Merge "Identity Credential: Require passing applicationId when generating...

0589e410f519e36514e7ece18f283f022df0f70efd2c12821d822f67f74aba98 android.hardware.identity@1.0::types

bbeee9604128ede83ee755b67e73b5ad29e6e1dbac9ec41fea6ffe2745b0c50a android.hardware.identity@1.0::IIdentityCredential

96ce8aad80f4c476f25261f790d357c117e79e18474c7dadd850dac704bbe65e android.hardware.identity@1.0::IIdentityCredentialStore

6e1e28a96c90ba78d47257faea3f3bb4e6360affbbfa5822f0dc31211f9266ff android.hardware.identity@1.0::IWritableIdentityCredential

8da9c938e58f7d636ddd2f92c646f99d9a9e79612e6441b6380ab12744251873 android.hardware.identity@1.0::IWritableIdentityCredential

27ae3724053940462114228872b3ffaf0b8e6177d5ba97f5a76339d12b8a99dd android.hardware.keymaster@4.1::IKeymasterDevice

adb0efdf1462e9b2e742c0dcadd598666aac551f178be06e755bfcdf5797abd0 android.hardware.keymaster@4.1::IOperation

ac429fca0da4ce91218768ec31b64ded88251f8a26d8c4f27c06abdc5b1926d9 android.hardware.keymaster@4.1::types

     * characteristics to an issuing authority.  Must not be called more than once.

     *

     * The certificate chain must be generated using Keymaster Attestation

     * (see https://source.android.com/security/keystore/attestation) and must also

     * have the Tag::IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY tag from KeyMaster 4.1 set. This tag indicates

     * that this key is an Identity Credential key (which can only sign/MAC very

     * specific messages) and not an Android Keystore key (which can be used to sign/MAC

     * anything).

     * (see https://source.android.com/security/keystore/attestation) with the

     * following additional requirements:

     *

     *  - The attestationVersion field in the attestation extension must be at least 3.

     *

     *  - The attestationSecurityLevel field must be set to either Software (0),

     *    TrustedEnvironment (1), or StrongBox (2) depending on how attestation is

     *    implemented. Only the default AOSP implementation of this HAL may use

     *    value 0 (additionally, this implementation must not be used on production

     *    devices).

     *

     *  - The keymasterVersion field in the attestation extension must be set to (10*major + minor)

     *    where major and minor are the Identity Credential interface major and minor versions.

     *    Specifically for this version of the interface (1.0) this value is 10.

     *

     *  - The keymasterSecurityLevel field in the attestation extension must be set to

     *    either Software (0), TrustedEnvironment (1), or StrongBox (2) depending on how

     *    the Trusted Application backing the HAL implementation is implemented. Only

     *    the default AOSP implementation of this HAL may use value 0 (additionally, this

     *    implementation must not be used on production devices)

     *

     *  - The attestationChallenge field must be set to the passed-in challenge.

     *

     *  - The uniqueId field must be empty.

     *

     *  - The softwareEnforced field in the attestation extension must include

     *    Tag::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID which must be set to the bytes of the passed-in

     *    attestationApplicationId.

     *

     *  - The teeEnforced field in the attestation extension must include

     *    Tag::IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY. This tag indicates that the key is an Identity

     *    Credential key (which can only sign/MAC very specific messages) and not an Android

     *    Keystore key (which can be used to sign/MAC anything).

     *

     * Additional authorizations may be needed in the softwareEnforced and teeEnforced

     * fields - the above is not an exhaustive list.

     *

     * @param attestationApplicationId is the DER encoded value to be stored

     *     in Tag::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID. This schema is described in

     *     https://developer.android.com/training/articles/security-key-attestation#certificate_schema_attestationid

     *

     * @param attestationChallenge a challenge set by the issuer to ensure freshness.

     *

     * @return result is OK on success, FAILED if an error occurred.

     *

     * @return certificate is the X.509 certificate chain for the credentialKey

     * @return certificateChain is the X.509 certificate chain for the credentialKey

     */

    getAttestationCertificate(vec<uint8_t> attestationChallenge)

        generates(Result result, vec<uint8_t> certificate);

    getAttestationCertificate(vec<uint8_t> attestationApplicationId,

                              vec<uint8_t> attestationChallenge)

        generates(Result result, vec<vec<uint8_t>> certificateChain);

    /**

     * Start the personalization process.

    return true;

}

// TODO: use |attestationApplicationId| and |attestationChallenge| and also

//       ensure the returned certificate chain satisfy the requirements listed in

//       the docs for IWritableIdentityCredential::getAttestationCertificate()

//

Return<void> WritableIdentityCredential::getAttestationCertificate(

        const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& /* attestationApplicationId */,

        const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& /* attestationChallenge */,

        getAttestationCertificate_cb _hidl_cb) {

    // For now, we dynamically generate an attestion key on each and every

    certificateChain.insert(certificateChain.end(), attestationKeyCertificate.value().begin(),

                            attestationKeyCertificate.value().end());

    _hidl_cb(support::resultOK(), certificateChain);

    optional<vector<vector<uint8_t>>> splitCertChain =

            support::certificateChainSplit(certificateChain);

    if (!splitCertChain) {

        _hidl_cb(support::result(ResultCode::FAILED, "Error splitting certificate chain"), {});

        return Void();

    }

    hidl_vec<hidl_vec<uint8_t>> ret;

    ret.resize(splitCertChain.value().size());

    std::copy(splitCertChain.value().begin(), splitCertChain.value().end(), ret.begin());

    _hidl_cb(support::resultOK(), ret);

    return Void();

}

    // Methods from ::android::hardware::identity::IWritableIdentityCredential

    // follow.

    Return<void> getAttestationCertificate(const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& attestationChallenge,

    Return<void> getAttestationCertificate(const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& attestationApplicationId,

                                           const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& attestationChallenge,

                                           getAttestationCertificate_cb _hidl_cb) override;

    Return<void> startPersonalization(uint16_t accessControlProfileCount,

    ASSERT_NE(writableCredential, nullptr);

    string challenge = "attestationChallenge";

    // TODO: set it to something random and check it's in the cert chain

    vector<uint8_t> attestationApplicationId = {};

    vector<uint8_t> attestationChallenge(challenge.begin(), challenge.end());

    vector<uint8_t> attestationCertificate;

    writableCredential->getAttestationCertificate(

            attestationChallenge,

            [&](const Result& _result, const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& _attestationCertificate) {

            attestationApplicationId, attestationChallenge,

            [&](const Result& _result, const hidl_vec<hidl_vec<uint8_t>>& _splitCertChain) {

                result = _result;

                attestationCertificate = _attestationCertificate;

                vector<vector<uint8_t>> splitCerts;

                std::copy(_splitCertChain.begin(), _splitCertChain.end(),

                          std::back_inserter(splitCerts));

                attestationCertificate = support::certificateChainJoin(splitCerts);

            });

    EXPECT_EQ("", result.message);

    ASSERT_EQ(ResultCode::OK, result.code);