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Commit 71992070 authored by David Zeuthen's avatar David Zeuthen
Browse files

identity: VTS: allow for multiple interpretations of AuthKey validity. 

Bug: 271948315
Test: atest VtsHalIdentityTargetTest
Change-Id: Iedb9caad933b0df2b190915f5cc7177e507f15b5
parent 475bb11a

identity/aidl/vts/Util.cpp

+18 −2
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -523,8 +523,24 @@ void verifyAuthKeyCertificate(const vector<uint8_t>& authKeyCertChain) { 
    int64_t allowDriftSecs = 10;

    EXPECT_LE(-allowDriftSecs, diffSecs);

    EXPECT_GE(allowDriftSecs, diffSecs);

    constexpr uint64_t kSecsInOneYear = 365 * 24 * 60 * 60;

    EXPECT_EQ(notBefore + kSecsInOneYear, notAfter);



    // The AIDL spec used to call for "one year in the future (365

    // days)" but was updated to say "current time and 31536000

    // seconds in the future (approximately 365 days)" to clarify that

    // this was the original intention.

    //

    // However a number of implementations interpreted this as a

    // "literal year" which started causing problems in March 2023

    // because 2024 is a leap year. Since the extra day doesn't really

    // matter (the validity period is specified in the MSO anyway and

    // that's what RPs use), we allow both interpretations.

    //

    // For simplicity, we just require that that notAfter is after

    // 31536000 and which also covers the case if there's a leap-day

    // and possible leap-seconds.

    //

    constexpr uint64_t kSecsIn365Days = 365 * 24 * 60 * 60;

    EXPECT_LE(notBefore + kSecsIn365Days, notAfter);

}



vector<RequestNamespace> buildRequestNamespaces(const vector<TestEntryData> entries) {