Merge changes from topic "ag-wire" into main am: 0a44da8589 am: dfa3f73729 am: fbbf579b56 (0c86e7cd) · Commits · e / os / android_hardware_interfaces

security/authgraph/aidl/vts/functional/Android.bp

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		@@ -46,3 +46,36 @@ cc_test {
		"vts",
		],
		}

		rust_test {
		name: "VtsAidlAuthGraphRoleTest",
		srcs: ["role_test.rs"],
		test_suites: [
		"general-tests",
		"vts",
		],
		defaults: [
		"authgraph_use_latest_hal_aidl_rust",
		],
		rustlibs: [
		"libauthgraph_vts_test",
		"libbinder_rs",
		],
		}

		rust_library {
		name: "libauthgraph_vts_test",
		crate_name: "authgraph_vts_test",
		srcs: ["lib.rs"],
		defaults: [
		"authgraph_use_latest_hal_aidl_rust",
		],
		rustlibs: [
		"libauthgraph_boringssl",
		"libauthgraph_core",
		"libauthgraph_hal",
		"libauthgraph_nonsecure",
		"libbinder_rs",
		"libcoset",
		],
		}

security/authgraph/aidl/vts/functional/lib.rs

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		/*
		* Copyright (C) 2023 The Android Open Source Project
		*
		* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
		* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
		* You may obtain a copy of the License at
		*
		* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
		*
		* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
		* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
		* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
		* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
		* limitations under the License.
		*/

		//! VTS test library for AuthGraph functionality.
		//!
		//! This test code is bundled as a library, not as `[cfg(test)]`, to allow it to be
		//! re-used inside the (Rust) VTS tests of components that use AuthGraph.

		use android_hardware_security_authgraph::aidl::android::hardware::security::authgraph::{
		Error::Error, IAuthGraphKeyExchange::IAuthGraphKeyExchange, Identity::Identity,
		PlainPubKey::PlainPubKey, PubKey::PubKey, SessionIdSignature::SessionIdSignature,
		};
		use authgraph_boringssl as boring;
		use authgraph_core::keyexchange as ke;
		use authgraph_core::{arc, key, traits};
		use authgraph_nonsecure::StdClock;
		use coset::CborSerializable;

		pub mod sink;
		pub mod source;

		/// Return a collection of AuthGraph trait implementations suitable for testing.
		pub fn test_impls() -> traits::TraitImpl {
		// Note that the local implementation is using a clock with a potentially different epoch than
		// the implementation under test.
		boring::trait_impls(
		Box::<boring::test_device::AgDevice>::default(),
		Some(Box::new(StdClock::default())),
		)
		}

		fn build_plain_pub_key(pub_key: &Option<Vec<u8>>) -> PubKey {
		PubKey::PlainKey(PlainPubKey {
		plainPubKey: pub_key.clone().unwrap(),
		})
		}

		fn extract_plain_pub_key(pub_key: &Option<PubKey>) -> &PlainPubKey {
		match pub_key {
		Some(PubKey::PlainKey(pub_key)) => pub_key,
		Some(PubKey::SignedKey(_)) => panic!("expect unsigned public key"),
		None => panic!("expect pubKey to be populated"),
		}
		}

		fn verification_key_from_identity(impls: &traits::TraitImpl, identity: &[u8]) -> key::EcVerifyKey {
		let identity = key::Identity::from_slice(identity).expect("invalid identity CBOR");
		impls
		.device
		.process_peer_cert_chain(&identity.cert_chain, &*impls.ecdsa)
		.expect("failed to extract signing key")
		}

		fn vec_to_identity(data: &[u8]) -> Identity {
		Identity {
		identity: data.to_vec(),
		}
		}

		fn vec_to_signature(data: &[u8]) -> SessionIdSignature {
		SessionIdSignature {
		signature: data.to_vec(),
		}
		}

		/// Decrypt a pair of AES-256 keys encrypted with the AuthGraph PBK.
		pub fn decipher_aes_keys(imp: &traits::TraitImpl, arc: &[Vec<u8>; 2]) -> [key::AesKey; 2] {
		[
		decipher_aes_key(imp, &arc[0]),
		decipher_aes_key(imp, &arc[1]),
		]
		}

