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Commit 068df80f authored by David Drysdale's avatar David Drysdale Committed by Automerger Merge Worker
Browse files

KeyMint VTS: more attestation info tests am: 92464374 

Original change: https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/c/platform/hardware/interfaces/+/15043811

Change-Id: Iff9b85355943f64fe8f63c45a4189abda73d92b9
parents 458e5ca3 92464374

security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp

+36 −21
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -62,6 +62,9 @@ namespace test { 


namespace {



// Invalid value for a patchlevel (which is of form YYYYMMDD).

const uint32_t kInvalidPatchlevel = 99998877;



// Overhead for PKCS#1 v1.5 signature padding of undigested messages.  Digested messages have

// additional overhead, for the digest algorithmIdentifier required by PKCS#1.

const size_t kPkcs1UndigestedSignaturePaddingOverhead = 11;
@@ -127,7 +130,6 @@ char nibble2hex[16] = {'0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', 
// lists to produce the lists that we expect to match the attestations.

auto kTagsToFilter = {

        Tag::CREATION_DATETIME,

    Tag::EC_CURVE,

        Tag::HARDWARE_TYPE,

        Tag::INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID,

};
@@ -163,6 +165,28 @@ string x509NameToStr(X509_NAME* name) { 
bool KeyMintAidlTestBase::arm_deleteAllKeys = false;

bool KeyMintAidlTestBase::dump_Attestations = false;



uint32_t KeyMintAidlTestBase::boot_patch_level(

        const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& key_characteristics) {

    // The boot patchlevel is not available as a property, but should be present

    // in the key characteristics of any created key.

    AuthorizationSet allAuths;

    for (auto& entry : key_characteristics) {

        allAuths.push_back(AuthorizationSet(entry.authorizations));

    }

    auto patchlevel = allAuths.GetTagValue(TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL);

    if (patchlevel.has_value()) {

        return patchlevel.value();

    } else {

        // No boot patchlevel is available. Return a value that won't match anything

        // and so will trigger test failures.

        return kInvalidPatchlevel;

    }

}



uint32_t KeyMintAidlTestBase::boot_patch_level() {

    return boot_patch_level(key_characteristics_);

}



ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::GetReturnErrorCode(const Status& result) {

    if (result.isOk()) return ErrorCode::OK;
@@ -1293,9 +1317,9 @@ bool verify_attestation_record(const string& challenge, // 
    AuthorizationSet att_sw_enforced;

    AuthorizationSet att_hw_enforced;

    uint32_t att_attestation_version;

    uint32_t att_keymaster_version;

    uint32_t att_keymint_version;

    SecurityLevel att_attestation_security_level;

    SecurityLevel att_keymaster_security_level;

    SecurityLevel att_keymint_security_level;

    vector<uint8_t> att_challenge;

    vector<uint8_t> att_unique_id;

    vector<uint8_t> att_app_id;
@@ -1304,8 +1328,8 @@ bool verify_attestation_record(const string& challenge, // 
                                          attest_rec->length,               //

                                          &att_attestation_version,         //

                                          &att_attestation_security_level,  //

                                          &att_keymaster_version,           //

                                          &att_keymaster_security_level,    //

                                          &att_keymint_version,             //

                                          &att_keymint_security_level,      //

                                          &att_challenge,                   //

                                          &att_sw_enforced,                 //

                                          &att_hw_enforced,                 //
@@ -1324,14 +1348,14 @@ bool verify_attestation_record(const string& challenge, // 
        expected_sw_enforced.push_back(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, appId);

    }



    EXPECT_EQ(att_keymaster_version, 100U);

    EXPECT_EQ(security_level, att_keymaster_security_level);

    EXPECT_EQ(att_keymint_version, 100U);

    EXPECT_EQ(security_level, att_keymint_security_level);

    EXPECT_EQ(security_level, att_attestation_security_level);





    char property_value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX] = {};

    // TODO(b/136282179): When running under VTS-on-GSI the TEE-backed

    // keymaster implementation will report YYYYMM dates instead of YYYYMMDD

    // keymint implementation will report YYYYMM dates instead of YYYYMMDD

    // for the BOOT_PATCH_LEVEL.

    if (avb_verification_enabled()) {

        for (int i = 0; i < att_hw_enforced.size(); i++) {
@@ -1370,13 +1394,6 @@ bool verify_attestation_record(const string& challenge, // 
        EXPECT_TRUE(expected_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED));

    }



    // Alternatively this checks the opposite - a false boolean tag (one that isn't provided in

    // the authorization list during key generation) isn't being attested to in the certificate.

