Merge "Update Identity Credential HAL docs." into rvc-dev

enum CipherSuite {

    /**

     * Specifies that the cipher suite that will be used to secure communications between the reader

     * is:

     * and the prover is using the following primitives

     *

     * - ECDHE with HKDF-SHA-256 for key agreement.

     * - AES-256 with GCM block mode for authenticated encryption (nonces are incremented by

     *   one for every message).

     * - ECDSA with SHA-256 for signing (used for signing session transcripts to defeat

     *   man-in-the-middle attacks), signing keys are not ephemeral.

     *  - ECKA-DH (Elliptic Curve Key Agreement Algorithm - Diffie-Hellman, see BSI TR-03111)

     *  - HKDF-SHA-256 (see RFC 5869)

     *  - AES-256-GCM (see NIST SP 800-38D)

     *  - HMAC-SHA-256 (see RFC 2104)

     *

     * The exact way these primitives are combined to derive the session key is specified in

     * section 9.2.1.4 of ISO/IEC 18013-5 (see description of cipher suite '1').

     *

     * At present this is the only supported cipher suite and it is mandatory for all

     * implementations to support it.

     * with the reader.  The reason for generating the key pair in the secure environment is so that

     * the secure environment knows what public key to expect to find in the session transcript.

     *

     * The generated key must be an EC key using the P-256 curve.

     *

     * This method may only be called once per instance. If called more than once, STATUS_FAILED

     * will be returned.

     *

     * This method may only be called once per instance. If called more than once, STATUS_FAILED

     * will be returned.

     *

     * @param publicKey contains the reader's ephemeral public key, in uncompressed form.

     * @param publicKey contains the reader's ephemeral public key, in uncompressed

     *        form (e.g. 0x04 || X || Y).

     */

    void setReaderEphemeralPublicKey(in byte[] publicKey);

     * This method be called after createEphemeralKeyPair(), setReaderEphemeralPublicKey(),

     * createAuthChallenge() and before startRetrieveEntry(). This method call is followed by

     * multiple calls of startRetrieveEntryValue(), retrieveEntryValue(), and finally

     * finishRetrieval().This whole process is called a "credential presentation".

     * finishRetrieval().

     *

     * It is permissible to perform multiple credential presentations using the same instance (e.g.

     * It is permissible to perform data retrievals multiple times using the same instance (e.g.

     * startRetrieval(), then multiple calls of startRetrieveEntryValue(), retrieveEntryValue(),

     * then finally finishRetrieval()) but if this is done, the sessionTranscript parameter

     * must be identical for each startRetrieval() invocation. If this is not the case, this call

     *     EReaderKeyBytes = #6.24(bstr .cbor EReaderKey.Pub)

     *     ItemsRequestBytes = #6.24(bstr .cbor ItemsRequest)

     *

     *     EReaderKey.Pub = COSE_Key    ; Ephemeral public key provided by reader

     *

     * The public key corresponding to the key used to made signature, can be found in the

     * 'x5chain' unprotected header element of the COSE_Sign1 structure (as as described

     * in 'draft-ietf-cose-x509-04'). There will be at least one certificate in said element

     *

     * It is permissible to keep retrieving values if an access control check fails.

     *

     * @param nameSpace is the namespace of the element, e.g. "org.iso.18013"

     * @param nameSpace is the namespace of the element, e.g. "org.iso.18013.5.1"

     *

     * @param name is the name of the element.

     * @param name is the name of the element, e.g. "driving_privileges".

     *

     * @param entrySize is the size of the entry value, if it's a text string or a byte string.

     *     It must be zero if the entry value is an integer or boolean. If this requirement

     *     is not met the call fails with STATUS_INVALID_DATA.

     * @param entrySize is the size of the entry value encoded in CBOR.

     *

     * @param accessControlProfileIds specifies the set of access control profiles that can

     *     authorize access to the provisioned element. If an identifier of a profile

     * @param out mac is empty if signingKeyBlob or the sessionTranscript passed to

     *    startRetrieval() is empty. Otherwise it is a COSE_Mac0 with empty payload

     *    and the detached content is set to DeviceAuthentication as defined below.

