crypto: aesni-intel - RFC4106 AES-GCM Driver Using Intel New Instructions (0bd82f5f) · Commits · e / devices / android_kernel_xiaomi_markw

arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S

+1192 −0

File changed.

Preview size limit exceeded, changes collapsed.

arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c

+516 −2

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -5,6 +5,14 @@
		* Copyright (C) 2008, Intel Corp.
		* Author: Huang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
		*
		* Added RFC4106 AES-GCM support for 128-bit keys under the AEAD
		* interface for 64-bit kernels.
		* Authors: Adrian Hoban <adrian.hoban@intel.com>
		* Gabriele Paoloni <gabriele.paoloni@intel.com>
		* Tadeusz Struk (tadeusz.struk@intel.com)
		* Aidan O'Mahony (aidan.o.mahony@intel.com)
		* Copyright (c) 2010, Intel Corporation.
		*
		* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
		* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
		* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
		@@ -21,6 +29,10 @@
		#include <crypto/ctr.h>
		#include <asm/i387.h>
		#include <asm/aes.h>
		#include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
		#include <crypto/internal/aead.h>
		#include <linux/workqueue.h>
		#include <linux/spinlock.h>

		#if defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CTR) \|\| defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CTR_MODULE)
		#define HAS_CTR
		@@ -42,8 +54,31 @@ struct async_aes_ctx {
		struct cryptd_ablkcipher *cryptd_tfm;
		};

		#define AESNI_ALIGN 16
		/* This data is stored at the end of the crypto_tfm struct.
		* It's a type of per "session" data storage location.
		* This needs to be 16 byte aligned.
		*/
		struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx {
		u8 hash_subkey[16];
		struct crypto_aes_ctx aes_key_expanded;
		u8 nonce[4];
		struct cryptd_aead *cryptd_tfm;
		};

		struct aesni_gcm_set_hash_subkey_result {
		int err;
		struct completion completion;
		};

		struct aesni_hash_subkey_req_data {
		u8 iv[16];
		struct aesni_gcm_set_hash_subkey_result result;
		struct scatterlist sg;
		};

		#define AESNI_ALIGN (16)
		#define AES_BLOCK_MASK (~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE-1))
		#define RFC4106_HASH_SUBKEY_SIZE 16

		asmlinkage int aesni_set_key(struct crypto_aes_ctx ctx, const u8 in_key,
		unsigned int key_len);
		@@ -62,6 +97,57 @@ asmlinkage void aesni_cbc_dec(struct crypto_aes_ctx ctx, u8 out,
		asmlinkage void aesni_ctr_enc(struct crypto_aes_ctx ctx, u8 out,
		const u8 in, unsigned int len, u8 iv);

		/* asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_enc()
		* void *ctx, AES Key schedule. Starts on a 16 byte boundary.
		* u8 *out, Ciphertext output. Encrypt in-place is allowed.
		* const u8 *in, Plaintext input
		* unsigned long plaintext_len, Length of data in bytes for encryption.
		* u8 *iv, Pre-counter block j0: 4 byte salt (from Security Association)
		* concatenated with 8 byte Initialisation Vector (from IPSec ESP
		* Payload) concatenated with 0x00000001. 16-byte aligned pointer.
		* u8 *hash_subkey, the Hash sub key input. Data starts on a 16-byte boundary.
		* const u8 *aad, Additional Authentication Data (AAD)
		* unsigned long aad_len, Length of AAD in bytes. With RFC4106 this
		* is going to be 8 or 12 bytes
		* u8 *auth_tag, Authenticated Tag output.
		* unsigned long auth_tag_len), Authenticated Tag Length in bytes.
		* Valid values are 16 (most likely), 12 or 8.
		*/
		asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_enc(void ctx, u8 out,
		const u8 in, unsigned long plaintext_len, u8 iv,
		u8 hash_subkey, const u8 aad, unsigned long aad_len,
		u8 *auth_tag, unsigned long auth_tag_len);

