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Commit d29fb73c authored by Janis Danisevskis's avatar Janis Danisevskis
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Fix typos in KM4 interface definition documentation

Test: N/A
Change-Id: I037ae8bc8cd35479a8e19af2f4651206fb02fda9
parent a2d9704c
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+2 −2
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ interface IKeymasterDevice {
     * device with a StrongBox Keymaster has two Keymasters instances, because there must be a TEE
     * Keymaster as well.  The HMAC key used to MAC and verify authentication tokens must be shared
     * between TEE and StrongBox so they can each validate tokens produced by the other.  This
     * method is the second and final step in the process for for agreeing on a shared key.  It is
     * method is the second and final step in the process for agreeing on a shared key.  It is
     * called by Keystore during startup if and only if Keystore loads multiple Keymaster HALs.
     * Keystore calls it on each of the HAL instances, and sends to it all of the
     * HmacSharingParameters returned by all HALs.
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ interface IKeymasterDevice {
     *     Any method of securely establishing K that ensures that an attacker cannot obtain or
     *     derive its value is acceptable.  What follows is a recommended approach, to be executed
     *     during each factory reset.  It relies on use of the factory-installed attestation keys to
     *     mitigate man-in-the-middle attacks.  This protocol requires that one of the instancess
     *     mitigate man-in-the-middle attacks.  This protocol requires that one of the instances
     *     have secure persistent storage.  This model was chosen because StrongBox has secure
     *     persistent storage (by definition), but the TEE may not.  The instance without storage is
     *     assumed to be able to derive a unique hardware-bound key (HBK) which is used only for