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Commit 09123017 authored by qctecmdr Service's avatar qctecmdr Service Committed by Gerrit - the friendly Code Review server
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Merge "Merge android-4.14-p.87 (11d6531a) into msm-4.14"

parents de4ad328 124f6fb7

Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt

+54 −2
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -4003,9 +4003,13 @@ 


	spectre_v2=	[X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2

			(indirect branch speculation) vulnerability.

			The default operation protects the kernel from

			user space attacks.



			on   - unconditionally enable

			off  - unconditionally disable

			on   - unconditionally enable, implies

			       spectre_v2_user=on

			off  - unconditionally disable, implies

			       spectre_v2_user=off

			auto - kernel detects whether your CPU model is

			       vulnerable
@@ -4015,6 +4019,12 @@ 
			CONFIG_RETPOLINE configuration option, and the

			compiler with which the kernel was built.



			Selecting 'on' will also enable the mitigation

			against user space to user space task attacks.



			Selecting 'off' will disable both the kernel and

			the user space protections.



			Specific mitigations can also be selected manually:



			retpoline	  - replace indirect branches
@@ -4024,6 +4034,48 @@ 
			Not specifying this option is equivalent to

			spectre_v2=auto.



	spectre_v2_user=

			[X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2

		        (indirect branch speculation) vulnerability between

		        user space tasks



			on	- Unconditionally enable mitigations. Is

				  enforced by spectre_v2=on



			off     - Unconditionally disable mitigations. Is

				  enforced by spectre_v2=off



			prctl   - Indirect branch speculation is enabled,

				  but mitigation can be enabled via prctl

				  per thread.  The mitigation control state

				  is inherited on fork.



			prctl,ibpb

				- Like "prctl" above, but only STIBP is

				  controlled per thread. IBPB is issued

				  always when switching between different user

				  space processes.



			seccomp

				- Same as "prctl" above, but all seccomp

				  threads will enable the mitigation unless

				  they explicitly opt out.



			seccomp,ibpb

				- Like "seccomp" above, but only STIBP is

				  controlled per thread. IBPB is issued

				  always when switching between different

				  user space processes.



			auto    - Kernel selects the mitigation depending on

				  the available CPU features and vulnerability.



			Default mitigation:

			If CONFIG_SECCOMP=y then "seccomp", otherwise "prctl"



			Not specifying this option is equivalent to

			spectre_v2_user=auto.



	spec_store_bypass_disable=

			[HW] Control Speculative Store Bypass (SSB) Disable mitigation

			(Speculative Store Bypass vulnerability)

Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst

+9 −0
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@@ -92,3 +92,12 @@ Speculation misfeature controls 
   * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0);

   * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0);

   * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE, 0, 0);



- PR_SPEC_INDIR_BRANCH: Indirect Branch Speculation in User Processes

                        (Mitigate Spectre V2 style attacks against user processes)



  Invocations:

   * prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, 0, 0, 0);

   * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0);

   * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0);

   * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE, 0, 0);

Makefile

+4 −1
Original line number Diff line number Diff line 
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0

VERSION = 4

PATCHLEVEL = 14

SUBLEVEL = 85

SUBLEVEL = 87

EXTRAVERSION =

NAME = Petit Gorille
@@ -897,6 +897,9 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-Wdeclaration-after-statement,) 
# disable pointer signed / unsigned warnings in gcc 4.0

KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-disable-warning, pointer-sign)



# disable stringop warnings in gcc 8+

KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-disable-warning, stringop-truncation)



# disable invalid "can't wrap" optimizations for signed / pointers

KBUILD_CFLAGS	+= $(call cc-option,-fno-strict-overflow)

arch/arc/Kconfig

+1 −1
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@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ endmenu 


choice

	prompt "ARC Instruction Set"

	default ISA_ARCOMPACT

	default ISA_ARCV2



config ISA_ARCOMPACT

	bool "ARCompact ISA"

arch/arc/Makefile

+1 −1
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@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ 
# published by the Free Software Foundation.

#



KBUILD_DEFCONFIG := nsim_700_defconfig

KBUILD_DEFCONFIG := nsim_hs_defconfig



cflags-y	+= -fno-common -pipe -fno-builtin -mmedium-calls -D__linux__

cflags-$(CONFIG_ISA_ARCOMPACT)	+= -mA7