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Commit b39baeaa authored by David Drysdale's avatar David Drysdale Committed by Gerrit Code Review
Browse files

Merge changes I2f5187bf,Icb79e1e0,I833894d3,I54dcaa61,I47a810f2 

* changes:
  Test that provisioned keys can be used with KeyMint
  Add tests with corrupted MAC on keypair
  Add more EEK variant tests and related fixes
  Commonize MacedPublicKey and ProtectedData checks
  Tweak IRemotelyProvisionedComponent AIDL docs
parents ae33614d f0d516d2

security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl

+2 −2
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ interface IRemotelyProvisionedComponent { 
     *                2 : bstr                        // KID : EEK ID

     *                3 : -25,                        // Algorithm : ECDH-ES + HKDF-256

     *                -1 : 4,                         // Curve : X25519

     *                -2 : bstr                       // Ed25519 public key

     *                -2 : bstr                       // X25519 public key

     *            }

     *

     *            EekSignatureInput = [
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ interface IRemotelyProvisionedComponent { 
     *        in the chain, which implies that it must not attempt to validate the signature.

     *

     *        If testMode is false, the method must validate the chain signatures, and must verify

     *        that the public key in the root certifictate is in its pre-configured set of

     *        that the public key in the root certificate is in its pre-configured set of

     *        authorized EEK root keys. If the public key is not in the database, or if signature

     *        verification fails, the method must return STATUS_INVALID_EEK.

     *

security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/MacedPublicKey.aidl

+6 −5
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ parcelable MacedPublicKey { 
    /**

     * key is a COSE_Mac0 structure containing the new public key.  It's MACed by a key available

     * only to the secure environment, as proof that the public key was generated by that

     * environment. In CDDL, assuming the contained key is an Ed25519 public key:

     * environment. In CDDL, assuming the contained key is a P-256 public key:

     *

     *     MacedPublicKey = [                     // COSE_Mac0

     *         protected: bstr .cbor { 1 : 5},    // Algorithm : HMAC-256
@@ -36,10 +36,11 @@ parcelable MacedPublicKey { 
     *     ]

     *

     *     PublicKey = {               // COSE_Key

     *         1 : 1,                  // Key type : octet key pair

     *         3 : -8                  // Algorithm : EdDSA

     *         -1 : 6,                 // Curve : Ed25519

     *         1 : 2,                  // Key type : EC2

     *         3 : -8                  // Algorithm : ES256

     *         -1 : 6,                 // Curve : P256

     *         -2 : bstr               // X coordinate, little-endian

     *         -3 : bstr               // Y coordinate, little-endian

     *         ? -70000 : nil          // Presence indicates this is a test key.  If set, K_mac is

     *                                 // all zeros.

     *     },
@@ -51,7 +52,7 @@ parcelable MacedPublicKey { 
     *         payload : bstr .cbor PublicKey

     *     ]

     *

     * if a non-Ed25519 public key were contained, the contents of the PublicKey map would change a

     * if a non-P256 public key were contained, the contents of the PublicKey map would change a

     * little; see RFC 8152 for details.

     */

    byte[] macedKey;

security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/ProtectedData.aidl

+1 −1
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ parcelable ProtectedData { 
     *         unprotected: {

     *             5 : bstr .size 12       // IV

     *         },

     *         ciphertext: bstr,           // AES-GCM-128(K, .cbor ProtectedDataPayload)

     *         ciphertext: bstr,           // AES-GCM-256(K, .cbor ProtectedDataPayload)

     *         recipients : [

     *             [                       // COSE_Recipient

     *                 protected : bstr .cbor {

security/keymint/aidl/default/RemotelyProvisionedComponent.cpp

+17 −2
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -46,6 +46,14 @@ using namespace keymaster; 


namespace {



// Hard-coded set of acceptable public keys that can act as roots of EEK chains.

inline const vector<bytevec> kAuthorizedEekRoots = {

        // TODO(drysdale): replace this random value with real root pubkey(s).

        {0x5c, 0xea, 0x4b, 0xd2, 0x31, 0x27, 0x15, 0x5e, 0x62, 0x94, 0x70,

         0x53, 0x94, 0x43, 0x0f, 0x9a, 0x89, 0xd5, 0xc5, 0x0f, 0x82, 0x9b,

         0xcd, 0x10, 0xe0, 0x79, 0xef, 0xf3, 0xfa, 0x40, 0xeb, 0x0a},

};



constexpr auto STATUS_FAILED = RemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_FAILED;

constexpr auto STATUS_INVALID_EEK = RemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_INVALID_EEK;

constexpr auto STATUS_INVALID_MAC = RemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_INVALID_MAC;
@@ -135,6 +143,13 @@ StatusOr<std::pair<bytevec /* EEK pub */, bytevec /* EEK ID */>> validateAndExtr 
                          "Failed to validate EEK chain: " + cosePubKey.moveMessage());

        }

        lastPubKey = *std::move(cosePubKey);



        // In prod mode the first pubkey should match a well-known Google public key.

        if (!testMode && i == 0 &&

            std::find(kAuthorizedEekRoots.begin(), kAuthorizedEekRoots.end(), lastPubKey) ==

                    kAuthorizedEekRoots.end()) {

            return Status(STATUS_INVALID_EEK, "Unrecognized root of EEK chain");

        }

    }



    auto eek = CoseKey::parseX25519(lastPubKey, true /* requireKid */);
@@ -417,8 +432,8 @@ RemotelyProvisionedComponent::generateBcc() { 
                                .add(1 /* Issuer */, "Issuer")

                                .add(2 /* Subject */, "Subject")

                                .add(-4670552 /* Subject Pub Key */, coseKey)

                                .add(-4670553 /* Key Usage */,

                                     std::vector<uint8_t>(0x05) /* Big endian order */)

                                .add(-4670553 /* Key Usage (little-endian order) */,

                                     std::vector<uint8_t>{0x20} /* keyCertSign = 1<<5 */)

                                .canonicalize()

                                .encode();

    auto coseSign1 = constructCoseSign1(privKey,       /* signing key */

security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/Android.bp

+4 −1
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -94,11 +94,14 @@ cc_test { 
    ],

    static_libs: [

        "android.hardware.security.keymint-V1-ndk_platform",

        "android.hardware.security.secureclock-V1-ndk_platform",

        "libcppcose",

        "libgmock_ndk",

        "libremote_provisioner",

        "libkeymint",

        "libkeymint_support",

        "libkeymint_remote_prov_support",

        "libkeymint_vts_test_utils",

        "libremote_provisioner",

    ],

    test_suites: [

        "general-tests",