Merge "Updating CDDL schemas to match the finalized spec." am: 11854c2d82 (b8cf151c) · Commits · e / os / android_hardware_interfaces

security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/DeviceInfo.aidl

+3 −0

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -37,10 +37,13 @@ parcelable DeviceInfo {
		* ? "board" : tstr,
		* ? "vb_state" : "green" / "yellow" / "orange", // Taken from the AVB values
		* ? "bootloader_state" : "locked" / "unlocked", // Taken from the AVB values
		* ? "vbmeta_digest": bstr, // Taken from the AVB values
		* ? "os_version" : tstr, // Same as android.os.Build.VERSION.release
		* ? "system_patch_level" : uint, // YYYYMMDD
		* ? "boot_patch_level" : uint, // YYYYMMDD
		* ? "vendor_patch_level" : uint, // YYYYMMDD
		* "version" : 1, // The CDDL schema version.
		* "security_level" : "tee" / "strongbox"
		* }
		*/
		byte[] deviceInfo;

security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl

+63 −40

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ import android.hardware.security.keymint.RpcHardwareInfo;
		*
		* The root of trust for secure provisioning is something called the "Boot Certificate Chain", or
		* BCC. The BCC is a chain of public key certificates, represented as COSE_Sign1 objects containing
		* COSE_Key representations of the public keys. The "root" of the BCC is a self-signed certificate
		* for a device-unique public key, denoted DK_pub. All public keys in the BCC are device-unique. The
		* COSE_Key representations of the public keys. The "root" of the BCC is
		* a device-unique public key, denoted DK_pub. All public keys in the BCC are device-unique. The
		* public key from each certificate in the chain is used to sign the next certificate in the
		* chain. The final, "leaf" certificate contains a public key, denoted KM_pub, whose corresponding
		* private key, denoted KM_priv, is available for use by the IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.
		@@ -58,12 +58,8 @@ import android.hardware.security.keymint.RpcHardwareInfo;
		* (given the necessary input), but no stage can compute the secret of any preceding stage. Updating
		* the firmware or configuration of any stage changes the key pair of that stage, and of all
		* subsequent stages, and no attacker who compromised the previous version of the updated firmware
		* can know or predict the post-update key pairs.
		*
		* The first BCC certificate is special because its contained public key, DK_pub, will never change,
		* making it a permanent, device-unique identifier. Although the remaining keys in the BCC are also
		* device-unique, they are not necessarily permanent, since they can change when the device software
		* is updated.
		* can know or predict the post-update key pairs. It is recommended and expected that the BCC is
		* constructed using the Open Profile for DICE.
		*
		* When the provisioning server receives a message signed by KM_priv and containing a BCC that
		* chains from DK_pub to KM_pub, it can be certain that (barring vulnerabilities in some boot
		@@ -78,7 +74,7 @@ import android.hardware.security.keymint.RpcHardwareInfo;
		* While a proper BCC, as described above, reflects the complete boot sequence from boot ROM to the
		* secure area image of the IRemotelyProvisionedComponent, it's also possible to use a "degenerate"
		* BCC which consists only of a single, self-signed certificate containing the public key of a
		* hardware-bound key pair. This is an appropriate solution for devices which haven't implemented
		* hardware-bound key pair. This is an appopriate solution for devices which haven't implemented
		* everything necessary to produce a proper BCC, but can derive a unique key pair in the secure
		* area. In this degenerate case, DK_pub is the same as KM_pub.
		*
		@@ -141,7 +137,7 @@ interface IRemotelyProvisionedComponent {
		* privateKeyHandle, that the contained public key is for remote certification.
		*
		* @return data representing a handle to the private key. The format is implementation-defined,
		* but note that specific services may define a required format.
		* but note that specific services may define a required format. KeyMint does.
		*/
		byte[] generateEcdsaP256KeyPair(in boolean testMode, out MacedPublicKey macedPublicKey);

