Add basic testing for KeyMint certs. (0e80b5d1) · Commits · e / os / android_hardware_interfaces

security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp

+55 −1

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ using std::optional;
		os << "(Empty)" << ::std::endl;
		else {
		os << "\n";
		for (size_t i = 0; i < set.size(); ++i) os << set[i] << ::std::endl;
		for (auto& entry : set) os << entry << ::std::endl;
		}
		return os;
		}
		@@ -131,6 +131,17 @@ ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::GenerateKey(const AuthorizationSet& key_desc,
		*key_blob = std::move(creationResult.keyBlob);
		*key_characteristics = std::move(creationResult.keyCharacteristics);
		cert_chain_ = std::move(creationResult.certificateChain);

		auto algorithm = key_desc.GetTagValue(TAG_ALGORITHM);
		EXPECT_TRUE(algorithm);
		if (algorithm &&
		(algorithm.value() == Algorithm::RSA \|\| algorithm.value() == Algorithm::EC)) {
		EXPECT_GE(cert_chain_.size(), 1);
		if (key_desc.Contains(TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE)) EXPECT_GT(cert_chain_.size(), 1);
		} else {
		// For symmetric keys there should be no certificates.
		EXPECT_EQ(cert_chain_.size(), 0);
		}
		}

		return GetReturnErrorCode(result);
		@@ -162,6 +173,17 @@ ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::ImportKey(const AuthorizationSet& key_desc, KeyFo
		*key_blob = std::move(creationResult.keyBlob);
		*key_characteristics = std::move(creationResult.keyCharacteristics);
		cert_chain_ = std::move(creationResult.certificateChain);

		auto algorithm = key_desc.GetTagValue(TAG_ALGORITHM);
		EXPECT_TRUE(algorithm);
		if (algorithm &&
		(algorithm.value() == Algorithm::RSA \|\| algorithm.value() == Algorithm::EC)) {
		EXPECT_GE(cert_chain_.size(), 1);
		if (key_desc.Contains(TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE)) EXPECT_GT(cert_chain_.size(), 1);
		} else {
		// For symmetric keys there should be no certificates.
		EXPECT_EQ(cert_chain_.size(), 0);
		}
		}

		return GetReturnErrorCode(result);
		@@ -195,6 +217,20 @@ ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::ImportWrappedKey(string wrapped_key, string wrapp
		key_blob_ = std::move(creationResult.keyBlob);
		key_characteristics_ = std::move(creationResult.keyCharacteristics);
		cert_chain_ = std::move(creationResult.certificateChain);

		AuthorizationSet allAuths;
		for (auto& entry : key_characteristics_) {
		allAuths.push_back(AuthorizationSet(entry.authorizations));
		}
		auto algorithm = allAuths.GetTagValue(TAG_ALGORITHM);
		EXPECT_TRUE(algorithm);
		if (algorithm &&
		(algorithm.value() == Algorithm::RSA \|\| algorithm.value() == Algorithm::EC)) {
		EXPECT_GE(cert_chain_.size(), 1);
		} else {
		// For symmetric keys there should be no certificates.
		EXPECT_EQ(cert_chain_.size(), 0);
		}
		}

		return GetReturnErrorCode(result);
		@@ -788,6 +824,24 @@ const vector<KeyParameter>& KeyMintAidlTestBase::SecLevelAuthorizations(
		return (found == key_characteristics.end()) ? kEmptyAuthList : found->authorizations;
		}

		const vector<KeyParameter>& KeyMintAidlTestBase::HwEnforcedAuthorizations(
		const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& key_characteristics) {
		auto found =
		std::find_if(key_characteristics.begin(), key_characteristics.end(), [](auto& entry) {
		return entry.securityLevel == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX \|\|
		entry.securityLevel == SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT;
		});
		return (found == key_characteristics.end()) ? kEmptyAuthList : found->authorizations;
		}

		const vector<KeyParameter>& KeyMintAidlTestBase::SwEnforcedAuthorizations(
		const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& key_characteristics) {
		auto found = std::find_if(
		key_characteristics.begin(), key_characteristics.end(),
		[](auto& entry) { return entry.securityLevel == SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE; });
		return (found == key_characteristics.end()) ? kEmptyAuthList : found->authorizations;
		}

