Merge "Update KM4 VTS tests to allow s/w implementation to pass." am: 1cba34ebd4 (097aaee8) · Commits · e / os / android_hardware_interfaces

keymaster/4.0/support/attestation_record.cpp

+13 −12

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -321,19 +321,20 @@ ErrorCode parse_root_of_trust(const uint8_t* asn1_key_desc, size_t asn1_key_desc
		LOG(ERROR) << AT << "Failed record parsing";
		return ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR;
		}
		if (!record->tee_enforced) {
		LOG(ERROR) << AT << "Failed hardware characteristic parsing";
		return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT;
		}
		if (!record->tee_enforced->root_of_trust) {

		KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST* root_of_trust = nullptr;
		if (record->tee_enforced && record->tee_enforced->root_of_trust) {
		root_of_trust = record->tee_enforced->root_of_trust;
		} else if (record->software_enforced && record->software_enforced->root_of_trust) {
		root_of_trust = record->software_enforced->root_of_trust;
		} else {
		LOG(ERROR) << AT << " Failed root of trust parsing";
		return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT;
		}
		if (!record->tee_enforced->root_of_trust->verified_boot_key) {
		if (!root_of_trust->verified_boot_key) {
		LOG(ERROR) << AT << " Failed verified boot key parsing";
		return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT;
		}
		KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST* root_of_trust = record->tee_enforced->root_of_trust;

		auto& vb_key = root_of_trust->verified_boot_key;
		verified_boot_key->resize(vb_key->length);

keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/KeymasterHidlTest.cpp

+27 −19

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ namespace test {
		using namespace std::literals::chrono_literals;

		void KeymasterHidlTest::InitializeKeymaster() {
		std::string instance_name = GetParam();
		keymaster_ = IKeymasterDevice::getService(GetParam());
		ASSERT_NE(keymaster_, nullptr);

		@@ -127,7 +128,7 @@ ErrorCode KeymasterHidlTest::ImportWrappedKey(string wrapped_key, string wrappin
		string masking_key,
		const AuthorizationSet& unwrapping_params) {
		ErrorCode error;
		ImportKey(wrapping_key_desc, KeyFormat::PKCS8, wrapping_key);
		EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(wrapping_key_desc, KeyFormat::PKCS8, wrapping_key));
		EXPECT_TRUE(keymaster_
		->importWrappedKey(HidlBuf(wrapped_key), key_blob_, HidlBuf(masking_key),
		unwrapping_params.hidl_data(), 0 /* passwordSid */,
		@@ -196,7 +197,9 @@ void KeymasterHidlTest::CheckGetCharacteristics(const HidlBuf& key_blob, const H
		HidlBuf empty_buf = {};
		EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
		GetCharacteristics(key_blob, client_id, app_data, key_characteristics));
		if (SecLevel() != SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE) {
		EXPECT_GT(key_characteristics->hardwareEnforced.size(), 0);
		}
		EXPECT_GT(key_characteristics->softwareEnforced.size(), 0);

		EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
		@@ -636,23 +639,25 @@ std::vector<uint32_t> KeymasterHidlTest::ValidKeySizes(Algorithm algorithm) {
		switch (algorithm) {
		case Algorithm::RSA:
		switch (SecLevel()) {
		case SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE:
		case SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT:
		return {2048, 3072, 4096};
		case SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX:
		return {2048};
		default:
		CHECK(false) << "Invalid security level " << uint32_t(SecLevel());
		ADD_FAILURE() << "Invalid security level " << uint32_t(SecLevel());
		break;
		}
		break;
		case Algorithm::EC:
		switch (SecLevel()) {
		case SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE:
		case SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT:
		return {224, 256, 384, 521};
		case SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX:
		return {256};
		default:
		CHECK(false) << "Invalid security level " << uint32_t(SecLevel());
		ADD_FAILURE() << "Invalid security level " << uint32_t(SecLevel());
		break;
		}
		break;
		@@ -667,15 +672,15 @@ std::vector<uint32_t> KeymasterHidlTest::ValidKeySizes(Algorithm algorithm) {
		return retval;
		}
		default:
		CHECK(false) << "Invalid Algorithm: " << algorithm;
		ADD_FAILURE() << "Invalid Algorithm: " << algorithm;
		return {};
		}
		CHECK(false) << "Should be impossible to get here";
		ADD_FAILURE() << "Should be impossible to get here";
		return {};
		}

