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Commit 5a2f3a02 authored by James Morris's avatar James Morris
Browse files

Merge branch 'next-evm' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/ima-2.6 into next 



Conflicts:
	fs/attr.c

Resolve conflict manually.

Signed-off-by: default avatarJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
parents 1d568ab0 817b54aa

Documentation/ABI/testing/evm

0 → 100644
+23 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line 
What:		security/evm

Date:		March 2011

Contact:	Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>

Description:

		EVM protects a file's security extended attributes(xattrs)

		against integrity attacks. The initial method maintains an

		HMAC-sha1 value across the extended attributes, storing the

		value as the extended attribute 'security.evm'.



		EVM depends on the Kernel Key Retention System to provide it

		with a trusted/encrypted key for the HMAC-sha1 operation.

		The key is loaded onto the root's keyring using keyctl.  Until

		EVM receives notification that the key has been successfully

		loaded onto the keyring (echo 1 > <securityfs>/evm), EVM

		can not create or validate the 'security.evm' xattr, but

		returns INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN.  Loading the key and signaling EVM

		should be done as early as possible.  Normally this is done

		in the initramfs, which has already been measured as part

		of the trusted boot.  For more information on creating and

		loading existing trusted/encrypted keys, refer to:

		Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt.  (A sample dracut

		patch, which loads the trusted/encrypted key and enables

		EVM, is available from http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/#EVM.)

Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt

+6 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ parameter is applicable: 
	EDD	BIOS Enhanced Disk Drive Services (EDD) is enabled

	EFI	EFI Partitioning (GPT) is enabled

	EIDE	EIDE/ATAPI support is enabled.

	EVM	Extended Verification Module

	FB	The frame buffer device is enabled.

	GCOV	GCOV profiling is enabled.

	HW	Appropriate hardware is enabled.
@@ -758,6 +759,11 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted. 
			This option is obsoleted by the "netdev=" option, which

			has equivalent usage. See its documentation for details.



	evm=		[EVM]

			Format: { "fix" }

			Permit 'security.evm' to be updated regardless of

			current integrity status.



	failslab=

	fail_page_alloc=

	fail_make_request=[KNL]

fs/attr.c

+4 −1
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ 
#include <linux/fsnotify.h>

#include <linux/fcntl.h>

#include <linux/security.h>

#include <linux/evm.h>



/**

 * inode_change_ok - check if attribute changes to an inode are allowed
@@ -237,8 +238,10 @@ int notify_change(struct dentry * dentry, struct iattr * attr) 
	else

		error = simple_setattr(dentry, attr);



	if (!error)

	if (!error) {

		fsnotify_change(dentry, ia_valid);

		evm_inode_post_setattr(dentry, ia_valid);

	}



	return error;

}

fs/btrfs/xattr.c

+25 −25
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -374,36 +374,36 @@ int btrfs_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) 
				XATTR_REPLACE);

}



int btrfs_xattr_security_init(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,

			      struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,

			      const struct qstr *qstr)

int btrfs_initxattrs(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr_array,

		     void *fs_info)

{

	int err;

	size_t len;

	void *value;

	char *suffix;

	const struct xattr *xattr;

	struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans = fs_info;

	char *name;

	int err = 0;



	err = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, &suffix, &value,

					   &len);

	if (err) {

		if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP)

			return 0;

		return err;

	}



	name = kmalloc(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN + strlen(suffix) + 1,

		       GFP_NOFS);

	for (xattr = xattr_array; xattr->name != NULL; xattr++) {

		name = kmalloc(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN +

			       strlen(xattr->name) + 1, GFP_NOFS);

		if (!name) {

			err = -ENOMEM;

	} else {

			break;

		}

		strcpy(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX);

		strcpy(name + XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN, suffix);

		err = __btrfs_setxattr(trans, inode, name, value, len, 0);

		strcpy(name + XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN, xattr->name);

		err = __btrfs_setxattr(trans, inode, name,

				       xattr->value, xattr->value_len, 0);

		kfree(name);

		if (err < 0)

			break;

	}



	kfree(suffix);

	kfree(value);

	return err;

}



int btrfs_xattr_security_init(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,

			      struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,

			      const struct qstr *qstr)

{

	return security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr,

					    &btrfs_initxattrs, trans);

}

fs/ext2/xattr_security.c

+18 −16
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -46,28 +46,30 @@ ext2_xattr_security_set(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, 
			      value, size, flags);

}



int

ext2_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,

		   const struct qstr *qstr)

int ext2_initxattrs(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr_array,

		    void *fs_info)

{

	int err;

	size_t len;

	void *value;

	char *name;

	const struct xattr *xattr;

	int err = 0;



	err = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, &name, &value, &len);

	if (err) {

		if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP)

			return 0;

		return err;

	}

	for (xattr = xattr_array; xattr->name != NULL; xattr++) {

		err = ext2_xattr_set(inode, EXT2_XATTR_INDEX_SECURITY,

			     name, value, len, 0);

	kfree(name);

	kfree(value);

				     xattr->name, xattr->value,

				     xattr->value_len, 0);

		if (err < 0)

			break;

	}

	return err;

}



int

ext2_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,

		   const struct qstr *qstr)

{

	return security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr,

					    &ext2_initxattrs, NULL);

}



const struct xattr_handler ext2_xattr_security_handler = {

	.prefix	= XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,

	.list	= ext2_xattr_security_list,