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Commit c83a3978 authored by David Drysdale's avatar David Drysdale Committed by Automerger Merge Worker
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Merge "RKPv2 spec clarifications" am: 85fb71b2 am: a6642987 

Original change: https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/platform/hardware/interfaces/+/2393756



Change-Id: I4be094c0512e2399e5a5907380e649cc4432143b
Signed-off-by: default avatarAutomerger Merge Worker <android-build-automerger-merge-worker@system.gserviceaccount.com>
parents 93b8f799 a6642987

security/rkp/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl

+17 −8
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -159,18 +159,27 @@ interface IRemotelyProvisionedComponent { 
     *        IRemotelyProvisionedComponent must validate the MACs on each key.  If any entry in the

     *        array lacks a valid MAC, the method must return STATUS_INVALID_MAC.

     *

     *        If testMode is true, the keysToCertify array must contain only keys flagged as test

     *        If testMode is true, the keysToSign array must contain only keys flagged as test

     *        keys. Otherwise, the method must return STATUS_PRODUCTION_KEY_IN_TEST_REQUEST.

     *

     *        If testMode is false, the keysToCertify array must not contain any keys flagged as

     *        If testMode is false, the keysToSign array must not contain any keys flagged as

     *        test keys. Otherwise, the method must return STATUS_TEST_KEY_IN_PRODUCTION_REQUEST.

     *

     * @param in endpointEncryptionKey contains an X25519 public key which will be used to encrypt

     *        the BCC. For flexibility, this is represented as a certificate chain, represented as a

     *        CBOR array of COSE_Sign1 objects, ordered from root to leaf. The leaf contains the

     *        X25519 encryption key, each other element is an Ed25519 key signing the next in the

     *        chain. The root is self-signed. An implementor may also choose to use P256 as an

     *        alternative curve for signing and encryption instead of Curve 25519.

     * @param in endpointEncryptionKey contains an X25519 or P-256 public key which will be used to

     *        encrypt the BCC. For flexibility, this is represented as a certificate chain

     *        in the form of a CBOR array of COSE_Sign1 objects, ordered from root to leaf.  An

     *        implementor may also choose to use P256 as an alternative curve for signing and

     *        encryption instead of Curve 25519, as indicated by the supportedEekCurve field in

     *        RpcHardwareInfo; the contents of the EEK chain will match the specified

     *        supportedEekCurve.

     *

     *        - For CURVE_25519 the leaf contains the X25519 agreement key, each other element is an

     *          Ed25519 key signing the next in the chain.

     *

     *        - For CURVE_P256 the leaf contains the P-256 agreement key, each other element is a

     *          P-256 key signing the next in the chain.

     *

     *        In either case, the root is self-signed.

     *

     *            EekChain = [ + SignedSignatureKey, SignedEek ]

     *

security/rkp/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/ProtectedData.aidl

+7 −2
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -50,6 +50,8 @@ parcelable ProtectedData { 
     *                                     ; salt = null

     *                                     ; info = .cbor Context (see below)

     *                                     ; K = HKDF-SHA-256(ikm, salt, info)

     *                                     ; AAD for the encryption is a CBOR-serialized

     *                                     ; Enc_structure (RFC 8152 s5.3) with empty external_aad.

     *         recipients : [

     *             [                       ; COSE_Recipient

     *                 protected : bstr .cbor {
@@ -65,7 +67,10 @@ parcelable ProtectedData { 
     *     ]

     *

     *     ; The COSE_KDF_Context that is used to derive the ProtectedData encryption key with

     *     ; HKDF. See details on use in ProtectedData comments above.

     *     ; HKDF. See details on use in ProtectedData comments above. The public key data

     *     ; included in the other field of PartyUInfo / PartyVInfo is encoded as:

     *     ;  - a raw 32-byte public key for X25519

     *     ;  - uncompressed SEC-1 coordinate data (0x04 || x || y) for P-256

     *     Context = [

     *         AlgorithmID : 3             ; AES-GCM 256

     *         PartyUInfo : [
@@ -138,7 +143,7 @@ parcelable ProtectedData { 
     *                                            ; bytes inclusive

     *         VerifiedDeviceInfo,

     *         tag: bstr                 ; This is the tag from COSE_Mac0 of

     *                                   ; KeysToCertify, to tie the key set to

     *                                   ; KeysToSign, to tie the key set to

     *                                   ; the signature.

     *     ]

     *