		std::vector<uint32_t> KeymasterHidlTest::InvalidKeySizes(Algorithm algorithm) {
		if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT) return {};
		CHECK(SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX);
		if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
		switch (algorithm) {
		case Algorithm::RSA:
		return {3072, 4096};
		@@ -687,6 +692,8 @@ std::vector<uint32_t> KeymasterHidlTest::InvalidKeySizes(Algorithm algorithm) {
		return {};
		}
		}
		return {};
		}

		std::vector<EcCurve> KeymasterHidlTest::ValidCurves() {
		if (securityLevel_ == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
		@@ -704,6 +711,7 @@ std::vector<EcCurve> KeymasterHidlTest::InvalidCurves() {

		std::vector<Digest> KeymasterHidlTest::ValidDigests(bool withNone, bool withMD5) {
		switch (SecLevel()) {
		case SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE:
		case SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT:
		if (withNone) {
		if (withMD5)
		@@ -729,10 +737,10 @@ std::vector<Digest> KeymasterHidlTest::ValidDigests(bool withNone, bool withMD5)
		return {Digest::SHA_2_256};
		break;
		default:
		CHECK(false) << "Invalid security level " << uint32_t(SecLevel());
		ADD_FAILURE() << "Invalid security level " << uint32_t(SecLevel());
		break;
		}
		CHECK(false) << "Should be impossible to get here";
		ADD_FAILURE() << "Should be impossible to get here";
		return {};
		}

keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/KeymasterHidlTest.h

+8 −4

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -204,6 +204,11 @@ class KeymasterHidlTest : public ::testing::TestWithParam<std::string> {
		KeyCharacteristics key_characteristics_;
		OperationHandle op_handle_ = kOpHandleSentinel;

		static std::vector<std::string> build_params() {
		auto params = android::hardware::getAllHalInstanceNames(IKeymasterDevice::descriptor);
		return params;
		}

		private:
		sp<IKeymasterDevice> keymaster_;
		uint32_t os_version_;
		@@ -216,8 +221,7 @@ class KeymasterHidlTest : public ::testing::TestWithParam<std::string> {

		#define INSTANTIATE_KEYMASTER_HIDL_TEST(name) \
		INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(PerInstance, name, \
		testing::ValuesIn(android::hardware::getAllHalInstanceNames( \
		IKeymasterDevice::descriptor)), \
		testing::ValuesIn(KeymasterHidlTest::build_params()), \
		android::hardware::PrintInstanceNameToString)

		} // namespace test

keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/keymaster_hidl_hal_test.cpp

+10 −4

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -397,10 +397,16 @@ bool verify_attestation_record(const string& challenge, const string& app_id,
		// true. A provided boolean tag that can be pulled back out of the certificate indicates correct
		// encoding. No need to check if it's in both lists, since the AuthorizationSet compare below
		// will handle mismatches of tags.
		if (security_level == SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE) {
		EXPECT_TRUE(expected_sw_enforced.Contains(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED));
		} else {
		EXPECT_TRUE(expected_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED));
		}

		// Alternatively this checks the opposite - a false boolean tag (one that isn't provided in
		// the authorization list during key generation) isn't being attested to in the certificate.
		EXPECT_FALSE(expected_sw_enforced.Contains(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED));
		EXPECT_FALSE(att_sw_enforced.Contains(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED));
		EXPECT_FALSE(expected_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED));
		EXPECT_FALSE(att_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED));

		@@ -461,10 +467,10 @@ bool verify_attestation_record(const string& challenge, const string& app_id,
		verified_boot_key.size()));
		} else if (!strcmp(property_value, "red")) {
		EXPECT_EQ(verified_boot_state, KM_VERIFIED_BOOT_FAILED);
		EXPECT_EQ(0, memcmp(verified_boot_key.data(), empty_boot_key.data(),
		verified_boot_key.size()));
		} else {
		EXPECT_TRUE(false);
		EXPECT_EQ(verified_boot_state, KM_VERIFIED_BOOT_UNVERIFIED);
		EXPECT_NE(0, memcmp(verified_boot_key.data(), empty_boot_key.data(),
		verified_boot_key.size()));
		}

		att_sw_enforced.Sort();