		@@ -162,65 +158,90 @@ interface IRemotelyProvisionedComponent {
		* If testMode is false, the keysToCertify array must not contain any keys flagged as
		* test keys. Otherwise, the method must return STATUS_TEST_KEY_IN_PRODUCTION_REQUEST.
		*
		* @param in endpointEncryptionKey contains an X25519 public key which will be used to encrypt
		* @param in endpointEncryptionKey contains an X22519 public key which will be used to encrypt
		* the BCC. For flexibility, this is represented as a certificate chain, represented as a
		* CBOR array of COSE_Sign1 objects, ordered from root to leaf. The leaf contains the
		* X25519 encryption key, each other element is an Ed25519 key signing the next in the
		* chain. The root is self-signed.
		* chain. The root is self-signed. An implementor may also choose to use P256 as an
		* alternative curve for signing and encryption instead of Curve 25519.
		*
		* EekChain = [ + SignedSignatureKey, SignedEek ]
		*
		* SignedSignatureKey = [ // COSE_Sign1
		* protected: bstr .cbor {
		* 1 : -8, // Algorithm : EdDSA
		* 1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256, // Algorithm
		* },
		* unprotected: {},
		* payload: bstr .cbor SignatureKey,
		* signature: bstr PureEd25519(.cbor SignatureKeySignatureInput)
		* payload: bstr .cbor SignatureKeyEd25519 /
		* bstr .cbor SignatureKeyP256,
		* signature: bstr PureEd25519(.cbor SignatureKeySignatureInput) /
		* bstr ECDSA(.cbor SignatureKeySignatureInput)
		* ]
		*
		* SignatureKey = { // COSE_Key
		* SignatureKeyEd25519 = { // COSE_Key
		* 1 : 1, // Key type : Octet Key Pair
		* 3 : -8, // Algorithm : EdDSA
		* 3 : AlgorithmEdDSA, // Algorithm
		* -1 : 6, // Curve : Ed25519
		* -2 : bstr // Ed25519 public key
		* }
		*
		* SignatureKeyP256 = {
		* 1 : 2, // Key type : EC2
		* 3 : AlgorithmES256, // Algorithm
		* -1 : 1, // Curve: P256
		* -2 : bstr, // X coordinate
		* -3 : bstr // Y coordinate
		* }
		*
		* SignatureKeySignatureInput = [
		* context: "Signature1",
		* body_protected: bstr .cbor {
		* 1 : -8, // Algorithm : EdDSA
		* 1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256, // Algorithm
		* },
		* external_aad: bstr .size 0,
		* payload: bstr .cbor SignatureKey
		* payload: bstr .cbor SignatureKeyEd25519 /
		* bstr .cbor SignatureKeyP256
		* ]
		*
		* SignedEek = [ // COSE_Sign1
		* protected: bstr .cbor {
		* 1 : -8, // Algorithm : EdDSA
		* 1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256, // Algorithm
		* },
		* unprotected: {},
		* payload: bstr .cbor Eek,
		* signature: bstr PureEd25519(.cbor EekSignatureInput)
		* payload: bstr .cbor EekX25519 / .cbor EekP256,
		* signature: bstr PureEd25519(.cbor EekSignatureInput) /
		* bstr ECDSA(.cbor EekSignatureInput)
		* ]
		*
		* Eek = { // COSE_Key
		* EekX25519 = { // COSE_Key
		* 1 : 1, // Key type : Octet Key Pair
		* 2 : bstr // KID : EEK ID
		* 3 : -25, // Algorithm : ECDH-ES + HKDF-256
		* -1 : 4, // Curve : X25519
		* -2 : bstr // X25519 public key
		* -2 : bstr // Ed25519 public key
		* }
		*
		* EekP256 = { // COSE_Key
		* 1 : 2, // Key type : EC2
		* 2 : bstr // KID : EEK ID
		* 3 : -25, // Algorithm : ECDH-ES + HKDF-256
		* -1 : 1, // Curve : P256
		* -2 : bstr // Sender X coordinate
		* -3 : bstr // Sender Y coordinate
		* }
		*
		* EekSignatureInput = [
		* context: "Signature1",
		* body_protected: bstr .cbor {
		* 1 : -8, // Algorithm : EdDSA
		* 1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256, // Algorithm
		* },
		* external_aad: bstr .size 0,
		* payload: bstr .cbor Eek
		* payload: bstr .cbor EekX25519 / .cbor EekP256
		* ]
		*
		* AlgorithmES256 = -7
		* AlgorithmEdDSA = -8
		*
		* If the contents of endpointEncryptionKey do not match the SignedEek structure above,
		* the method must return STATUS_INVALID_EEK.
		*
		@@ -228,7 +249,7 @@ interface IRemotelyProvisionedComponent {
		* in the chain, which implies that it must not attempt to validate the signature.
		*
		* If testMode is false, the method must validate the chain signatures, and must verify
		* that the public key in the root certificate is in its pre-configured set of
		* that the public key in the root certifictate is in its pre-configured set of
		* authorized EEK root keys. If the public key is not in the database, or if signature
		* verification fails, the method must return STATUS_INVALID_EEK.
		*
		@@ -236,8 +257,13 @@ interface IRemotelyProvisionedComponent {
		* by the secure area. See the description of the 'signature' output parameter for
		* details.
		*
		* @param out keysToSignMac contains the MAC of KeysToSign in the CertificateRequest
		* structure. Specifically, it contains:
		* @param out DeviceInfo contains the VerifiedDeviceInfo portion of the DeviceInfo array in
		* CertificateRequest. The structure is described within the DeviceInfo.aidl file.
		*
		* @param out ProtectedData contains the encrypted BCC and the ephemeral MAC key used to
		* authenticate the keysToSign (see keysToSignMac output argument).
		*
		* @return The of KeysToSign in the CertificateRequest structure. Specifically, it contains:
		*
		* HMAC-256(EK_mac, .cbor KeysToMacStructure)
		*
		@@ -261,9 +287,6 @@ interface IRemotelyProvisionedComponent {
		* // Payload is PublicKeys from keysToSign argument, in provided order.
		* payload : bstr .cbor [ * PublicKey ]
		* ]
		*
		* @param out ProtectedData contains the encrypted BCC and the ephemeral MAC key used to
		* authenticate the keysToSign (see keysToSignMac output argument).
		*/
		byte[] generateCertificateRequest(in boolean testMode, in MacedPublicKey[] keysToSign,
		in byte[] endpointEncryptionCertChain, in byte[] challenge, out DeviceInfo deviceInfo,