     *    The key used for the MAC operation is EMacKey and is derived as follows:

     *

     *     KDF(ECDH(SDeviceKey.Priv, EReaderKey.Pub))

     *

     *    where SDeviceKey.Priv is the key identified by signingKeyBlob. The KDF

     *    and ECDH functions shall be the same as the ciphersuite selected and

     *    passed to IIdentityStore.getCredential(). The EMacKey shall be derived

     *    using a salt of 0x00.

     *    This code is produced by using the key agreement and key derivation function

     *    from the ciphersuite with the authentication private key and the reader

     *    ephemeral public key to compute a shared message authentication code (MAC)

     *    key, then using the MAC function from the ciphersuite to compute a MAC of

     *    the authenticated data. See section 9.2.3.5 of ISO/IEC 18013-5 for details

     *    of this operation.

     *

     *        DeviceAuthentication = [

     *            "DeviceAuthentication",

    /**

     * Generate a key pair to be used for signing session data and retrieved data items.

     *

     * The generated key must be an EC key using the P-256 curve.

     *

     * This method shall return just a single X.509 certificate which is signed by CredentialKey.

     * When combined with the certificate chain returned at provisioning time by

     * getAttestationCertificate() on IWritableIdentityCredential (for the credential key), this

     * forms a chain all the way from the root of trust to the generated key.

     *

     * The public part of a signing key is usually included in issuer-signed data and is

     * used for anti-cloning purposes or as a mechanism for the issuer to attest to data

     * generated on the device.

     *

     * The following non-optional fields for the X.509 certificate shall be set as follows:

     *

     *  - version: INTEGER 2 (means v3 certificate).

     *

     *  - serialNumber: INTEGER 1 (fixed value: same on all certs).

     *

     *  - signature: must be set to ECDSA.

     *

     *  - subject: CN shall be set to "Android Identity Credential Authentication Key".

     *

     *  - issuer: shall be set to "credentialStoreName (credentialStoreAuthorName)" using the

     *    values returned in HardwareInformation.

     *

     *  - validity: should be from current time and one year in the future.

     *

     *  - subjectPublicKeyInfo: must contain attested public key.

     *

     * @param out signingKeyBlob contains an encrypted copy of the newly-generated private

     *     signing key.

     *

 *

 * - For each namespase, a set of name/value pairs, each with an associated set of access control

 *   profile IDs.  Names are UTF-8 strings of up to 256 bytes in length (most should be much

 *   shorter).  Values stored must be encoed as valid CBOR (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7049) and

 *   the encoeded size is is limited to at most 512 KiB.

 *   shorter).  Values stored must be encoded as CBOR (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7049) and

 *   the encoded size is is limited to at most 512 KiB.

 *

 * - A set of access control profiles, each with a profile ID and a specification of the

 *   conditions which satisfy the profile's requirements.

@VintfStability

interface IIdentityCredentialStore {

    /**

     * Success.

     * Success. This is never returned but included for completeness and for use by code

     * using these statuses for internal use.

     */

    const int STATUS_OK = 0;

    HardwareInformation getHardwareInformation();

    /**

     * createCredential creates a new Credential.  When a Credential is created, two cryptographic

     * createCredential creates a new credential.  When a credential is created, two cryptographic

     * keys are created: StorageKey, an AES key used to secure the externalized Credential

     * contents, and CredentialKeyPair, an EC key pair used to authenticate the store to the IA.  In

     * addition, all of the Credential data content is imported and a certificate for the

     * CredentialKeyPair and a signature produced with the CredentialKeyPair are created.  These

     * contents, and CredentialKey, an EC key pair used to authenticate the store to the IA.

     *

     * CredentialKey must be an EC key using the P-256 curve.

     *

     * In addition, all of the Credential data content is imported and a certificate for the

     * CredentialKey and a signature produced with the CredentialKey are created.  These

     * latter values may be checked by an issuing authority to verify that the data was imported

     * into secure hardware and that it was imported unmodified.

     *

     * @param docType is an optional name (may be an empty string) that identifies the type of

     *     credential being created, e.g. "org.iso.18013-5.2019.mdl" (the doc type of the ISO

     *     credential being created, e.g. "org.iso.18013.5.1.mDL" (the doc type of the ISO

     *     driving license standard).

     *

     * @param testCredential indicates if this is a test store.  Test credentials must use an

     * Credential.

     *

     * The cipher suite used to communicate with the remote verifier must also be specified. Currently

     * only a single cipher-suite is supported and the details of this are as follow:

     *

     *  - ECDHE with HKDF-SHA-256 for key agreement.