		} // namespace test

		} // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint

security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h

+12 −4

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -27,7 +27,11 @@

		#include <keymint_support/authorization_set.h>

		namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::test {
		namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint {

		::std::ostream& operator<<(::std::ostream& os, const AuthorizationSet& set);

		namespace test {

		using ::android::sp;
		using Status = ::ndk::ScopedAStatus;
		@@ -37,8 +41,6 @@ using ::std::vector;

		constexpr uint64_t kOpHandleSentinel = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF;

		::std::ostream& operator<<(::std::ostream& os, const AuthorizationSet& set);

		class KeyMintAidlTestBase : public ::testing::TestWithParam<string> {
		public:
		void SetUp() override;
		@@ -173,6 +175,10 @@ class KeyMintAidlTestBase : public ::testing::TestWithParam<string> {
		inline const vector<KeyParameter>& SecLevelAuthorizations() {
		return SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics_);
		}
		const vector<KeyParameter>& HwEnforcedAuthorizations(
		const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& key_characteristics);
		const vector<KeyParameter>& SwEnforcedAuthorizations(
		const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& key_characteristics);

		private:
		std::shared_ptr<IKeyMintDevice> keymint_;
		@@ -190,4 +196,6 @@ class KeyMintAidlTestBase : public ::testing::TestWithParam<string> {
		testing::ValuesIn(KeyMintAidlTestBase::build_params()), \
		::android::PrintInstanceNameToString)

		} // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::test
		} // namespace test

		} // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint

security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp

+319 −13

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -180,9 +180,280 @@ struct RSA_Delete {
		void operator()(RSA* p) { RSA_free(p); }
		};

		/* TODO(seleneh) add attestation verification codes like verify_chain() and
		* attestation tests after we decided on the keymint 1 attestation changes.
		*/
		char nibble2hex[16] = {'0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7',
		'8', '9', 'a', 'b', 'c', 'd', 'e', 'f'};

		string bin2hex(const vector<uint8_t>& data) {
		string retval;
		retval.reserve(data.size() * 2 + 1);
		for (uint8_t byte : data) {
		retval.push_back(nibble2hex[0x0F & (byte >> 4)]);
		retval.push_back(nibble2hex[0x0F & byte]);
		}
		return retval;
		}

		X509* parse_cert_blob(const vector<uint8_t>& blob) {
		const uint8_t* p = blob.data();
		return d2i_X509(nullptr, &p, blob.size());
		}

		bool verify_chain(const vector<Certificate>& chain) {
		for (size_t i = 0; i < chain.size(); ++i) {
		X509_Ptr key_cert(parse_cert_blob(chain[i].encodedCertificate));
		X509_Ptr signing_cert;
		if (i < chain.size() - 1) {
		signing_cert.reset(parse_cert_blob(chain[i + 1].encodedCertificate));
		} else {
		signing_cert.reset(parse_cert_blob(chain[i].encodedCertificate));
		}
		EXPECT_TRUE(!!key_cert.get() && !!signing_cert.get());
		if (!key_cert.get() \|\| !signing_cert.get()) return false;

		EVP_PKEY_Ptr signing_pubkey(X509_get_pubkey(signing_cert.get()));
		EXPECT_TRUE(!!signing_pubkey.get());
		if (!signing_pubkey.get()) return false;

		EXPECT_EQ(1, X509_verify(key_cert.get(), signing_pubkey.get()))
		<< "Verification of certificate " << i << " failed "
		<< "OpenSSL error string: " << ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL);

		char* cert_issuer = //
		X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(key_cert.get()), nullptr, 0);
		char* signer_subj =
		X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(signing_cert.get()), nullptr, 0);
		EXPECT_STREQ(cert_issuer, signer_subj) << "Cert " << i << " has wrong issuer.";
		if (i == 0) {
		char* cert_sub = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(key_cert.get()), nullptr, 0);
		EXPECT_STREQ("/CN=Android Keystore Key", cert_sub)
		<< "Cert " << i << " has wrong subject.";
		OPENSSL_free(cert_sub);
		}