		/* asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_dec()
		* void *ctx, AES Key schedule. Starts on a 16 byte boundary.
		* u8 *out, Plaintext output. Decrypt in-place is allowed.
		* const u8 *in, Ciphertext input
		* unsigned long ciphertext_len, Length of data in bytes for decryption.
		* u8 *iv, Pre-counter block j0: 4 byte salt (from Security Association)
		* concatenated with 8 byte Initialisation Vector (from IPSec ESP
		* Payload) concatenated with 0x00000001. 16-byte aligned pointer.
		* u8 *hash_subkey, the Hash sub key input. Data starts on a 16-byte boundary.
		* const u8 *aad, Additional Authentication Data (AAD)
		* unsigned long aad_len, Length of AAD in bytes. With RFC4106 this is going
		* to be 8 or 12 bytes
		* u8 *auth_tag, Authenticated Tag output.
		* unsigned long auth_tag_len) Authenticated Tag Length in bytes.
		* Valid values are 16 (most likely), 12 or 8.
		*/
		asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_dec(void ctx, u8 out,
		const u8 in, unsigned long ciphertext_len, u8 iv,
		u8 hash_subkey, const u8 aad, unsigned long aad_len,
		u8 *auth_tag, unsigned long auth_tag_len);

		static inline struct
		aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx_get(struct crypto_aead tfm)
		{
		return
		(struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx *)
		PTR_ALIGN((u8 *)
		crypto_tfm_ctx(crypto_aead_tfm(tfm)), AESNI_ALIGN);
		}

		static inline struct crypto_aes_ctx aes_ctx(void raw_ctx)
		{
		unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)raw_ctx;
		@@ -730,6 +816,422 @@ static struct crypto_alg ablk_xts_alg = {
		};
		#endif

		static int rfc4106_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
		{
		struct cryptd_aead *cryptd_tfm;
		struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx ctx = (struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx )
		PTR_ALIGN((u8 *)crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm), AESNI_ALIGN);
		cryptd_tfm = cryptd_alloc_aead("__driver-gcm-aes-aesni", 0, 0);
		if (IS_ERR(cryptd_tfm))
		return PTR_ERR(cryptd_tfm);
		ctx->cryptd_tfm = cryptd_tfm;
		tfm->crt_aead.reqsize = sizeof(struct aead_request)
		+ crypto_aead_reqsize(&cryptd_tfm->base);
		return 0;
		}

		static void rfc4106_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
		{
		struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx *ctx =
		(struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx *)
		PTR_ALIGN((u8 *)crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm), AESNI_ALIGN);
		if (!IS_ERR(ctx->cryptd_tfm))
		cryptd_free_aead(ctx->cryptd_tfm);
		return;
		}

		static void
		rfc4106_set_hash_subkey_done(struct crypto_async_request *req, int err)
		{
		struct aesni_gcm_set_hash_subkey_result *result = req->data;

		if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
		return;
		result->err = err;
		complete(&result->completion);
		}

		static int
		rfc4106_set_hash_subkey(u8 hash_subkey, const u8 key, unsigned int key_len)
		{
		struct crypto_ablkcipher *ctr_tfm;
		struct ablkcipher_request *req;
		int ret = -EINVAL;
		struct aesni_hash_subkey_req_data *req_data;

		ctr_tfm = crypto_alloc_ablkcipher("ctr(aes)", 0, 0);
		if (IS_ERR(ctr_tfm))
		return PTR_ERR(ctr_tfm);

		crypto_ablkcipher_clear_flags(ctr_tfm, ~0);

		ret = crypto_ablkcipher_setkey(ctr_tfm, key, key_len);
		if (ret) {
		crypto_free_ablkcipher(ctr_tfm);
		return ret;
		}

		req = ablkcipher_request_alloc(ctr_tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
		if (!req) {
		crypto_free_ablkcipher(ctr_tfm);
		return -EINVAL;
		}

		req_data = kmalloc(sizeof(*req_data), GFP_KERNEL);
		if (!req_data) {
		crypto_free_ablkcipher(ctr_tfm);
		return -ENOMEM;
		}
		memset(req_data->iv, 0, sizeof(req_data->iv));

		/* Clear the data in the hash sub key container to zero.*/
		/* We want to cipher all zeros to create the hash sub key. */
		memset(hash_subkey, 0, RFC4106_HASH_SUBKEY_SIZE);

		init_completion(&req_data->result.completion);
		sg_init_one(&req_data->sg, hash_subkey, RFC4106_HASH_SUBKEY_SIZE);
		ablkcipher_request_set_tfm(req, ctr_tfm);
		ablkcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP \|
		CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
		rfc4106_set_hash_subkey_done,
		&req_data->result);

		ablkcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &req_data->sg,
		&req_data->sg, RFC4106_HASH_SUBKEY_SIZE, req_data->iv);

		ret = crypto_ablkcipher_encrypt(req);
		if (ret == -EINPROGRESS \|\| ret == -EBUSY) {
		ret = wait_for_completion_interruptible
		(&req_data->result.completion);
		if (!ret)
		ret = req_data->result.err;
		}
		ablkcipher_request_free(req);
		kfree(req_data);
		crypto_free_ablkcipher(ctr_tfm);
		return ret;
		}