		/// Decrypt an AES-256 key encrypted with the AuthGraph PBK.
		pub fn decipher_aes_key(imp: &traits::TraitImpl, arc: &[u8]) -> key::AesKey {
		let pbk = imp.device.get_per_boot_key().expect("no PBK available");
		let arc::ArcContent {
		payload,
		protected_headers: _,
		unprotected_headers: _,
		} = arc::decipher_arc(&pbk, arc, &*imp.aes_gcm).expect("failed to decrypt arc");
		assert_eq!(payload.0.len(), 32);
		let mut key = key::AesKey([0; 32]);
		key.0.copy_from_slice(&payload.0);
		assert_ne!(key.0, [0; 32], "agreed AES-256 key should be non-zero");
		key
		}

security/authgraph/aidl/vts/functional/role_test.rs

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		/*
		* Copyright (C) 2023 The Android Open Source Project
		*
		* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
		* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
		* You may obtain a copy of the License at
		*
		* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
		*
		* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
		* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
		* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
		* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
		* limitations under the License.
		*/

		//! Tests of individual AuthGraph role (source or sink) functionality.

		#![cfg(test)]

		use authgraph_vts_test as vts;
		use android_hardware_security_authgraph::aidl::android::hardware::security::authgraph::{
		IAuthGraphKeyExchange::IAuthGraphKeyExchange,
		};

		const AUTH_GRAPH_NONSECURE: &str =
		"android.hardware.security.authgraph.IAuthGraphKeyExchange/nonsecure";

		/// Retrieve the /nonsecure instance of AuthGraph, which supports both sink and source roles.
		fn get_nonsecure() -> Option<binder::Strong<dyn IAuthGraphKeyExchange>> {
		binder::get_interface(AUTH_GRAPH_NONSECURE).ok()
		}

		/// Macro to require availability of a /nonsecure instance of AuthGraph.
		///
		/// Note that this macro triggers `return` if not found.
		macro_rules! require_nonsecure {
		{} => {
		match get_nonsecure() {
		Some(v) => v,
		None => {
		eprintln!("Skipping test as no /nonsecure impl found");
		return;
		}
		}
		}
		}

		#[test]
		fn test_nonsecure_source_mainline() {
		let mut impls = vts::test_impls();
		vts::source::test_mainline(&mut impls, require_nonsecure!());
		}
		#[test]
		fn test_nonsecure_source_corrupt_sig() {
		let mut impls = vts::test_impls();
		vts::source::test_corrupt_sig(&mut impls, require_nonsecure!());
		}
		#[test]
		fn test_nonsecure_source_corrupt_keys() {
		let mut impls = vts::test_impls();
		vts::source::test_corrupt_key(&mut impls, require_nonsecure!());
		}
		#[test]
		fn test_nonsecure_sink_mainline() {
		let mut impls = vts::test_impls();
		vts::sink::test_mainline(&mut impls, require_nonsecure!());
		}
		#[test]
		fn test_nonsecure_sink_corrupt_sig() {
		let mut impls = vts::test_impls();
		vts::sink::test_corrupt_sig(&mut impls, require_nonsecure!());
		}
		#[test]
		fn test_nonsecure_sink_corrupt_keys() {
		let mut impls = vts::test_impls();
		vts::sink::test_corrupt_keys(&mut impls, require_nonsecure!());
		}

security/authgraph/aidl/vts/functional/sink.rs

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		/*
		* Copyright (C) 2023 The Android Open Source Project
		*
		* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
		* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
		* You may obtain a copy of the License at
		*
		* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
		*
		* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
		* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
		* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
		* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
		* limitations under the License.
		*/

		//! VTS tests for sinks
		use super::*;
		use authgraph_core::traits;

		/// Run AuthGraph tests against the provided sink, using a local test source implementation.
		pub fn test(impls: &mut traits::TraitImpl, sink: binder::Strong<dyn IAuthGraphKeyExchange>) {
		test_mainline(impls, sink.clone());
		test_corrupt_sig(impls, sink.clone());
		test_corrupt_keys(impls, sink);
		}

