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Commit 7f1a6ae7 authored by Jann Horn's avatar Jann Horn Committed by Sasha Levin
Browse files

fs: take i_mutex during prepare_binprm for set[ug]id executables 



[ Upstream commit 8b01fc86b9f425899f8a3a8fc1c47d73c2c20543 ]

This prevents a race between chown() and execve(), where chowning a
setuid-user binary to root would momentarily make the binary setuid
root.

This patch was mostly written by Linus Torvalds.

Signed-off-by: default avatarJann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarSasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
parent c42f3e15

fs/exec.c

+48 −28
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -1250,45 +1250,65 @@ static void check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) 
	spin_unlock(&p->fs->lock);

}



/*

 * Fill the binprm structure from the inode.

 * Check permissions, then read the first 128 (BINPRM_BUF_SIZE) bytes

 *

 * This may be called multiple times for binary chains (scripts for example).

 */

int prepare_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)

static void bprm_fill_uid(struct linux_binprm *bprm)

{

	struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);

	umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;

	int retval;



	struct inode *inode;

	unsigned int mode;

	kuid_t uid;

	kgid_t gid;



	/* clear any previous set[ug]id data from a previous binary */

	bprm->cred->euid = current_euid();

	bprm->cred->egid = current_egid();



	if (!(bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) &&

	    !task_no_new_privs(current) &&

	    kuid_has_mapping(bprm->cred->user_ns, inode->i_uid) &&

	    kgid_has_mapping(bprm->cred->user_ns, inode->i_gid)) {

		/* Set-uid? */

	if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)

		return;



	if (task_no_new_privs(current))

		return;



	inode = file_inode(bprm->file);

	mode = READ_ONCE(inode->i_mode);

	if (!(mode & (S_ISUID|S_ISGID)))

		return;



	/* Be careful if suid/sgid is set */

	mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);



	/* reload atomically mode/uid/gid now that lock held */

	mode = inode->i_mode;

	uid = inode->i_uid;

	gid = inode->i_gid;

	mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);



	/* We ignore suid/sgid if there are no mappings for them in the ns */

	if (!kuid_has_mapping(bprm->cred->user_ns, uid) ||

		 !kgid_has_mapping(bprm->cred->user_ns, gid))

		return;



	if (mode & S_ISUID) {

		bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;

			bprm->cred->euid = inode->i_uid;

		bprm->cred->euid = uid;

	}



		/* Set-gid? */

		/*

		 * If setgid is set but no group execute bit then this

		 * is a candidate for mandatory locking, not a setgid

		 * executable.

		 */

	if ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) {

		bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;

			bprm->cred->egid = inode->i_gid;

		bprm->cred->egid = gid;

	}

}



/*

 * Fill the binprm structure from the inode.

 * Check permissions, then read the first 128 (BINPRM_BUF_SIZE) bytes

 *

 * This may be called multiple times for binary chains (scripts for example).

 */

int prepare_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)

{

	int retval;



	bprm_fill_uid(bprm);



	/* fill in binprm security blob */

	retval = security_bprm_set_creds(bprm);

	if (retval)