Commit c80a9f32 authored Feb 19, 2018 by Florian Westphal Committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman Mar 18, 2018

netfilter: ebtables: CONFIG_COMPAT: don't trust userland offsets



commit b71812168571fa55e44cdd0254471331b9c4c4c6 upstream.

We need to make sure the offsets are not out of range of the
total size.
Also check that they are in ascending order.

The WARN_ON triggered by syzkaller (it sets panic_on_warn) is
changed to also bail out, no point in continuing parsing.

Briefly tested with simple ruleset of
-A INPUT --limit 1/s' --log
plus jump to custom chains using 32bit ebtables binary.

Reported-by:  <syzbot+845a53d13171abf8bf29@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

parent 3dbf839a

net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c

+12 −1

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -2019,7 +2019,9 @@ static int ebt_size_mwt(struct compat_ebt_entry_mwt *match32,
		if (match_kern)
		match_kern->match_size = ret;

		WARN_ON(type == EBT_COMPAT_TARGET && size_left);
		if (WARN_ON(type == EBT_COMPAT_TARGET && size_left))
		return -EINVAL;

		match32 = (struct compat_ebt_entry_mwt *) buf;
		}

		@@ -2076,6 +2078,15 @@ static int size_entry_mwt(struct ebt_entry entry, const unsigned char base,
		*
		* offsets are relative to beginning of struct ebt_entry (i.e., 0).
		*/
		for (i = 0; i < 4 ; ++i) {
		if (offsets[i] >= *total)
		return -EINVAL;
		if (i == 0)
		continue;
		if (offsets[i-1] > offsets[i])
		return -EINVAL;
		}

		for (i = 0, j = 1 ; j < 4 ; j++, i++) {
		struct compat_ebt_entry_mwt *match32;
		unsigned int size;