		/// Perform mainline AuthGraph key exchange with the provided sink and local implementation.
		/// Return the agreed AES keys in plaintext.
		pub fn test_mainline(
		impls: &mut traits::TraitImpl,
		sink: binder::Strong<dyn IAuthGraphKeyExchange>,
		) -> [key::AesKey; 2] {
		// Step 1: create an ephemeral ECDH key at the (local) source.
		let source_init_info = ke::create(impls).expect("failed to create() with local impl");

		// Step 2: pass the source's ECDH public key and other session info to the (remote) sink.
		let init_result = sink
		.init(
		&build_plain_pub_key(&source_init_info.ke_key.pub_key),
		&vec_to_identity(&source_init_info.identity),
		&source_init_info.nonce,
		source_init_info.version,
		)
		.expect("failed to init() with remote impl");
		let sink_init_info = init_result.sessionInitiationInfo;
		let sink_pub_key = extract_plain_pub_key(&sink_init_info.key.pubKey);

		let sink_info = init_result.sessionInfo;
		assert!(!sink_info.sessionId.is_empty());

		// The AuthGraph core library will verify the session ID signature, but do it here too.
		let sink_verification_key =
		verification_key_from_identity(&impls, &sink_init_info.identity.identity);
		ke::verify_signature_on_session_id(
		&sink_verification_key,
		&sink_info.sessionId,
		&sink_info.signature.signature,
		&*impls.ecdsa,
		)
		.expect("failed verification of signed session ID");

		// Step 3: pass the sink's ECDH public key and other session info to the (local) source, so it
		// can calculate the same pair of symmetric keys.
		let source_info = ke::finish(
		impls,
		&sink_pub_key.plainPubKey,
		&sink_init_info.identity.identity,
		&sink_info.signature.signature,
		&sink_init_info.nonce,
		sink_init_info.version,
		source_init_info.ke_key,
		)
		.expect("failed to finish() with local impl");
		assert!(!source_info.session_id.is_empty());

		// The AuthGraph core library will verify the session ID signature, but do it here too.
		let source_verification_key =
		verification_key_from_identity(&impls, &source_init_info.identity);
		ke::verify_signature_on_session_id(
		&source_verification_key,
		&source_info.session_id,
		&source_info.session_id_signature,
		&*impls.ecdsa,
		)
		.expect("failed verification of signed session ID");

		// Both ends should agree on the session ID.
		assert_eq!(source_info.session_id, sink_info.sessionId);

		// Step 4: pass the (local) source's session ID signature back to the sink, so it can check it
		// and update the symmetric keys so they're marked as authentication complete.
		let _sink_arcs = sink
		.authenticationComplete(
		&vec_to_signature(&source_info.session_id_signature),
		&sink_info.sharedKeys,
		)
		.expect("failed to authenticationComplete() with remote sink");

		// Decrypt and return the session keys.
		decipher_aes_keys(&impls, &source_info.shared_keys)
		}

		/// Perform mainline AuthGraph key exchange with the provided sink, but provide an invalid
		/// session ID signature.
		pub fn test_corrupt_sig(
		impls: &mut traits::TraitImpl,
		sink: binder::Strong<dyn IAuthGraphKeyExchange>,
		) {
		// Step 1: create an ephemeral ECDH key at the (local) source.
		let source_init_info = ke::create(impls).expect("failed to create() with local impl");

		// Step 2: pass the source's ECDH public key and other session info to the (remote) sink.
		let init_result = sink
		.init(
		&build_plain_pub_key(&source_init_info.ke_key.pub_key),
		&vec_to_identity(&source_init_info.identity),
		&source_init_info.nonce,
		source_init_info.version,
		)
		.expect("failed to init() with remote impl");
		let sink_init_info = init_result.sessionInitiationInfo;
		let sink_pub_key = extract_plain_pub_key(&sink_init_info.key.pubKey);

		let sink_info = init_result.sessionInfo;
		assert!(!sink_info.sessionId.is_empty());

