Loading security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl +6 −6 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -196,12 +196,12 @@ import android.hardware.security.secureclock.TimeStampToken; * derive a key that is used to encrypt the private/secret key material. * * The root of trust consists of a bitstring that must be derived from the public key used by * Verified Boot to verify the signature on the boot image and from the lock state of the * device. If the public key is changed to allow a different system image to be used or if the * lock state is changed, then all of the IKeyMintDevice-protected keys created by the previous * system state must be unusable, unless the previous state is restored. The goal is to increase * the value of the software-enforced key access controls by making it impossible for an attacker- * installed operating system to use IKeyMintDevice keys. * Verified Boot to verify the signature on the boot image, from the lock state and from the * Verified Boot state of the device. If the public key is changed to allow a different system * image to be used or if the lock state is changed, then all of the IKeyMintDevice-protected keys * created by the previous system state must be unusable, unless the previous state is restored. * The goal is to increase the value of the software-enforced key access controls by making it * impossible for an attacker-installed operating system to use IKeyMintDevice keys. * * == Version Binding == * Loading Loading
security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl +6 −6 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -196,12 +196,12 @@ import android.hardware.security.secureclock.TimeStampToken; * derive a key that is used to encrypt the private/secret key material. * * The root of trust consists of a bitstring that must be derived from the public key used by * Verified Boot to verify the signature on the boot image and from the lock state of the * device. If the public key is changed to allow a different system image to be used or if the * lock state is changed, then all of the IKeyMintDevice-protected keys created by the previous * system state must be unusable, unless the previous state is restored. The goal is to increase * the value of the software-enforced key access controls by making it impossible for an attacker- * installed operating system to use IKeyMintDevice keys. * Verified Boot to verify the signature on the boot image, from the lock state and from the * Verified Boot state of the device. If the public key is changed to allow a different system * image to be used or if the lock state is changed, then all of the IKeyMintDevice-protected keys * created by the previous system state must be unusable, unless the previous state is restored. * The goal is to increase the value of the software-enforced key access controls by making it * impossible for an attacker-installed operating system to use IKeyMintDevice keys. * * == Version Binding == * Loading