		OPENSSL_free(cert_issuer);
		OPENSSL_free(signer_subj);

		if (dump_Attestations) std::cout << bin2hex(chain[i].encodedCertificate) << std::endl;
		}

		return true;
		}

		// Extract attestation record from cert. Returned object is still part of cert; don't free it
		// separately.
		ASN1_OCTET_STRING* get_attestation_record(X509* certificate) {
		ASN1_OBJECT_Ptr oid(OBJ_txt2obj(kAttestionRecordOid, 1 /* dotted string format */));
		EXPECT_TRUE(!!oid.get());
		if (!oid.get()) return nullptr;

		int location = X509_get_ext_by_OBJ(certificate, oid.get(), -1 /* search from beginning */);
		EXPECT_NE(-1, location) << "Attestation extension not found in certificate";
		if (location == -1) return nullptr;

		X509_EXTENSION* attest_rec_ext = X509_get_ext(certificate, location);
		EXPECT_TRUE(!!attest_rec_ext)
		<< "Found attestation extension but couldn't retrieve it? Probably a BoringSSL bug.";
		if (!attest_rec_ext) return nullptr;

		ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attest_rec = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(attest_rec_ext);
		EXPECT_TRUE(!!attest_rec) << "Attestation extension contained no data";
		return attest_rec;
		}

		bool tag_in_list(const KeyParameter& entry) {
		// Attestations don't contain everything in key authorization lists, so we need to filter
		// the key lists to produce the lists that we expect to match the attestations.
		auto tag_list = {
		Tag::BLOB_USAGE_REQUIREMENTS, //
		Tag::CREATION_DATETIME, //
		Tag::EC_CURVE,
		Tag::HARDWARE_TYPE,
		Tag::INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID,
		};
		return std::find(tag_list.begin(), tag_list.end(), entry.tag) != tag_list.end();
		}

		AuthorizationSet filtered_tags(const AuthorizationSet& set) {
		AuthorizationSet filtered;
		std::remove_copy_if(set.begin(), set.end(), std::back_inserter(filtered), tag_in_list);
		return filtered;
		}

		bool avb_verification_enabled() {
		char value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
		return property_get("ro.boot.vbmeta.device_state", value, "") != 0;
		}

		bool verify_attestation_record(const string& challenge, //
		const string& app_id, //
		AuthorizationSet expected_sw_enforced, //
		AuthorizationSet expected_hw_enforced, //
		SecurityLevel security_level,
		const vector<uint8_t>& attestation_cert) {
		X509_Ptr cert(parse_cert_blob(attestation_cert));
		EXPECT_TRUE(!!cert.get());
		if (!cert.get()) return false;

		ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attest_rec = get_attestation_record(cert.get());
		EXPECT_TRUE(!!attest_rec);
		if (!attest_rec) return false;

		AuthorizationSet att_sw_enforced;
		AuthorizationSet att_hw_enforced;
		uint32_t att_attestation_version;
		uint32_t att_keymaster_version;
		SecurityLevel att_attestation_security_level;
		SecurityLevel att_keymaster_security_level;
		vector<uint8_t> att_challenge;
		vector<uint8_t> att_unique_id;
		vector<uint8_t> att_app_id;

		auto error = parse_attestation_record(attest_rec->data, //
		attest_rec->length, //
		&att_attestation_version, //
		&att_attestation_security_level, //
		&att_keymaster_version, //
		&att_keymaster_security_level, //
		&att_challenge, //
		&att_sw_enforced, //
		&att_hw_enforced, //
		&att_unique_id);
		EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, error);
		if (error != ErrorCode::OK) return false;

		EXPECT_GE(att_attestation_version, 3U);

		expected_sw_enforced.push_back(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID,
		vector<uint8_t>(app_id.begin(), app_id.end()));

		EXPECT_GE(att_keymaster_version, 4U);
		EXPECT_EQ(security_level, att_keymaster_security_level);
		EXPECT_EQ(security_level, att_attestation_security_level);

		EXPECT_EQ(challenge.length(), att_challenge.size());
		EXPECT_EQ(0, memcmp(challenge.data(), att_challenge.data(), challenge.length()));

		char property_value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX] = {};
		// TODO(b/136282179): When running under VTS-on-GSI the TEE-backed
		// keymaster implementation will report YYYYMM dates instead of YYYYMMDD
		// for the BOOT_PATCH_LEVEL.
		if (avb_verification_enabled()) {
		for (int i = 0; i < att_hw_enforced.size(); i++) {
		if (att_hw_enforced[i].tag == TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL \|\|
		att_hw_enforced[i].tag == TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL) {
		std::string date =
		std::to_string(att_hw_enforced[i].value.get<KeyParameterValue::dateTime>());
		// strptime seems to require delimiters, but the tag value will
		// be YYYYMMDD
		date.insert(6, "-");
		date.insert(4, "-");
		EXPECT_EQ(date.size(), 10);
		struct tm time;
		strptime(date.c_str(), "%Y-%m-%d", &time);