		// Step 3: pass the sink's ECDH public key and other session info to the (local) source, so it
		// can calculate the same pair of symmetric keys.
		let source_info = ke::finish(
		impls,
		&sink_pub_key.plainPubKey,
		&sink_init_info.identity.identity,
		&sink_info.signature.signature,
		&sink_init_info.nonce,
		sink_init_info.version,
		source_init_info.ke_key,
		)
		.expect("failed to finish() with local impl");
		assert!(!source_info.session_id.is_empty());

		// Build a corrupted version of the (local) source's session ID signature.
		let mut corrupt_signature = source_info.session_id_signature.clone();
		let sig_len = corrupt_signature.len();
		corrupt_signature[sig_len - 1] ^= 0x01;

		// Step 4: pass the (local) source's invalid session ID signature back to the sink,
		// which should reject it.
		let result =
		sink.authenticationComplete(&vec_to_signature(&corrupt_signature), &sink_info.sharedKeys);
		let err = result.expect_err("expect failure with corrupt signature");
		assert_eq!(
		err,
		binder::Status::new_service_specific_error(Error::INVALID_SIGNATURE.0, None)
		);
		}

		/// Perform mainline AuthGraph key exchange with the provided sink, but provide an invalid
		/// Arc for the sink's key.
		pub fn test_corrupt_keys(
		impls: &mut traits::TraitImpl,
		sink: binder::Strong<dyn IAuthGraphKeyExchange>,
		) {
		// Step 1: create an ephemeral ECDH key at the (local) source.
		let source_init_info = ke::create(impls).expect("failed to create() with local impl");

		// Step 2: pass the source's ECDH public key and other session info to the (remote) sink.
		let init_result = sink
		.init(
		&build_plain_pub_key(&source_init_info.ke_key.pub_key),
		&vec_to_identity(&source_init_info.identity),
		&source_init_info.nonce,
		source_init_info.version,
		)
		.expect("failed to init() with remote impl");
		let sink_init_info = init_result.sessionInitiationInfo;
		let sink_pub_key = extract_plain_pub_key(&sink_init_info.key.pubKey);

		let sink_info = init_result.sessionInfo;
		assert!(!sink_info.sessionId.is_empty());

		// Step 3: pass the sink's ECDH public key and other session info to the (local) source, so it
		// can calculate the same pair of symmetric keys.
		let source_info = ke::finish(
		impls,
		&sink_pub_key.plainPubKey,
		&sink_init_info.identity.identity,
		&sink_info.signature.signature,
		&sink_init_info.nonce,
		sink_init_info.version,
		source_init_info.ke_key,
		)
		.expect("failed to finish() with local impl");
		assert!(!source_info.session_id.is_empty());

		// Deliberately corrupt the sink's shared key Arcs before returning them
		let mut corrupt_keys = sink_info.sharedKeys.clone();
		let len0 = corrupt_keys[0].arc.len();
		let len1 = corrupt_keys[1].arc.len();
		corrupt_keys[0].arc[len0 - 1] ^= 0x01;
		corrupt_keys[1].arc[len1 - 1] ^= 0x01;

		// Step 4: pass the (local) source's session ID signature back to the sink, but with corrupted
		// keys, which should be rejected.
		let result = sink.authenticationComplete(
		&vec_to_signature(&source_info.session_id_signature),
		&corrupt_keys,
		);
		let err = result.expect_err("expect failure with corrupt keys");
		assert_eq!(
		err,
		binder::Status::new_service_specific_error(Error::INVALID_SHARED_KEY_ARCS.0, None)
		);
		}

security/authgraph/aidl/vts/functional/source.rs

0 → 100644

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		/*
		* Copyright (C) 2023 The Android Open Source Project
		*
		* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
		* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
		* You may obtain a copy of the License at
		*
		* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
		*
		* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
		* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
		* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
		* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
		* limitations under the License.
		*/

		//! VTS tests for sources
		use super::*;
		use authgraph_core::traits;

