",
		"%s rcvs upgrades: i_keys=0x%x r_keys=0x%x (i-initiator r-responder)",
		__func__, p_cb->local_i_key, p_cb->local_r_key);

		if (/*((p_cb->peer_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BOND) \|\|
		@@ -1302,8 +1299,8 @@ void smp_process_io_response(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
		(!(p_cb->le_secure_connections_mode_is_used) \|\|
		(p_cb->selected_association_model == SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS))) {
		SMP_TRACE_ERROR(
		"Slave requires secure connection only mode \
		but it can't be provided -> Slave fails pairing");
		"Slave requires secure connection only mode "
		"but it can't be provided -> Slave fails pairing");
		smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
		return;
		}
		@@ -1482,8 +1479,8 @@ void smp_process_local_nonce(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
		/* slave commitment is already received, send local nonce, wait for
		* remote nonce*/
		SMP_TRACE_DEBUG(
		"master in assoc mode = %d \
		already rcvd slave commitment - race condition",
		"master in assoc mode = %d "
		"already rcvd slave commitment - race condition",
		p_cb->selected_association_model);
		p_cb->flags &= ~SMP_PAIR_FLAG_HAVE_PEER_COMM;
		smp_send_rand(p_cb, NULL);
		@@ -1838,12 +1835,11 @@ void smp_set_local_oob_random_commitment(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
		void smp_link_encrypted(BD_ADDR bda, uint8_t encr_enable) {
		tSMP_CB* p_cb = &smp_cb;

		SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s encr_enable=%d", __func__, encr_enable);
		SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: encr_enable=%d", __func__, encr_enable);

		if (memcmp(&smp_cb.pairing_bda[0], bda, BD_ADDR_LEN) == 0) {
		/* encryption completed with STK, remmeber the key size now, could be
		* overwite
		* when key exchange happens */
		/* encryption completed with STK, remember the key size now, could be
		* overwritten when key exchange happens */
		if (p_cb->loc_enc_size != 0 && encr_enable) {
		/* update the link encryption key size if a SMP pairing just performed */
		btm_ble_update_sec_key_size(bda, p_cb->loc_enc_size);
		@@ -1954,7 +1950,7 @@ void smp_derive_link_key_from_long_term_key(tSMP_CB* p_cb,
		*
		* Description This function is called to process BR/EDR LK:
		* - to derive SMP LTK from BR/EDR LK;
		*8 - to save SMP LTK.
		* - to save SMP LTK.
		*
		* Returns void
		*
		@@ -1964,7 +1960,7 @@ void smp_br_process_link_key(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {

		SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
		if (!smp_calculate_long_term_key_from_link_key(p_cb)) {
		SMP_TRACE_ERROR("%s failed", __func__);
		SMP_TRACE_ERROR("%s: failed", __func__);
		smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_BR_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &status);
		return;
		}

system/stack/smp/smp_keys.cc

+4 −4

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -886,8 +886,8 @@ void smp_calculate_local_commitment(tSMP_CB* p_cb) {
		case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_NUM_COMP:
		if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
		SMP_TRACE_WARNING(
		"local commitment calc on master is not expected \
		for Just Works/Numeric Comparison models");
		"local commitment calc on master is not expected "
		"for Just Works/Numeric Comparison models");
		smp_calculate_f4(p_cb->loc_publ_key.x, p_cb->peer_publ_key.x, p_cb->rand,
		0, p_cb->commitment);
		break;
		@@ -933,8 +933,8 @@ void smp_calculate_peer_commitment(tSMP_CB* p_cb, BT_OCTET16 output_buf) {
		case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_NUM_COMP:
		if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_SLAVE)
		SMP_TRACE_WARNING(
		"peer commitment calc on slave is not expected \
		for Just Works/Numeric Comparison models");
		"peer commitment calc on slave is not expected "
		"for Just Works/Numeric Comparison models");
		smp_calculate_f4(p_cb->peer_publ_key.x, p_cb->loc_publ_key.x, p_cb->rrand,
		0, output_buf);
		break;

system/stack/smp/smp_utils.cc

+12 −12

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -995,8 +995,8 @@ bool smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length(tSMP_CB* p_cb) {

		if (p_cb->rcvd_cmd_len != smp_cmd_size_per_spec[cmd_code]) {
		SMP_TRACE_WARNING(
		"Rcvd from the peer cmd 0x%02x with invalid length\
		0x%02x (per spec the length is 0x%02x).",
		"Rcvd from the peer cmd 0x%02x with invalid length "
		"0x%02x (per spec the length is 0x%02x).",
		cmd_code, p_cb->rcvd_cmd_len, smp_cmd_size_per_spec[cmd_code]);
		return false;
		}
		@@ -1030,24 +1030,24 @@ bool smp_pairing_request_response_parameters_are_valid(tSMP_CB* p_cb) {

		if (io_caps >= BTM_IO_CAP_MAX) {
		SMP_TRACE_WARNING(
		"Rcvd from the peer cmd 0x%02x with IO Capabilty \
		value (0x%02x) out of range).",
		"Rcvd from the peer cmd 0x%02x with IO Capability "
		"value (0x%02x) out of range).",
		p_cb->rcvd_cmd_code, io_caps);
		return false;
		}

		if (!((oob_flag == SMP_OOB_NONE) \|\| (oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT))) {
		SMP_TRACE_WARNING(
		"Rcvd from the peer cmd 0x%02x with OOB data flag value \
		(0x%02x) out of range).",
		"Rcvd from the peer cmd 0x%02x with OOB data flag value "
		"(0x%02x) out of range).",
		p_cb->rcvd_cmd_code, oob_flag);
		return false;
		}

		if (!((bond_flag == SMP_AUTH_NO_BOND) \|\| (bond_flag == SMP_AUTH_BOND))) {
		SMP_TRACE_WARNING(
		"Rcvd from the peer cmd 0x%02x with Bonding_Flags value (0x%02x)\
		out of range).",
		"Rcvd from the peer cmd 0x%02x with Bonding_Flags value (0x%02x) "
		"out of range).",
		p_cb->rcvd_cmd_code, bond_flag);
		return false;
		}
		@@ -1055,8 +1055,8 @@ bool smp_pairing_request_response_parameters_are_valid(tSMP_CB* p_cb) {
		if ((enc_size < SMP_ENCR_KEY_SIZE_MIN) \|\|
		(enc_size > SMP_ENCR_KEY_SIZE_MAX)) {
		SMP_TRACE_WARNING(
		"Rcvd from the peer cmd 0x%02x with Maximum Encryption \
		Key value (0x%02x) out of range).",
		"Rcvd from the peer cmd 0x%02x with Maximum Encryption "
		"Key value (0x%02x) out of range).",
		p_cb->rcvd_cmd_code, enc_size);
		return false;
		}
		@@ -1080,8 +1080,8 @@ bool smp_pairing_keypress_notification_is_valid(tSMP_CB* p_cb) {

		if (keypress_notification >= BTM_SP_KEY_OUT_OF_RANGE) {
		SMP_TRACE_WARNING(
		"Rcvd from the peer cmd 0x%02x with Pairing Keypress \
		Notification value (0x%02x) out of range).",
		"Rcvd from the peer cmd 0x%02x with Pairing Keypress "
		"Notification value (0x%02x) out of range).",
		p_cb->rcvd_cmd_code, keypress_notification);
		return false;
		}