Add Trusted User Presence support to Keymaster HAL.

                                                * if device is still on-body (requires secure

                                                * on-body sensor. */

    /**

     * TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED is an optional feature that specifies that this key must be

     * unusable except when the user has provided proof of physical presence.  Proof of physical

     * presence must be a signal that cannot be triggered by an attacker who doesn't have one of:

     *

     *    a) Physical control of the device or

     *

     *    b) Control of the secure environment that holds the key.

     *

     * For instance, proof of user identity may be considered proof of presence if it meets the

     * requirements.  However, proof of identity established in one security domain (e.g. TEE) does

     * not constitute proof of presence in another security domain (e.g. StrongBox), and no

     * mechanism analogous to the authentication token is defined for communicating proof of

     * presence across security domains.

     *

     * Some examples:

     *

     *     A hardware button hardwired to a pin on a StrongBox device in such a way that nothing

     *     other than a button press can trigger the signal constitutes proof of physical presence

     *     for StrongBox keys.

     *

     *     Fingerprint authentication provides proof of presence (and identity) for TEE keys if the

     *     TEE has exclusive control of the fingerprint scanner and performs fingerprint matching.

     *

     *     Password authentication does not provide proof of presence to either TEE or StrongBox,

     *     even if TEE or StrongBox does the password matching, because password input is handled by

     *     the non-secure world, which means an attacker who has compromised Android can spoof

     *     password authentication.

     *

     * Note that no mechanism is defined for delivering proof of presence to Keymaster,

     * except perhaps as implied by an auth token.  This means that Keymaster must be able to check

     * proof of presence some other way.  Further, the proof of presence must be performed between

     * begin() and the first call to update() or finish().  If the first update() or the finish()

     * call is made without proof of presence, the keymaster method must return

     * ErrorCode::PROOF_OF_PRESENCE_REQUIRED and abort the operation.  The caller must delay the

     * update() or finish() call until proof of presence has been provided, which means the caller

     * must also have some mechanism for verifying that the proof has been provided.

     *

     * Only one operation requiring TUP may be in flight at a time.  If begin() has already been

     * called on one key with TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED, and another begin() comes in for that

     * key or another with TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED, Keymaster must return

     * ErrorCode::CONCURRENT_PROOF_OF_PRESENCE_REQUESTED.

     */

    TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED = TagType:BOOL | 507,

    /* Application access control */

    APPLICATION_ID = TagType:BYTES | 601, /* Byte string identifying the authorized application. */

    CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS = -66,

    ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE_UNAVAILABLE = -67,

    HARDWARE_TYPE_UNAVAILABLE = -68,

    PROOF_OF_PRESENCE_REQUIRED = -69,

    CONCURRENT_PROOF_OF_PRESENCE_REQUESTED = -70,

    UNIMPLEMENTED = -100,

    VERSION_MISMATCH = -101,

        case Tag::ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY:

        case Tag::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE:

        case Tag::RESET_SINCE_ID_ROTATION:

        case Tag::TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED:

            return true;

        /* Integer tags */