		/// Run AuthGraph tests against the provided source, using a local test sink implementation.
		pub fn test(impls: &mut traits::TraitImpl, source: binder::Strong<dyn IAuthGraphKeyExchange>) {
		test_mainline(impls, source.clone());
		test_corrupt_sig(impls, source.clone());
		test_corrupt_key(impls, source);
		}

		/// Perform mainline AuthGraph key exchange with the provided source.
		/// Return the agreed AES keys in plaintext.
		pub fn test_mainline(
		impls: &mut traits::TraitImpl,
		source: binder::Strong<dyn IAuthGraphKeyExchange>,
		) -> [key::AesKey; 2] {
		// Step 1: create an ephemeral ECDH key at the (remote) source.
		let source_init_info = source
		.create()
		.expect("failed to create() with remote impl");
		assert!(source_init_info.key.pubKey.is_some());
		assert!(source_init_info.key.arcFromPBK.is_some());
		let source_pub_key = extract_plain_pub_key(&source_init_info.key.pubKey);

		// Step 2: pass the source's ECDH public key and other session info to the (local) sink.
		let init_result = ke::init(
		impls,
		&source_pub_key.plainPubKey,
		&source_init_info.identity.identity,
		&source_init_info.nonce,
		source_init_info.version,
		)
		.expect("failed to init() with local impl");
		let sink_init_info = init_result.session_init_info;
		let sink_pub_key = sink_init_info
		.ke_key
		.pub_key
		.expect("expect pub_key to be populated");

		let sink_info = init_result.session_info;
		assert!(!sink_info.session_id.is_empty());

		// The AuthGraph core library will verify the session ID signature, but do it here too.
		let sink_verification_key = verification_key_from_identity(&impls, &sink_init_info.identity);
		ke::verify_signature_on_session_id(
		&sink_verification_key,
		&sink_info.session_id,
		&sink_info.session_id_signature,
		&*impls.ecdsa,
		)
		.expect("failed verification of signed session ID");

		// Step 3: pass the sink's ECDH public key and other session info to the (remote) source, so it
		// can calculate the same pair of symmetric keys.
		let source_info = source
		.finish(
		&PubKey::PlainKey(PlainPubKey {
		plainPubKey: sink_pub_key,
		}),
		&Identity {
		identity: sink_init_info.identity,
		},
		&vec_to_signature(&sink_info.session_id_signature),
		&sink_init_info.nonce,
		sink_init_info.version,
		&source_init_info.key,
		)
		.expect("failed to finish() with remote impl");
		assert!(!source_info.sessionId.is_empty());

		// The AuthGraph core library will verify the session ID signature, but do it here too.
		let source_verification_key =
		verification_key_from_identity(&impls, &source_init_info.identity.identity);
		ke::verify_signature_on_session_id(
		&source_verification_key,
		&source_info.sessionId,
		&source_info.signature.signature,
		&*impls.ecdsa,
		)
		.expect("failed verification of signed session ID");

		// Both ends should agree on the session ID.
		assert_eq!(source_info.sessionId, sink_info.session_id);

		// Step 4: pass the (remote) source's session ID signature back to the sink, so it can check it
		// and update the symmetric keys so they're marked as authentication complete.
		let sink_arcs = ke::authentication_complete(
		impls,
		&source_info.signature.signature,
		sink_info.shared_keys,
		)
		.expect("failed to authenticationComplete() with local sink");

		// Decrypt and return the session keys.
		decipher_aes_keys(&impls, &sink_arcs)
		}

		/// Perform mainline AuthGraph key exchange with the provided source, but provide an invalid session
		/// ID signature.
		pub fn test_corrupt_sig(
		impls: &mut traits::TraitImpl,
		source: binder::Strong<dyn IAuthGraphKeyExchange>,
		) {
		// Step 1: create an ephemeral ECDH key at the (remote) source.
		let source_init_info = source
		.create()
		.expect("failed to create() with remote impl");
		assert!(source_init_info.key.pubKey.is_some());
		assert!(source_init_info.key.arcFromPBK.is_some());
		let source_pub_key = extract_plain_pub_key(&source_init_info.key.pubKey);

