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Commit e99ed866 authored by David Drysdale's avatar David Drysdale
Browse files

Add tests with corrupted MAC on keypair 

Test: VtsHalRemotelyProvisionedComponentTargetTest
Change-Id: Icb79e1e03518ebb20430f33c3d30a44a383798ed
parent cceca9f5

security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.cpp

+64 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -128,6 +128,30 @@ void check_maced_pubkey(const MacedPublicKey& macedPubKey, bool testMode, 
    }

}



ErrMsgOr<MacedPublicKey> corrupt_maced_key(const MacedPublicKey& macedPubKey) {

    auto [coseMac0, _, mac0ParseErr] = cppbor::parse(macedPubKey.macedKey);

    if (!coseMac0 || coseMac0->asArray()->size() != kCoseMac0EntryCount) {

        return "COSE Mac0 parse failed";

    }

    auto protParams = coseMac0->asArray()->get(kCoseMac0ProtectedParams)->asBstr();

    auto unprotParams = coseMac0->asArray()->get(kCoseMac0UnprotectedParams)->asMap();

    auto payload = coseMac0->asArray()->get(kCoseMac0Payload)->asBstr();

    auto tag = coseMac0->asArray()->get(kCoseMac0Tag)->asBstr();

    if (!protParams || !unprotParams || !payload || !tag) {

        return "Invalid COSE_Sign1: missing content";

    }

    auto corruptMac0 = cppbor::Array();

    corruptMac0.add(protParams->clone());

    corruptMac0.add(unprotParams->clone());

    corruptMac0.add(payload->clone());

    vector<uint8_t> tagData = tag->value();

    tagData[0] ^= 0x08;

    tagData[tagData.size() - 1] ^= 0x80;

    corruptMac0.add(cppbor::Bstr(tagData));



    return MacedPublicKey{corruptMac0.encode()};

}



ErrMsgOr<cppbor::Array> corrupt_sig(const cppbor::Array* coseSign1) {

    if (coseSign1->size() != kCoseSign1EntryCount) {

        return "Invalid COSE_Sign1, wrong entry count";
@@ -416,6 +440,46 @@ TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, NonEmptyRequest_prodMode) { 
    }

}



/**

 * Generate a non-empty certificate request in test mode, but with the MAC corrupted on the keypair.

 */

TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, NonEmptyRequestCorruptMac_testMode) {

    bool testMode = true;

    generateKeys(testMode, 1 /* numKeys */);

    MacedPublicKey keyWithCorruptMac = corrupt_maced_key(keysToSign_[0]).moveValue();



    bytevec keysToSignMac;

    DeviceInfo deviceInfo;

    ProtectedData protectedData;

    auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(

            testMode, {keyWithCorruptMac}, eekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo, &protectedData,

            &keysToSignMac);

    ASSERT_FALSE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();

    EXPECT_EQ(status.getServiceSpecificError(), BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_INVALID_MAC);

}



/**

 * Generate a non-empty certificate request in prod mode, but with the MAC corrupted on the keypair.

 */

TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, NonEmptyRequestCorruptMac_prodMode) {

    bool testMode = true;

    generateKeys(testMode, 1 /* numKeys */);

    MacedPublicKey keyWithCorruptMac = corrupt_maced_key(keysToSign_[0]).moveValue();



    bytevec keysToSignMac;

    DeviceInfo deviceInfo;

    ProtectedData protectedData;

    auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(

            testMode, {keyWithCorruptMac}, eekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo, &protectedData,

            &keysToSignMac);

    ASSERT_FALSE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();

    auto rc = status.getServiceSpecificError();



    // TODO(drysdale): drop the INVALID_EEK potential error code when a real GEEK is available.

    EXPECT_TRUE(rc == BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_INVALID_EEK ||

                rc == BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_INVALID_MAC);

}



/**

 * Generate a non-empty certificate request in prod mode that has a corrupt EEK chain.

 * Confirm that the request is rejected.