     *  - AES-256 with GCM block mode for authenticated encryption (nonces are incremented by one

     *    for every message).

     *  - ECDSA with SHA-256 for signing (used for signing session transcripts to defeat

     *    man-in-the-middle attacks), signing keys are not ephemeral.

     *

     * Support for other cipher suites may be added in a future version of this HAL.

     * only a single cipher-suite is supported. Support for other cipher suites may be added in a

     * future version of this HAL.

     *

     * This method fails with STATUS_INVALID_DATA if the passed in credentialData cannot be

     * decoded or decrypted.

     *     return argument of the same name in finishAddingEntries(), in

     *     IWritableIdentityCredential.

     *

     * @return an IIdentityCredential HIDL interface that provides operations on the Credential.

     * @return an IIdentityCredential interface that provides operations on the Credential.

     */

    IIdentityCredential getCredential(in CipherSuite cipherSuite, in byte[] credentialData);

}

     *    attestationApplicationId.

     *

     *  - The teeEnforced field in the attestation extension must include

     *    Tag::IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY. This tag indicates that the key is an Identity

     *

     *    - Tag::IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY which indicates that the key is an Identity

     *      Credential key (which can only sign/MAC very specific messages) and not an Android

     *      Keystore key (which can be used to sign/MAC anything).

     *

     *    - Tag::PURPOSE must be set to SIGN

     *

     *    - Tag::KEY_SIZE must be set to the appropriate key size, in bits (e.g. 256)

     *

     *    - Tag::ALGORITHM must be set to EC

     *

     *    - Tag::NO_AUTH_REQUIRED must be set

     *

     *    - Tag::DIGEST must be set to SHA_2_256

     *

     *    - Tag::EC_CURVE must be set to P_256

     *

     * Additional authorizations may be needed in the softwareEnforced and teeEnforced

     * fields - the above is not an exhaustive list.

     * fields - the above is not an exhaustive list. Specifically, authorizations containing

     * information about the root of trust, OS version, verified boot state, and so on should

     * be included.

     *

     * Since the chain is required to be generated using Keymaster Attestation, the returned

     * certificate chain has the following properties:

     *

     *  - The certificate chain is of at least length three.

     *

     *  - The root of trust is the same as for Keymaster Attestation. This is usually

     *    a certificate owned by Google but depending on the specific Android device it may

     *    be another certificate.

     *

     * As with any user of attestation, the Issuing Authority (as a relying party) wishing

     * to issue a credential to a device using these APIs, must carefully examine the

     * returned certificate chain for all of the above (and more). In particular, the Issuing

     * Authority should check the root of trust, verified boot state, patch level,

     * application id, etc.

     *

     * This all depends on the needs of the Issuing Authority and the kind of credential but

     * in general an Issuing Authority should never issue a credential to a device without

     * verified boot enabled, to an unrecognized application, or if it appears the device

     * hasn't been updated for a long time.

     *

     * See https://github.com/google/android-key-attestation for an example of how to

     * examine attestations generated from Android devices.

     *

     * @param attestationApplicationId is the DER encoded value to be stored

     *     in Tag::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID. This schema is described in

     *     be used to reference the profile. If this is not satisfied the call fails with

     *     STATUS_INVALID_DATA.

     *

     * @param readerCertificate if non-empty, specifies a X.509 certificate (or chain of

     * @param readerCertificate if non-empty, specifies a single X.509 certificate (not a chain of

     *     certificates) that must be used to authenticate requests (see the readerSignature

     *     parameter in IIdentityCredential.startRetrieval).

     *

     * @param accessControlProfileIds specifies the set of access control profiles that can

     *     authorize access to the provisioned element.

     *

     * @param nameSpace is the namespace of the element, e.g. "org.iso.18013"

     * @param nameSpace is the namespace of the element, e.g. "org.iso.18013.5.1"

     *

     * @param name is the name of the element.

     *

    /**

     * readerCertificate, if non-empty, specifies a single X.509 certificate (not a chain

     * of certificates) that must be used to authenticate requests. For details about how

     * this is done, see the readerSignature paremter of IIdentityCredential.startRetrieval.

     * this is done, see the readerSignature parameter of IIdentityCredential.startRetrieval.

     */

    Certificate readerCertificate;