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Commit 1c4fe4f9 authored by Seth Moore's avatar Seth Moore Committed by Automerger Merge Worker
Browse files

Update KeyMint VTS tests with prod GEEK am: 87eb1dd9 

Original change: https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/c/platform/hardware/interfaces/+/15080864

Change-Id: Iaa4cdfb2f7e1ad17ba6e672ea28731f8050b7f26
parents bd41532c 87eb1dd9

security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.cpp

+62 −87
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -103,8 +103,8 @@ ErrMsgOr<cppbor::Array> corrupt_sig(const cppbor::Array* coseSign1) { 
    return std::move(corruptSig);

}



ErrMsgOr<EekChain> corrupt_sig_chain(const EekChain& eek, int which) {

    auto [chain, _, parseErr] = cppbor::parse(eek.chain);

ErrMsgOr<bytevec> corrupt_sig_chain(const bytevec& encodedEekChain, int which) {

    auto [chain, _, parseErr] = cppbor::parse(encodedEekChain);

    if (!chain || !chain->asArray()) {

        return "EekChain parse failed";

    }
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ ErrMsgOr<EekChain> corrupt_sig_chain(const EekChain& eek, int which) { 
            corruptChain.add(eekChain->get(ii)->clone());

        }

    }

    return EekChain{corruptChain.encode(), eek.last_pubkey, eek.last_privkey};

    return corruptChain.encode();

}



string device_suffix(const string& name) {
@@ -272,14 +272,14 @@ TEST_P(GenerateKeyTests, generateEcdsaP256Key_testMode) { 
class CertificateRequestTest : public VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests {

  protected:

    CertificateRequestTest() : eekId_(string_to_bytevec("eekid")), challenge_(randomBytes(32)) {

        generateEek(3);

        generateTestEekChain(3);

    }



    void generateEek(size_t eekLength) {

    void generateTestEekChain(size_t eekLength) {

        auto chain = generateEekChain(eekLength, eekId_);

        EXPECT_TRUE(chain) << chain.message();

        if (chain) eekChain_ = chain.moveValue();

        eekLength_ = eekLength;

        if (chain) testEekChain_ = chain.moveValue();

        testEekLength_ = eekLength;

    }



    void generateKeys(bool testMode, size_t numKeys) {
@@ -309,7 +309,8 @@ class CertificateRequestTest : public VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests { 
        ASSERT_TRUE(senderPubkey) << senderPubkey.message();

        EXPECT_EQ(senderPubkey->second, eekId_);



        auto sessionKey = x25519_HKDF_DeriveKey(eekChain_.last_pubkey, eekChain_.last_privkey,

        auto sessionKey =

                x25519_HKDF_DeriveKey(testEekChain_.last_pubkey, testEekChain_.last_privkey,

                                      senderPubkey->first, false /* senderIsA */);

        ASSERT_TRUE(sessionKey) << sessionKey.message();
@@ -363,8 +364,8 @@ class CertificateRequestTest : public VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests { 
    }



    bytevec eekId_;

    size_t eekLength_;

    EekChain eekChain_;

    size_t testEekLength_;

    EekChain testEekChain_;

    bytevec challenge_;

    std::vector<MacedPublicKey> keysToSign_;

    cppbor::Array cborKeysToSign_;
@@ -378,13 +379,13 @@ TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, EmptyRequest_testMode) { 
    bool testMode = true;

    for (size_t eekLength : {2, 3, 7}) {

        SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "EEK of length " << eekLength);

        generateEek(eekLength);

        generateTestEekChain(eekLength);



        bytevec keysToSignMac;

        DeviceInfo deviceInfo;

        ProtectedData protectedData;

        auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(

                testMode, {} /* keysToSign */, eekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo,

                testMode, {} /* keysToSign */, testEekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo,

                &protectedData, &keysToSignMac);

        ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
@@ -400,24 +401,21 @@ TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, EmptyRequest_testMode) { 
 */

TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, NewKeyPerCallInTestMode) {

    constexpr bool testMode = true;

    constexpr size_t eekLength = 2;



    generateEek(eekLength);



    bytevec keysToSignMac;

    DeviceInfo deviceInfo;

    ProtectedData protectedData;

    auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(

            testMode, {} /* keysToSign */, eekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo, &protectedData,

            &keysToSignMac);

            testMode, {} /* keysToSign */, testEekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo,

            &protectedData, &keysToSignMac);

    ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();



    std::vector<BccEntryData> firstBcc;

    checkProtectedData(deviceInfo, /*keysToSign=*/cppbor::Array(), keysToSignMac, protectedData,

                       &firstBcc);



    status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(testMode, {} /* keysToSign */,

                                                        eekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo,

    status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(

            testMode, {} /* keysToSign */, testEekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo,

            &protectedData, &keysToSignMac);

    ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
@@ -435,28 +433,20 @@ TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, NewKeyPerCallInTestMode) { 
}



/**

 * Generate an empty certificate request in prod mode.  Generation will fail because we don't have a

 * valid GEEK.