		static int rfc4106_set_key(struct crypto_aead parent, const u8 key,
		unsigned int key_len)
		{
		int ret = 0;
		struct crypto_tfm *tfm = crypto_aead_tfm(parent);
		struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx *ctx = aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx_get(parent);
		u8 *new_key_mem = NULL;

		if (key_len < 4) {
		crypto_tfm_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
		return -EINVAL;
		}
		/Account for 4 byte nonce at the end./
		key_len -= 4;
		if (key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_128) {
		crypto_tfm_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
		return -EINVAL;
		}

		memcpy(ctx->nonce, key + key_len, sizeof(ctx->nonce));
		/This must be on a 16 byte boundary!/
		if ((unsigned long)(&(ctx->aes_key_expanded.key_enc[0])) % AESNI_ALIGN)
		return -EINVAL;

		if ((unsigned long)key % AESNI_ALIGN) {
		/key is not aligned: use an auxuliar aligned pointer/
		new_key_mem = kmalloc(key_len+AESNI_ALIGN, GFP_KERNEL);
		if (!new_key_mem)
		return -ENOMEM;

		new_key_mem = PTR_ALIGN(new_key_mem, AESNI_ALIGN);
		memcpy(new_key_mem, key, key_len);
		key = new_key_mem;
		}

		if (!irq_fpu_usable())
		ret = crypto_aes_expand_key(&(ctx->aes_key_expanded),
		key, key_len);
		else {
		kernel_fpu_begin();
		ret = aesni_set_key(&(ctx->aes_key_expanded), key, key_len);
		kernel_fpu_end();
		}
		/This must be on a 16 byte boundary!/
		if ((unsigned long)(&(ctx->hash_subkey[0])) % AESNI_ALIGN) {
		ret = -EINVAL;
		goto exit;
		}
		ret = rfc4106_set_hash_subkey(ctx->hash_subkey, key, key_len);
		exit:
		kfree(new_key_mem);
		return ret;
		}

		/* This is the Integrity Check Value (aka the authentication tag length and can
		* be 8, 12 or 16 bytes long. */
		static int rfc4106_set_authsize(struct crypto_aead *parent,
		unsigned int authsize)
		{
		struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx *ctx = aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx_get(parent);
		struct crypto_aead *cryptd_child = cryptd_aead_child(ctx->cryptd_tfm);

		switch (authsize) {
		case 8:
		case 12:
		case 16:
		break;
		default:
		return -EINVAL;
		}
		crypto_aead_crt(parent)->authsize = authsize;
		crypto_aead_crt(cryptd_child)->authsize = authsize;
		return 0;
		}

		static int rfc4106_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
		{
		int ret;
		struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
		struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx *ctx = aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx_get(tfm);
		struct crypto_aead *cryptd_child = cryptd_aead_child(ctx->cryptd_tfm);

		if (!irq_fpu_usable()) {
		struct aead_request *cryptd_req =
		(struct aead_request *) aead_request_ctx(req);
		memcpy(cryptd_req, req, sizeof(*req));
		aead_request_set_tfm(cryptd_req, &ctx->cryptd_tfm->base);
		return crypto_aead_encrypt(cryptd_req);
		} else {
		kernel_fpu_begin();
		ret = cryptd_child->base.crt_aead.encrypt(req);
		kernel_fpu_end();
		return ret;
		}
		}

		static int rfc4106_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
		{
		int ret;
		struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
		struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx *ctx = aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx_get(tfm);
		struct crypto_aead *cryptd_child = cryptd_aead_child(ctx->cryptd_tfm);

		if (!irq_fpu_usable()) {
		struct aead_request *cryptd_req =
		(struct aead_request *) aead_request_ctx(req);
		memcpy(cryptd_req, req, sizeof(*req));
		aead_request_set_tfm(cryptd_req, &ctx->cryptd_tfm->base);
		return crypto_aead_decrypt(cryptd_req);
		} else {
		kernel_fpu_begin();
		ret = cryptd_child->base.crt_aead.decrypt(req);
		kernel_fpu_end();
		return ret;
		}
		}

		static struct crypto_alg rfc4106_alg = {
		.cra_name = "rfc4106(gcm(aes))",
		.cra_driver_name = "rfc4106-gcm-aesni",
		.cra_priority = 400,
		.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD \| CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
		.cra_blocksize = 1,
		.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx) + AESNI_ALIGN,
		.cra_alignmask = 0,
		.cra_type = &crypto_nivaead_type,
		.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
		.cra_list = LIST_HEAD_INIT(rfc4106_alg.cra_list),
		.cra_init = rfc4106_init,
		.cra_exit = rfc4106_exit,
		.cra_u = {
		.aead = {
		.setkey = rfc4106_set_key,
		.setauthsize = rfc4106_set_authsize,
		.encrypt = rfc4106_encrypt,
		.decrypt = rfc4106_decrypt,
		.geniv = "seqiv",
		.ivsize = 8,
		.maxauthsize = 16,
		},
		},
		};

