Donate to e Foundation | Murena handsets with /e/OS | Own a part of Murena! Learn more

Commit 48bdd143 authored by Catherine Vlasov's avatar Catherine Vlasov Committed by Automerger Merge Worker
Browse files

Merge "Add strict equality check for VB key digest length on VSR-16+." into... 

Merge "Add strict equality check for VB key digest length on VSR-16+." into main am: 57d44a97 am: 47851ba3

Original change: https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/platform/hardware/interfaces/+/3350986



Change-Id: I1060959f50d999a776f96430f6ed9c7dd9e086d7
Signed-off-by: default avatarAutomerger Merge Worker <android-build-automerger-merge-worker@system.gserviceaccount.com>
parents 39a37430 47851ba3

security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp

+19 −6
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -1908,16 +1908,29 @@ void verify_root_of_trust(const vector<uint8_t>& verified_boot_key, bool device_ 
        }

    }



    if (get_vsr_api_level() > __ANDROID_API_V__) {

        // The Verified Boot key field should be exactly 32 bytes since it

        // contains the SHA-256 hash of the key on locked devices or 32 bytes

        // of zeroes on unlocked devices. This wasn't checked for earlier

        // versions of the KeyMint HAL, so only only be strict for VSR-16+.

        EXPECT_EQ(verified_boot_key.size(), 32);

    } else if (get_vsr_api_level() == __ANDROID_API_V__) {

        // The Verified Boot key field should be:

        //   - Exactly 32 bytes on locked devices since it should contain

        //     the SHA-256 hash of the key, or

        //   - Up to 32 bytes of zeroes on unlocked devices (behaviour on

        //     unlocked devices isn't specified in the HAL interface

        //     specification).

        // Thus, we can't check for strict equality in case unlocked devices

        // report values with less than 32 bytes. This wasn't checked for

        // earlier versions of the KeyMint HAL, so only check on VSR-15.

        EXPECT_LE(verified_boot_key.size(), 32);

    }



    // Verified Boot key should be all zeroes if the boot state is "orange".

    std::string empty_boot_key(32, '\0');

    std::string verified_boot_key_str((const char*)verified_boot_key.data(),

                                      verified_boot_key.size());

    if (get_vsr_api_level() >= __ANDROID_API_V__) {

        // The attestation should contain the SHA-256 hash of the verified boot

        // key.  However, this was not checked for earlier versions of the KeyMint

        // HAL so only be strict for VSR-V and above.

        EXPECT_LE(verified_boot_key.size(), 32);

    }

    EXPECT_NE(property_get("ro.boot.verifiedbootstate", property_value, ""), 0);

    if (!strcmp(property_value, "green")) {

        EXPECT_EQ(verified_boot_state, VerifiedBoot::VERIFIED);

security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/SecureElementProvisioningTest.cpp

+16 −4
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -114,10 +114,22 @@ class SecureElementProvisioningTest : public testing::Test { 
        const auto& vbKey = rot->asArray()->get(pos++);

        ASSERT_TRUE(vbKey);

        ASSERT_TRUE(vbKey->asBstr());

        if (get_vsr_api_level() >= __ANDROID_API_V__) {

            // The attestation should contain the SHA-256 hash of the verified boot

            // key.  However, this not was checked for earlier versions of the KeyMint

            // HAL so only be strict for VSR-V and above.

        if (get_vsr_api_level() > __ANDROID_API_V__) {

            // The Verified Boot key field should be exactly 32 bytes since it

            // contains the SHA-256 hash of the key on locked devices or 32 bytes

            // of zeroes on unlocked devices. This wasn't checked for earlier

            // versions of the KeyMint HAL, so only only be strict for VSR-16+.

            ASSERT_EQ(vbKey->asBstr()->value().size(), 32);

        } else if (get_vsr_api_level() == __ANDROID_API_V__) {

            // The Verified Boot key field should be:

            //   - Exactly 32 bytes on locked devices since it should contain

            //     the SHA-256 hash of the key, or

            //   - Up to 32 bytes of zeroes on unlocked devices (behaviour on

            //     unlocked devices isn't specified in the HAL interface

            //     specification).

            // Thus, we can't check for strict equality in case unlocked devices

            // report values with less than 32 bytes. This wasn't checked for

            // earlier versions of the KeyMint HAL, so only check on VSR-15.

            ASSERT_LE(vbKey->asBstr()->value().size(), 32);

        }