 *

 * TODO(swillden): Get a valid GEEK and use it so the generation can succeed, though we won't be

 * able to decrypt.

 * Generate an empty certificate request in prod mode. This test must be run explicitly, and

 * is not run by default. Not all devices are GMS devices, and therefore they do not all

 * trust the Google EEK root.

 */

TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, EmptyRequest_prodMode) {

TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, DISABLED_EmptyRequest_prodMode) {

    bool testMode = false;

    for (size_t eekLength : {2, 3, 7}) {

        SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "EEK of length " << eekLength);

        generateEek(eekLength);



    bytevec keysToSignMac;

    DeviceInfo deviceInfo;

    ProtectedData protectedData;

    auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(

                testMode, {} /* keysToSign */, eekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo,

            testMode, {} /* keysToSign */, getProdEekChain(), challenge_, &deviceInfo,

            &protectedData, &keysToSignMac);

        EXPECT_FALSE(status.isOk());

        EXPECT_EQ(status.getServiceSpecificError(),

                  BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_INVALID_EEK);

    }

    EXPECT_TRUE(status.isOk());

}



/**
@@ -468,13 +458,13 @@ TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, NonEmptyRequest_testMode) { 


    for (size_t eekLength : {2, 3, 7}) {

        SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "EEK of length " << eekLength);

        generateEek(eekLength);

        generateTestEekChain(eekLength);



        bytevec keysToSignMac;

        DeviceInfo deviceInfo;

        ProtectedData protectedData;

        auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(

                testMode, keysToSign_, eekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo, &protectedData,

                testMode, keysToSign_, testEekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo, &protectedData,

                &keysToSignMac);

        ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
@@ -483,30 +473,21 @@ TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, NonEmptyRequest_testMode) { 
}



/**

 * Generate a non-empty certificate request in prod mode.  Must fail because we don't have a valid

 * GEEK.

 *

 * TODO(swillden): Get a valid GEEK and use it so the generation can succeed, though we won't be

 * able to decrypt.

 * Generate a non-empty certificate request in prod mode. This test must be run explicitly, and

 * is not run by default. Not all devices are GMS devices, and therefore they do not all

 * trust the Google EEK root.

 */

TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, NonEmptyRequest_prodMode) {

TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, DISABLED_NonEmptyRequest_prodMode) {

    bool testMode = false;

    generateKeys(testMode, 4 /* numKeys */);



    for (size_t eekLength : {2, 3, 7}) {

        SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "EEK of length " << eekLength);

        generateEek(eekLength);



    bytevec keysToSignMac;

    DeviceInfo deviceInfo;

    ProtectedData protectedData;

    auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(

                testMode, keysToSign_, eekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo, &protectedData,

            testMode, keysToSign_, getProdEekChain(), challenge_, &deviceInfo, &protectedData,

            &keysToSignMac);

        EXPECT_FALSE(status.isOk());

        EXPECT_EQ(status.getServiceSpecificError(),

                  BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_INVALID_EEK);

    }

    EXPECT_TRUE(status.isOk());

}



/**
@@ -521,8 +502,8 @@ TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, NonEmptyRequestCorruptMac_testMode) { 
    DeviceInfo deviceInfo;

    ProtectedData protectedData;

    auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(

            testMode, {keyWithCorruptMac}, eekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo, &protectedData,

            &keysToSignMac);

            testMode, {keyWithCorruptMac}, testEekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo,

            &protectedData, &keysToSignMac);

    ASSERT_FALSE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();

    EXPECT_EQ(status.getServiceSpecificError(), BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_INVALID_MAC);

}
@@ -531,7 +512,7 @@ TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, NonEmptyRequestCorruptMac_testMode) { 
 * Generate a non-empty certificate request in prod mode, but with the MAC corrupted on the keypair.