		static int __driver_rfc4106_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
		{
		u8 one_entry_in_sg = 0;
		u8 src, dst, *assoc;
		__be32 counter = cpu_to_be32(1);
		struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
		struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx *ctx = aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx_get(tfm);
		void *aes_ctx = &(ctx->aes_key_expanded);
		unsigned long auth_tag_len = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm);
		u8 iv_tab[16+AESNI_ALIGN];
		u8* iv = (u8 ) PTR_ALIGN((u8 )iv_tab, AESNI_ALIGN);
		struct scatter_walk src_sg_walk;
		struct scatter_walk assoc_sg_walk;
		struct scatter_walk dst_sg_walk;
		unsigned int i;

		/* Assuming we are supporting rfc4106 64-bit extended */
		/* sequence numbers We need to have the AAD length equal */
		/* to 8 or 12 bytes */
		if (unlikely(req->assoclen != 8 && req->assoclen != 12))
		return -EINVAL;
		/* IV below built */
		for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
		*(iv+i) = ctx->nonce[i];
		for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
		*(iv+4+i) = req->iv[i];
		((__be32 )(iv+12)) = counter;

		if ((sg_is_last(req->src)) && (sg_is_last(req->assoc))) {
		one_entry_in_sg = 1;
		scatterwalk_start(&src_sg_walk, req->src);
		scatterwalk_start(&assoc_sg_walk, req->assoc);
		src = scatterwalk_map(&src_sg_walk, 0);
		assoc = scatterwalk_map(&assoc_sg_walk, 0);
		dst = src;
		if (unlikely(req->src != req->dst)) {
		scatterwalk_start(&dst_sg_walk, req->dst);
		dst = scatterwalk_map(&dst_sg_walk, 0);
		}

		} else {
		/* Allocate memory for src, dst, assoc */
		src = kmalloc(req->cryptlen + auth_tag_len + req->assoclen,
		GFP_ATOMIC);
		if (unlikely(!src))
		return -ENOMEM;
		assoc = (src + req->cryptlen + auth_tag_len);
		scatterwalk_map_and_copy(src, req->src, 0, req->cryptlen, 0);
		scatterwalk_map_and_copy(assoc, req->assoc, 0,
		req->assoclen, 0);
		dst = src;
		}

		aesni_gcm_enc(aes_ctx, dst, src, (unsigned long)req->cryptlen, iv,
		ctx->hash_subkey, assoc, (unsigned long)req->assoclen, dst
		+ ((unsigned long)req->cryptlen), auth_tag_len);

		/* The authTag (aka the Integrity Check Value) needs to be written
		* back to the packet. */
		if (one_entry_in_sg) {
		if (unlikely(req->src != req->dst)) {
		scatterwalk_unmap(dst, 0);
		scatterwalk_done(&dst_sg_walk, 0, 0);
		}
		scatterwalk_unmap(src, 0);
		scatterwalk_unmap(assoc, 0);
		scatterwalk_done(&src_sg_walk, 0, 0);
		scatterwalk_done(&assoc_sg_walk, 0, 0);
		} else {
		scatterwalk_map_and_copy(dst, req->dst, 0,
		req->cryptlen + auth_tag_len, 1);
		kfree(src);
		}
		return 0;
		}

		static int __driver_rfc4106_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
		{
		u8 one_entry_in_sg = 0;
		u8 src, dst, *assoc;
		unsigned long tempCipherLen = 0;
		__be32 counter = cpu_to_be32(1);
		int retval = 0;
		struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
		struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx *ctx = aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx_get(tfm);
		void *aes_ctx = &(ctx->aes_key_expanded);
		unsigned long auth_tag_len = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm);
		u8 iv_and_authTag[32+AESNI_ALIGN];
		u8 iv = (u8 ) PTR_ALIGN((u8 *)iv_and_authTag, AESNI_ALIGN);
		u8 *authTag = iv + 16;
		struct scatter_walk src_sg_walk;
		struct scatter_walk assoc_sg_walk;
		struct scatter_walk dst_sg_walk;
		unsigned int i;