security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/ProtectedData.aidl

+75 −35

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -40,11 +40,7 @@ parcelable ProtectedData {
		* 1 : -25 // Algorithm : ECDH-ES + HKDF-256
		* },
		* unprotected : {
		* -1 : { // COSE_Key
		* 1 : 1, // Key type : Octet Key Pair
		* -1 : 4, // Curve : X25519
		* -2 : bstr // Sender X25519 public key
		* }
		* -1 : PubKeyX25519 / PubKeyEcdhP256 // Of the sender
		* 4 : bstr, // KID : EEK ID
		* },
		* ciphertext : nil
		@@ -67,7 +63,7 @@ parcelable ProtectedData {
		* other : bstr // EEK pubkey
		* ],
		* SuppPubInfo : [
		* 128, // Output key length
		* 256, // Output key length
		* protected : bstr .size 0
		* ]
		* ]
		@@ -75,21 +71,35 @@ parcelable ProtectedData {
		* ProtectedDataPayload [
		* SignedMac,
		* Bcc,
		* ? AdditionalDKSignatures,
		* ]
		* AdditionalDKSignatures = {
		* + SignerName => DKCertChain
		* }
		*
		* SignerName = tstr
		*
		* DKCertChain = [
		* 2* Certificate // Root -> Leaf. Root is the vendor
		* // self-signed cert, leaf contains DK_pub
		* ]
		*
		* Certificate = COSE_Sign1 of a public key
		*
		* SignedMac = [ // COSE_Sign1
		* bstr .cbor { // Protected params
		* 1 : -8, // Algorithm : EdDSA
		* 1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256, // Algorithm
		* },
		* {}, // Unprotected params
		* bstr .size 32, // MAC key
		* bstr PureEd25519(DK_priv, .cbor SignedMac_structure)
		* bstr PureEd25519(KM_priv, .cbor SignedMac_structure) /
		* ECDSA(KM_priv, bstr .cbor SignedMac_structure)
		* ]
		*
		* SignedMac_structure = [
		* "Signature1",
		* bstr .cbor { // Protected params
		* 1 : -8, // Algorithm : EdDSA
		* 1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256, // Algorithm
		* },
		* bstr .cbor SignedMacAad
		* bstr .size 32 // MAC key
		@@ -97,11 +107,14 @@ parcelable ProtectedData {
		*
		* SignedMacAad = [
		* challenge : bstr,
		* DeviceInfo
		* VerifiedDeviceInfo,
		* tag: bstr // This is the tag from COSE_Mac0 of
		* // KeysToCertify, to tie the key set to
		* // the signature.
		* ]
		*
		* Bcc = [
		* PubKey, // DK_pub
		* PubKeyEd25519 / PubKeyECDSA256, // DK_pub
		* + BccEntry, // Root -> leaf (KM_pub)
		* ]
		*
		@@ -120,44 +133,38 @@ parcelable ProtectedData {
		* ? -4670549 : bstr, // Authority Hash
		* ? -4670550 : bstr, // Authority Descriptor
		* ? -4670551 : bstr, // Mode
		* -4670552 : bstr .cbor PubKey // Subject Public Key
		* -4670552 : bstr .cbor PubKeyEd25519 /
		* bstr .cbor PubKeyECDSA256 // Subject Public Key
		* -4670553 : bstr // Key Usage
		* }
		*
