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Commit a5ddfbdc authored by David Drysdale's avatar David Drysdale
Browse files

Tweak IRemotelyProvisionedComponent AIDL docs 

 - Use P-256 in MacedPublicKey: The main place that MacedPublicKey is
   used requires a P-256 key, so use that as the example in the comment.
 - Fix leaf key type comment
 - Fix AES key size comment
 - Typo fix

Test: none, just comment change
Change-Id: I47a810f2a965facad6ddcd251341f233884e5f7c
parent 6a022ad1

security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl

+2 −2
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ interface IRemotelyProvisionedComponent { 
     *                2 : bstr                        // KID : EEK ID

     *                3 : -25,                        // Algorithm : ECDH-ES + HKDF-256

     *                -1 : 4,                         // Curve : X25519

     *                -2 : bstr                       // Ed25519 public key

     *                -2 : bstr                       // X25519 public key

     *            }

     *

     *            EekSignatureInput = [
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ interface IRemotelyProvisionedComponent { 
     *        in the chain, which implies that it must not attempt to validate the signature.

     *

     *        If testMode is false, the method must validate the chain signatures, and must verify

     *        that the public key in the root certifictate is in its pre-configured set of

     *        that the public key in the root certificate is in its pre-configured set of

     *        authorized EEK root keys. If the public key is not in the database, or if signature

     *        verification fails, the method must return STATUS_INVALID_EEK.

     *

security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/MacedPublicKey.aidl

+6 −5
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ parcelable MacedPublicKey { 
    /**

     * key is a COSE_Mac0 structure containing the new public key.  It's MACed by a key available

     * only to the secure environment, as proof that the public key was generated by that

     * environment. In CDDL, assuming the contained key is an Ed25519 public key:

     * environment. In CDDL, assuming the contained key is a P-256 public key:

     *

     *     MacedPublicKey = [                     // COSE_Mac0

     *         protected: bstr .cbor { 1 : 5},    // Algorithm : HMAC-256
@@ -36,10 +36,11 @@ parcelable MacedPublicKey { 
     *     ]

     *

     *     PublicKey = {               // COSE_Key

     *         1 : 1,                  // Key type : octet key pair

     *         3 : -8                  // Algorithm : EdDSA

     *         -1 : 6,                 // Curve : Ed25519

     *         1 : 2,                  // Key type : EC2

     *         3 : -8                  // Algorithm : ES256

     *         -1 : 6,                 // Curve : P256

     *         -2 : bstr               // X coordinate, little-endian

     *         -3 : bstr               // Y coordinate, little-endian

     *         ? -70000 : nil          // Presence indicates this is a test key.  If set, K_mac is

     *                                 // all zeros.

     *     },
@@ -51,7 +52,7 @@ parcelable MacedPublicKey { 
     *         payload : bstr .cbor PublicKey

     *     ]

     *

     * if a non-Ed25519 public key were contained, the contents of the PublicKey map would change a

     * if a non-P256 public key were contained, the contents of the PublicKey map would change a

     * little; see RFC 8152 for details.

     */

    byte[] macedKey;

security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/ProtectedData.aidl

+1 −1
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ parcelable ProtectedData { 
     *         unprotected: {

     *             5 : bstr .size 12       // IV

     *         },

     *         ciphertext: bstr,           // AES-GCM-128(K, .cbor ProtectedDataPayload)

     *         ciphertext: bstr,           // AES-GCM-256(K, .cbor ProtectedDataPayload)

     *         recipients : [

     *             [                       // COSE_Recipient

     *                 protected : bstr .cbor {