		if (unlikely((req->cryptlen < auth_tag_len) \|\|
		(req->assoclen != 8 && req->assoclen != 12)))
		return -EINVAL;
		/* Assuming we are supporting rfc4106 64-bit extended */
		/* sequence numbers We need to have the AAD length */
		/* equal to 8 or 12 bytes */

		tempCipherLen = (unsigned long)(req->cryptlen - auth_tag_len);
		/* IV below built */
		for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
		*(iv+i) = ctx->nonce[i];
		for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
		*(iv+4+i) = req->iv[i];
		((__be32 )(iv+12)) = counter;

		if ((sg_is_last(req->src)) && (sg_is_last(req->assoc))) {
		one_entry_in_sg = 1;
		scatterwalk_start(&src_sg_walk, req->src);
		scatterwalk_start(&assoc_sg_walk, req->assoc);
		src = scatterwalk_map(&src_sg_walk, 0);
		assoc = scatterwalk_map(&assoc_sg_walk, 0);
		dst = src;
		if (unlikely(req->src != req->dst)) {
		scatterwalk_start(&dst_sg_walk, req->dst);
		dst = scatterwalk_map(&dst_sg_walk, 0);
		}

		} else {
		/* Allocate memory for src, dst, assoc */
		src = kmalloc(req->cryptlen + req->assoclen, GFP_ATOMIC);
		if (!src)
		return -ENOMEM;
		assoc = (src + req->cryptlen + auth_tag_len);
		scatterwalk_map_and_copy(src, req->src, 0, req->cryptlen, 0);
		scatterwalk_map_and_copy(assoc, req->assoc, 0,
		req->assoclen, 0);
		dst = src;
		}

		aesni_gcm_dec(aes_ctx, dst, src, tempCipherLen, iv,
		ctx->hash_subkey, assoc, (unsigned long)req->assoclen,
		authTag, auth_tag_len);

		/* Compare generated tag with passed in tag. */
		retval = memcmp(src + tempCipherLen, authTag, auth_tag_len) ?
		-EBADMSG : 0;

		if (one_entry_in_sg) {
		if (unlikely(req->src != req->dst)) {
		scatterwalk_unmap(dst, 0);
		scatterwalk_done(&dst_sg_walk, 0, 0);
		}
		scatterwalk_unmap(src, 0);
		scatterwalk_unmap(assoc, 0);
		scatterwalk_done(&src_sg_walk, 0, 0);
		scatterwalk_done(&assoc_sg_walk, 0, 0);
		} else {
		scatterwalk_map_and_copy(dst, req->dst, 0, req->cryptlen, 1);
		kfree(src);
		}
		return retval;
		}

		static struct crypto_alg __rfc4106_alg = {
		.cra_name = "__gcm-aes-aesni",
		.cra_driver_name = "__driver-gcm-aes-aesni",
		.cra_priority = 0,
		.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD,
		.cra_blocksize = 1,
		.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx) + AESNI_ALIGN,
		.cra_alignmask = 0,
		.cra_type = &crypto_aead_type,
		.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
		.cra_list = LIST_HEAD_INIT(__rfc4106_alg.cra_list),
		.cra_u = {
		.aead = {
		.encrypt = __driver_rfc4106_encrypt,
		.decrypt = __driver_rfc4106_decrypt,
		},
		},
		};

		static int __init aesni_init(void)
		{
		int err;
		@@ -738,6 +1240,7 @@ static int __init aesni_init(void)
		printk(KERN_INFO "Intel AES-NI instructions are not detected.\n");
		return -ENODEV;
		}

		if ((err = crypto_register_alg(&aesni_alg)))
		goto aes_err;
		if ((err = crypto_register_alg(&__aesni_alg)))
		@@ -770,10 +1273,19 @@ static int __init aesni_init(void)
		if ((err = crypto_register_alg(&ablk_xts_alg)))
		goto ablk_xts_err;
		#endif

		err = crypto_register_alg(&__rfc4106_alg);
		if (err)
		goto __aead_gcm_err;
		err = crypto_register_alg(&rfc4106_alg);
		if (err)
		goto aead_gcm_err;
		return err;

		aead_gcm_err:
		crypto_unregister_alg(&__rfc4106_alg);
		__aead_gcm_err:
		#ifdef HAS_XTS
		crypto_unregister_alg(&ablk_xts_alg);
		ablk_xts_err:
		#endif
		#ifdef HAS_PCBC
		@@ -809,6 +1321,8 @@ aes_err:

		static void __exit aesni_exit(void)
		{
		crypto_unregister_alg(&__rfc4106_alg);
		crypto_unregister_alg(&rfc4106_alg);
		#ifdef HAS_XTS
		crypto_unregister_alg(&ablk_xts_alg);
		#endif