		// Step 2: pass the source's ECDH public key and other session info to the (local) sink.
		let init_result = ke::init(
		impls,
		&source_pub_key.plainPubKey,
		&source_init_info.identity.identity,
		&source_init_info.nonce,
		source_init_info.version,
		)
		.expect("failed to init() with local impl");
		let sink_init_info = init_result.session_init_info;
		let sink_pub_key = sink_init_info
		.ke_key
		.pub_key
		.expect("expect pub_key to be populated");
		let sink_info = init_result.session_info;
		assert!(!sink_info.session_id.is_empty());

		// Deliberately corrupt the sink's session ID signature.
		let mut corrupt_signature = sink_info.session_id_signature.clone();
		let sig_len = corrupt_signature.len();
		corrupt_signature[sig_len - 1] ^= 0x01;

		// Step 3: pass the sink's ECDH public key and other session info to the (remote) source, so it
		// can calculate the same pair of symmetric keys.
		let result = source.finish(
		&PubKey::PlainKey(PlainPubKey {
		plainPubKey: sink_pub_key,
		}),
		&Identity {
		identity: sink_init_info.identity,
		},
		&vec_to_signature(&corrupt_signature),
		&sink_init_info.nonce,
		sink_init_info.version,
		&source_init_info.key,
		);
		let err = result.expect_err("expect failure with corrupt signature");
		assert_eq!(
		err,
		binder::Status::new_service_specific_error(Error::INVALID_SIGNATURE.0, None)
		);
		}

		/// Perform mainline AuthGraph key exchange with the provided source, but give it back
		/// a corrupted key.
		pub fn test_corrupt_key(
		impls: &mut traits::TraitImpl,
		source: binder::Strong<dyn IAuthGraphKeyExchange>,
		) {
		// Step 1: create an ephemeral ECDH key at the (remote) source.
		let source_init_info = source
		.create()
		.expect("failed to create() with remote impl");
		assert!(source_init_info.key.pubKey.is_some());
		assert!(source_init_info.key.arcFromPBK.is_some());
		let source_pub_key = extract_plain_pub_key(&source_init_info.key.pubKey);

		// Step 2: pass the source's ECDH public key and other session info to the (local) sink.
		let init_result = ke::init(
		impls,
		&source_pub_key.plainPubKey,
		&source_init_info.identity.identity,
		&source_init_info.nonce,
		source_init_info.version,
		)
		.expect("failed to init() with local impl");
		let sink_init_info = init_result.session_init_info;
		let sink_pub_key = sink_init_info
		.ke_key
		.pub_key
		.expect("expect pub_key to be populated");

		let sink_info = init_result.session_info;
		assert!(!sink_info.session_id.is_empty());

		// The AuthGraph core library will verify the session ID signature, but do it here too.
		let sink_verification_key = verification_key_from_identity(&impls, &sink_init_info.identity);
		ke::verify_signature_on_session_id(
		&sink_verification_key,
		&sink_info.session_id,
		&sink_info.session_id_signature,
		&*impls.ecdsa,
		)
		.expect("failed verification of signed session ID");

		// Deliberately corrupt the source's encrypted key.
		let mut corrupt_key = source_init_info.key.clone();
		match &mut corrupt_key.arcFromPBK {
		Some(a) => {
		let len = a.arc.len();
		a.arc[len - 1] ^= 0x01;
		}
		None => panic!("no arc data"),
		}

		// Step 3: pass the sink's ECDH public key and other session info to the (remote) source, but
		// give it back a corrupted version of its own key.
		let result = source.finish(
		&PubKey::PlainKey(PlainPubKey {
		plainPubKey: sink_pub_key,
		}),
		&Identity {
		identity: sink_init_info.identity,
		},
		&vec_to_signature(&sink_info.session_id_signature),
		&sink_init_info.nonce,
		sink_init_info.version,
		&corrupt_key,
		);

		let err = result.expect_err("expect failure with corrupt signature");
		assert_eq!(
		err,
		binder::Status::new_service_specific_error(Error::INVALID_PRIV_KEY_ARC_IN_KEY.0, None)
		);
		}