		// Day of the month (0-31)
		EXPECT_GE(time.tm_mday, 0);
		EXPECT_LT(time.tm_mday, 32);
		// Months since Jan (0-11)
		EXPECT_GE(time.tm_mon, 0);
		EXPECT_LT(time.tm_mon, 12);
		// Years since 1900
		EXPECT_GT(time.tm_year, 110);
		EXPECT_LT(time.tm_year, 200);
		}
		}
		}

		// Check to make sure boolean values are properly encoded. Presence of a boolean tag indicates
		// true. A provided boolean tag that can be pulled back out of the certificate indicates correct
		// encoding. No need to check if it's in both lists, since the AuthorizationSet compare below
		// will handle mismatches of tags.
		if (security_level == SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE) {
		EXPECT_TRUE(expected_sw_enforced.Contains(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED));
		} else {
		EXPECT_TRUE(expected_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED));
		}

		// Alternatively this checks the opposite - a false boolean tag (one that isn't provided in
		// the authorization list during key generation) isn't being attested to in the certificate.
		EXPECT_FALSE(expected_sw_enforced.Contains(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED));
		EXPECT_FALSE(att_sw_enforced.Contains(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED));
		EXPECT_FALSE(expected_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED));
		EXPECT_FALSE(att_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED));

		if (att_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC)) {
		// For ECDSA keys, either an EC_CURVE or a KEY_SIZE can be specified, but one must be.
		EXPECT_TRUE(att_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_EC_CURVE) \|\|
		att_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE));
		}

		// Test root of trust elements
		vector<uint8_t> verified_boot_key;
		VerifiedBoot verified_boot_state;
		bool device_locked;
		vector<uint8_t> verified_boot_hash;
		error = parse_root_of_trust(attest_rec->data, attest_rec->length, &verified_boot_key,
		&verified_boot_state, &device_locked, &verified_boot_hash);
		EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, error);

		if (avb_verification_enabled()) {
		EXPECT_NE(property_get("ro.boot.vbmeta.digest", property_value, ""), 0);
		string prop_string(property_value);
		EXPECT_EQ(prop_string.size(), 64);
		EXPECT_EQ(prop_string, bin2hex(verified_boot_hash));

		EXPECT_NE(property_get("ro.boot.vbmeta.device_state", property_value, ""), 0);
		if (!strcmp(property_value, "unlocked")) {
		EXPECT_FALSE(device_locked);
		} else {
		EXPECT_TRUE(device_locked);
		}

		// Check that the device is locked if not debuggable, e.g., user build
		// images in CTS. For VTS, debuggable images are used to allow adb root
		// and the device is unlocked.
		if (!property_get_bool("ro.debuggable", false)) {
		EXPECT_TRUE(device_locked);
		} else {
		EXPECT_FALSE(device_locked);
		}
		}

		// Verified boot key should be all 0's if the boot state is not verified or self signed
		std::string empty_boot_key(32, '\0');
		std::string verified_boot_key_str((const char*)verified_boot_key.data(),
		verified_boot_key.size());
		EXPECT_NE(property_get("ro.boot.verifiedbootstate", property_value, ""), 0);
		if (!strcmp(property_value, "green")) {
		EXPECT_EQ(verified_boot_state, VerifiedBoot::VERIFIED);
		EXPECT_NE(0, memcmp(verified_boot_key.data(), empty_boot_key.data(),
		verified_boot_key.size()));
		} else if (!strcmp(property_value, "yellow")) {
		EXPECT_EQ(verified_boot_state, VerifiedBoot::SELF_SIGNED);
		EXPECT_NE(0, memcmp(verified_boot_key.data(), empty_boot_key.data(),
		verified_boot_key.size()));
		} else if (!strcmp(property_value, "orange")) {
		EXPECT_EQ(verified_boot_state, VerifiedBoot::UNVERIFIED);
		EXPECT_EQ(0, memcmp(verified_boot_key.data(), empty_boot_key.data(),
		verified_boot_key.size()));
		} else if (!strcmp(property_value, "red")) {
		EXPECT_EQ(verified_boot_state, VerifiedBoot::FAILED);
		} else {
		EXPECT_EQ(verified_boot_state, VerifiedBoot::UNVERIFIED);
		EXPECT_NE(0, memcmp(verified_boot_key.data(), empty_boot_key.data(),
		verified_boot_key.size()));
		}