 */

TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, NonEmptyRequestCorruptMac_prodMode) {

    bool testMode = true;

    bool testMode = false;

    generateKeys(testMode, 1 /* numKeys */);

    MacedPublicKey keyWithCorruptMac = corrupt_maced_key(keysToSign_[0]).moveValue();
@@ -539,38 +520,35 @@ TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, NonEmptyRequestCorruptMac_prodMode) { 
    DeviceInfo deviceInfo;

    ProtectedData protectedData;

    auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(

            testMode, {keyWithCorruptMac}, eekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo, &protectedData,

            &keysToSignMac);

            testMode, {keyWithCorruptMac}, getProdEekChain(), challenge_, &deviceInfo,

            &protectedData, &keysToSignMac);

    ASSERT_FALSE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();

    auto rc = status.getServiceSpecificError();



    // TODO(drysdale): drop the INVALID_EEK potential error code when a real GEEK is available.

    EXPECT_TRUE(rc == BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_INVALID_EEK ||

                rc == BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_INVALID_MAC);

    EXPECT_EQ(status.getServiceSpecificError(), BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_INVALID_MAC);

}



/**

 * Generate a non-empty certificate request in prod mode that has a corrupt EEK chain.

 * Confirm that the request is rejected.

 *

 * TODO(drysdale): Update to use a valid GEEK, so that the test actually confirms that the

 * implementation is checking signatures.

 */

TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, NonEmptyCorruptEekRequest_prodMode) {

    bool testMode = false;

    generateKeys(testMode, 4 /* numKeys */);



    for (size_t ii = 0; ii < eekLength_; ii++) {

        auto chain = corrupt_sig_chain(eekChain_, ii);

    auto prodEekChain = getProdEekChain();

    auto [parsedChain, _, parseErr] = cppbor::parse(prodEekChain);

    ASSERT_NE(parsedChain, nullptr) << parseErr;

    ASSERT_NE(parsedChain->asArray(), nullptr);



    for (int ii = 0; ii < parsedChain->asArray()->size(); ++ii) {

        auto chain = corrupt_sig_chain(prodEekChain, ii);

        ASSERT_TRUE(chain) << chain.message();

        EekChain corruptEek = chain.moveValue();



        bytevec keysToSignMac;

        DeviceInfo deviceInfo;

        ProtectedData protectedData;

        auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(

                testMode, keysToSign_, corruptEek.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo, &protectedData,

                &keysToSignMac);

        auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(testMode, keysToSign_, *chain,

                                                                 challenge_, &deviceInfo,

                                                                 &protectedData, &keysToSignMac);

        ASSERT_FALSE(status.isOk());

        ASSERT_EQ(status.getServiceSpecificError(),

                  BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_INVALID_EEK);
@@ -580,9 +558,6 @@ TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, NonEmptyCorruptEekRequest_prodMode) { 
/**

 * Generate a non-empty certificate request in prod mode that has an incomplete EEK chain.

 * Confirm that the request is rejected.

 *

 * TODO(drysdale): Update to use a valid GEEK, so that the test actually confirms that the

 * implementation is checking signatures.

 */

TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, NonEmptyIncompleteEekRequest_prodMode) {

    bool testMode = false;
@@ -590,7 +565,7 @@ TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, NonEmptyIncompleteEekRequest_prodMode) { 


    // Build an EEK chain that omits the first self-signed cert.

    auto truncatedChain = cppbor::Array();

    auto [chain, _, parseErr] = cppbor::parse(eekChain_.chain);

    auto [chain, _, parseErr] = cppbor::parse(getProdEekChain());

    ASSERT_TRUE(chain);

    auto eekChain = chain->asArray();

    ASSERT_NE(eekChain, nullptr);
@@ -619,7 +594,7 @@ TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, NonEmptyRequest_prodKeyInTestCert) { 
    DeviceInfo deviceInfo;

    ProtectedData protectedData;

    auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(

            true /* testMode */, keysToSign_, eekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo,

            true /* testMode */, keysToSign_, testEekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo,

            &protectedData, &keysToSignMac);

    ASSERT_FALSE(status.isOk());

    ASSERT_EQ(status.getServiceSpecificError(),
@@ -637,7 +612,7 @@ TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, NonEmptyRequest_testKeyInProdCert) { 
    DeviceInfo deviceInfo;

    ProtectedData protectedData;

    auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(

            false /* testMode */, keysToSign_, eekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo,

            false /* testMode */, keysToSign_, testEekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo,

            &protectedData, &keysToSignMac);

    ASSERT_FALSE(status.isOk());

    ASSERT_EQ(status.getServiceSpecificError(),