Loading security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp +6 −0 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -1792,6 +1792,12 @@ void verify_root_of_trust(const vector<uint8_t>& verified_boot_key, bool device_ std::string empty_boot_key(32, '\0'); std::string verified_boot_key_str((const char*)verified_boot_key.data(), verified_boot_key.size()); if (get_vsr_api_level() >= __ANDROID_API_V__) { // The attestation should contain the SHA-256 hash of the verified boot // key. However, this was not checked for earlier versions of the KeyMint // HAL so only be strict for VSR-V and above. EXPECT_LE(verified_boot_key.size(), 32); } EXPECT_NE(property_get("ro.boot.verifiedbootstate", property_value, ""), 0); if (!strcmp(property_value, "green")) { EXPECT_EQ(verified_boot_state, VerifiedBoot::VERIFIED); Loading security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/SecureElementProvisioningTest.cpp +6 −0 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -114,6 +114,12 @@ class SecureElementProvisioningTest : public testing::Test { const auto& vbKey = rot->asArray()->get(pos++); ASSERT_TRUE(vbKey); ASSERT_TRUE(vbKey->asBstr()); if (get_vsr_api_level() >= __ANDROID_API_V__) { // The attestation should contain the SHA-256 hash of the verified boot // key. However, this not was checked for earlier versions of the KeyMint // HAL so only be strict for VSR-V and above. ASSERT_LE(vbKey->asBstr()->value().size(), 32); } const auto& deviceLocked = rot->asArray()->get(pos++); ASSERT_TRUE(deviceLocked); Loading Loading
security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp +6 −0 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -1792,6 +1792,12 @@ void verify_root_of_trust(const vector<uint8_t>& verified_boot_key, bool device_ std::string empty_boot_key(32, '\0'); std::string verified_boot_key_str((const char*)verified_boot_key.data(), verified_boot_key.size()); if (get_vsr_api_level() >= __ANDROID_API_V__) { // The attestation should contain the SHA-256 hash of the verified boot // key. However, this was not checked for earlier versions of the KeyMint // HAL so only be strict for VSR-V and above. EXPECT_LE(verified_boot_key.size(), 32); } EXPECT_NE(property_get("ro.boot.verifiedbootstate", property_value, ""), 0); if (!strcmp(property_value, "green")) { EXPECT_EQ(verified_boot_state, VerifiedBoot::VERIFIED); Loading
security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/SecureElementProvisioningTest.cpp +6 −0 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -114,6 +114,12 @@ class SecureElementProvisioningTest : public testing::Test { const auto& vbKey = rot->asArray()->get(pos++); ASSERT_TRUE(vbKey); ASSERT_TRUE(vbKey->asBstr()); if (get_vsr_api_level() >= __ANDROID_API_V__) { // The attestation should contain the SHA-256 hash of the verified boot // key. However, this not was checked for earlier versions of the KeyMint // HAL so only be strict for VSR-V and above. ASSERT_LE(vbKey->asBstr()->value().size(), 32); } const auto& deviceLocked = rot->asArray()->get(pos++); ASSERT_TRUE(deviceLocked); Loading