		att_sw_enforced.Sort();
		expected_sw_enforced.Sort();
		EXPECT_EQ(filtered_tags(expected_sw_enforced), filtered_tags(att_sw_enforced));

		att_hw_enforced.Sort();
		expected_hw_enforced.Sort();
		EXPECT_EQ(filtered_tags(expected_hw_enforced), filtered_tags(att_hw_enforced));

		return true;
		}

		std::string make_string(const uint8_t* data, size_t length) {
		return std::string(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(data), length);
		@@ -288,6 +559,51 @@ TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, Rsa) {
		}
		}

		/*
		* NewKeyGenerationTest.Rsa
		*
		* Verifies that keymint can generate all required RSA key sizes, and that the resulting keys
		* have correct characteristics.
		*/
		TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, RsaWithAttestation) {
		for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::RSA)) {
		auto challenge = "hello";
		auto app_id = "foo";

		vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
		vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
		ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
		.RsaSigningKey(key_size, 65537)
		.Digest(Digest::NONE)
		.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
		.AttestationChallenge(challenge)
		.AttestationApplicationId(app_id)
		.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED),
		&key_blob, &key_characteristics));

		ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
		CheckBaseParams(key_characteristics);

		AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);

		EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::RSA));
		EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
		<< "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
		EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, 65537U));

		EXPECT_TRUE(verify_chain(cert_chain_));
		ASSERT_GT(cert_chain_.size(), 0);

		AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
		AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
		EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(challenge, app_id, //
		sw_enforced, hw_enforced, SecLevel(),
		cert_chain_[0].encodedCertificate));

		CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
		}
		}

		/*
		* NewKeyGenerationTest.NoInvalidRsaSizes
		*
		@@ -3895,16 +4211,6 @@ TEST_P(AddEntropyTest, AddLargeEntropy) {

		INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(AddEntropyTest);

		typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase AttestationTest;

		/*
		* AttestationTest.RsaAttestation
		*
		* Verifies that attesting to RSA keys works and generates the expected output.
		*/
		// TODO(seleneh) add attestation tests back after decided on the new attestation
		// behavior under generateKey and importKey

		typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase KeyDeletionTest;

		/**

security/keymint/support/include/keymint_support/authorization_set.h

+20 −0

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -259,6 +259,12 @@ class AuthorizationSetBuilder : public AuthorizationSet {
		size - 1); // drop the terminating '\0'
		}

		template <Tag tag>
		AuthorizationSetBuilder& Authorization(TypedTag<TagType::BYTES, tag> ttag,
		const std::string& data) {
		return Authorization(ttag, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(data.data()), data.size());
		}

		AuthorizationSetBuilder& Authorizations(const AuthorizationSet& set) {
		for (const auto& entry : set) {
		push_back(entry);
		@@ -294,6 +300,20 @@ class AuthorizationSetBuilder : public AuthorizationSet {
		AuthorizationSetBuilder& Digest(std::vector<Digest> digests);
		AuthorizationSetBuilder& Padding(std::initializer_list<PaddingMode> paddings);

		AuthorizationSetBuilder& AttestationChallenge(const std::string& challenge) {
		return Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE, challenge);
		}
		AuthorizationSetBuilder& AttestationChallenge(std::vector<uint8_t> challenge) {
		return Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE, challenge);
		}

		AuthorizationSetBuilder& AttestationApplicationId(const std::string& id) {
		return Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, id);
		}
		AuthorizationSetBuilder& AttestationApplicationId(std::vector<uint8_t> id) {
		return Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, id);
		}

		template <typename... T>
		AuthorizationSetBuilder& BlockMode(T&&... a) {
		return BlockMode({std::forward<T>(a)...});