		* BccEntry = [ // COSE_Sign1
		* BccEntry = [ // COSE_Sign1 (untagged)
		* protected : bstr .cbor {
		* 1 : -8, // Algorithm : EdDSA
		* 1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256, // Algorithm
		* },
		* unprotected: {},
		* payload: bstr .cbor BccPayload,
		* // First entry in the chain is signed by DK_pub, the others are each signed by their
		* // immediate predecessor. See RFC 8032 for signature representation.
		* signature: bstr .cbor PureEd25519(SigningKey, bstr .cbor BccEntryInput)
		* signature: bstr .cbor PureEd25519(SigningKey, bstr .cbor BccEntryInput) /
		* bstr .cbor ECDSA(SigningKey, bstr .cbor BccEntryInput)
		* // See RFC 8032 for details of how to encode the signature value for Ed25519.
		* ]
		*
		* PubKey = { // COSE_Key
		* 1 : 1, // Key type : octet key pair
		* 3 : -8, // Algorithm : EdDSA
		* 4 : 2, // Ops: Verify
		* -1 : 6, // Curve : Ed25519
		* -2 : bstr // X coordinate, little-endian
		* }
		*
		* BccEntryInput = [
		* context: "Signature1",
		* protected: bstr .cbor {
		* 1 : -8, // Algorithm : EdDSA
		* 1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256, // Algorithm
		* },
		* external_aad: bstr .size 0,
		* payload: bstr .cbor BccPayload
		* ]
		*
		* DeviceInfo = {
		* VerifiedDeviceInfo = {
		* ? "brand" : tstr,
		* ? "manufacturer" : tstr,
		* ? "product" : tstr,
		* ? "model" : tstr,
		* ? "board" : tstr,
		* ? "device" : tstr,
		* ? "vb_state" : "green" / "yellow" / "orange",
		* ? "bootloader_state" : "locked" / "unlocked",
		* ? "os_version" : tstr,
		@@ -165,6 +172,39 @@ parcelable ProtectedData {
		* ? "boot_patch_level" : uint, // YYYYMMDD
		* ? "vendor_patch_level" : uint, // YYYYMMDD
		* }
		*
		* PubKeyX25519 = { // COSE_Key
		* 1 : 1, // Key type : Octet Key Pair
		* -1 : 4, // Curve : X25519
		* -2 : bstr // Sender X25519 public key
		* }
		*
		* PubKeyEd25519 = { // COSE_Key
		* 1 : 1, // Key type : octet key pair
		* 3 : AlgorithmEdDSA, // Algorithm : EdDSA
		* 4 : 2, // Ops: Verify
		* -1 : 6, // Curve : Ed25519
		* -2 : bstr // X coordinate, little-endian
		* }
		*
		* PubKeyEcdhP256 = { // COSE_Key
		* 1 : 2, // Key type : EC2
		* -1 : 1, // Curve : P256
		* -2 : bstr // Sender X coordinate
		* -3 : bstr // Sender Y coordinate
		* }
		*
		* PubKeyECDSA256 = { // COSE_Key
		* 1 : 2, // Key type : EC2
		* 3 : AlgorithmES256, // Algorithm : ECDSA w/ SHA-256
		* 4 : 2, // Ops: Verify
		* -1 : 1, // Curve: P256
		* -2 : bstr, // X coordinate
		* -3 : bstr // Y coordinate
		* }
		*
		* AlgorithmES256 = -7
		* AlgorithmEdDSA = -8
		*/
		byte[] protectedData;
		}