    EXPECT_FALSE(expected_sw_enforced.Contains(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED));

    EXPECT_FALSE(att_sw_enforced.Contains(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED));

    EXPECT_FALSE(expected_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED));

    EXPECT_FALSE(att_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED));



    if (att_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC)) {

        // For ECDSA keys, either an EC_CURVE or a KEY_SIZE can be specified, but one must be.

        EXPECT_TRUE(att_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_EC_CURVE) ||
@@ -1442,9 +1459,7 @@ bool verify_attestation_record(const string& challenge, // 


    att_sw_enforced.Sort();

    expected_sw_enforced.Sort();

    auto a = filtered_tags(expected_sw_enforced);

    auto b = filtered_tags(att_sw_enforced);

    EXPECT_EQ(a, b);

    EXPECT_EQ(filtered_tags(expected_sw_enforced), filtered_tags(att_sw_enforced));



    att_hw_enforced.Sort();

    expected_hw_enforced.Sort();

security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h

+2 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -76,6 +76,8 @@ class KeyMintAidlTestBase : public ::testing::TestWithParam<string> { 
    uint32_t os_version() { return os_version_; }

    uint32_t os_patch_level() { return os_patch_level_; }

    uint32_t vendor_patch_level() { return vendor_patch_level_; }

    uint32_t boot_patch_level(const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& key_characteristics);

    uint32_t boot_patch_level();



    ErrorCode GetReturnErrorCode(const Status& result);

security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp

+166 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ 
#include <cutils/log.h>



#include <signal.h>



#include <algorithm>

#include <iostream>



#include <openssl/ec.h>
@@ -1438,6 +1440,170 @@ TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaAttestation) { 
    }

}



/*

 * NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaAttestationTags

 *

 * Verifies that creation of an attested ECDSA key includes various tags in the

 * attestation extension.

 */

TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaAttestationTags) {

    auto challenge = "hello";

    auto app_id = "foo";

    auto subject = "cert subj 2";

    vector<uint8_t> subject_der(make_name_from_str(subject));

    uint64_t serial_int = 0x1010;

    vector<uint8_t> serial_blob(build_serial_blob(serial_int));

    const AuthorizationSetBuilder base_builder =

            AuthorizationSetBuilder()

                    .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)

                    .EcdsaSigningKey(256)

                    .Digest(Digest::NONE)

                    .AttestationChallenge(challenge)

                    .AttestationApplicationId(app_id)

                    .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SERIAL, serial_blob)

                    .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT, subject_der)

                    .SetDefaultValidity();



    // Various tags that map to fields in the attestation extension ASN.1 schema.

    auto extra_tags = AuthorizationSetBuilder()

                              .Authorization(TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE)

                              .Authorization(TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY)

                              .Authorization(TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME, 1619621648000)

                              .Authorization(TAG_ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME, 1619621648000)

                              .Authorization(TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME, 1619621999000)

                              .Authorization(TAG_USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT, 42)

                              .Authorization(TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT, 100000)

                              .Authorization(TAG_ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY)

                              .Authorization(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED)

                              .Authorization(TAG_TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED)

                              .Authorization(TAG_UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED)

                              .Authorization(TAG_CREATION_DATETIME, 1619621648000);

    for (const KeyParameter& tag : extra_tags) {

        SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "tag-" << tag);

        vector<uint8_t> key_blob;

        vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;

        AuthorizationSetBuilder builder = base_builder;

        builder.push_back(tag);

        auto result = GenerateKey(builder, &key_blob, &key_characteristics);

        if (result == ErrorCode::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE_UNAVAILABLE &&

            tag.tag == TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE) {

            continue;

        }

        if (result == ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_TAG &&

            (tag.tag == TAG_ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY || tag.tag == TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED)) {

            // Optional tag not supported by this KeyMint implementation.

            continue;

        }

        ASSERT_EQ(result, ErrorCode::OK);

        ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);



        EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_));

        ASSERT_GT(cert_chain_.size(), 0);

        verify_subject_and_serial(cert_chain_[0], serial_int, subject, /* self_signed = */ false);



        AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);

        AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);

        if (tag.tag != TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID) {

            // Expect to find most of the extra tags in the key characteristics

            // of the generated key (but not for ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID).

            EXPECT_TRUE(hw_enforced.Contains(tag.tag) || sw_enforced.Contains(tag.tag))

                    << tag << " not in hw:" << hw_enforced << " nor sw:" << sw_enforced;

        }



        // Verifying the attestation record will check for the specific tag because

        // it's included in the authorizations.

        EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(challenge, app_id, sw_enforced, hw_enforced,

                                              SecLevel(), cert_chain_[0].encodedCertificate));



        CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);

    }



    // Device attestation IDs should be rejected for normal attestation requests; these fields

    // are only used for device unique attestation.

    auto invalid_tags = AuthorizationSetBuilder()

                                .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, "brand")

                                .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, "device")

                                .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, "product")

                                .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, "serial")

                                .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI, "imei")

                                .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID, "meid")

                                .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER, "manufacturer")

                                .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, "model");

    for (const KeyParameter& tag : invalid_tags) {

        SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "tag-" << tag);

        vector<uint8_t> key_blob;

        vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;

        AuthorizationSetBuilder builder =

                AuthorizationSetBuilder()

                        .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)

                        .EcdsaSigningKey(256)

                        .Digest(Digest::NONE)

                        .AttestationChallenge(challenge)

                        .AttestationApplicationId(app_id)

                        .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SERIAL, serial_blob)

                        .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT, subject_der)

                        .SetDefaultValidity();

        builder.push_back(tag);

        ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS,

                  GenerateKey(builder, &key_blob, &key_characteristics));

    }

}



/*

 * NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaAttestationTagNoApplicationId

 *

 * Verifies that creation of an attested ECDSA key does not include APPLICATION_ID.

 */

TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaAttestationTagNoApplicationId) {

    auto challenge = "hello";

    auto attest_app_id = "foo";

    auto subject = "cert subj 2";

    vector<uint8_t> subject_der(make_name_from_str(subject));

    uint64_t serial_int = 0x1010;

    vector<uint8_t> serial_blob(build_serial_blob(serial_int));



    // Earlier versions of the attestation extension schema included a slot:

    //     applicationId  [601] EXPLICIT OCTET_STRING OPTIONAL,

    // This should never have been included, and should never be filled in.

    // Generate an attested key that include APPLICATION_ID and APPLICATION_DATA,

    // to confirm that this field never makes it into the attestation extension.

    vector<uint8_t> key_blob;

    vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;

    auto result = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()

                                      .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)

                                      .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)

                                      .Digest(Digest::NONE)

                                      .AttestationChallenge(challenge)

                                      .AttestationApplicationId(attest_app_id)

                                      .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_ID, "client_id")

                                      .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA, "appdata")

                                      .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SERIAL, serial_blob)

                                      .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT, subject_der)

                                      .SetDefaultValidity(),

                              &key_blob, &key_characteristics);

    ASSERT_EQ(result, ErrorCode::OK);

    ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);



    EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_));

    ASSERT_GT(cert_chain_.size(), 0);

    verify_subject_and_serial(cert_chain_[0], serial_int, subject, /* self_signed = */ false);



    AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);

    AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);

    EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(challenge, attest_app_id, sw_enforced, hw_enforced,

                                          SecLevel(), cert_chain_[0].encodedCertificate));



    // Check that the app id is not in the cert.

    string app_id = "clientid";

    std::vector<uint8_t> needle(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(app_id.data()),

                                reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(app_id.data()) + app_id.size());

    ASSERT_EQ(std::search(cert_chain_[0].encodedCertificate.begin(),

                          cert_chain_[0].encodedCertificate.end(), needle.begin(), needle.end()),

              cert_chain_[0].encodedCertificate.end());



    CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);

}



/*

 * NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaSelfSignAttestation

 *