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Commit 3296ca27 authored by Linus Torvalds's avatar Linus Torvalds
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Merge branch 'for-linus' of... 

Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (44 commits)
  nommu: Provide mmap_min_addr definition.
  TOMOYO: Add description of lists and structures.
  TOMOYO: Remove unused field.
  integrity: ima audit dentry_open failure
  TOMOYO: Remove unused parameter.
  security: use mmap_min_addr indepedently of security models
  TOMOYO: Simplify policy reader.
  TOMOYO: Remove redundant markers.
  SELinux: define audit permissions for audit tree netlink messages
  TOMOYO: Remove unused mutex.
  tomoyo: avoid get+put of task_struct
  smack: Remove redundant initialization.
  integrity: nfsd imbalance bug fix
  rootplug: Remove redundant initialization.
  smack: do not beyond ARRAY_SIZE of data
  integrity: move ima_counts_get
  integrity: path_check update
  IMA: Add __init notation to ima functions
  IMA: Minimal IMA policy and boot param for TCB IMA policy
  selinux: remove obsolete read buffer limit from sel_read_bool
  ...
parents e893123c 73fbad28

Documentation/Smack.txt

+18 −2
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -184,8 +184,9 @@ length. Single character labels using special characters, that being anything 
other than a letter or digit, are reserved for use by the Smack development

team. Smack labels are unstructured, case sensitive, and the only operation

ever performed on them is comparison for equality. Smack labels cannot

contain unprintable characters or the "/" (slash) character. Smack labels

cannot begin with a '-', which is reserved for special options.

contain unprintable characters, the "/" (slash), the "\" (backslash), the "'"

(quote) and '"' (double-quote) characters.

Smack labels cannot begin with a '-', which is reserved for special options.



There are some predefined labels:
@@ -523,3 +524,18 @@ Smack supports some mount options: 


These mount options apply to all file system types.



Smack auditing



If you want Smack auditing of security events, you need to set CONFIG_AUDIT

in your kernel configuration.

By default, all denied events will be audited. You can change this behavior by

writing a single character to the /smack/logging file :

0 : no logging

1 : log denied (default)

2 : log accepted

3 : log denied & accepted



Events are logged as 'key=value' pairs, for each event you at least will get

the subjet, the object, the rights requested, the action, the kernel function

that triggered the event, plus other pairs depending on the type of event

audited.

Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt

+6 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -928,6 +928,12 @@ and is between 256 and 4096 characters. It is defined in the file 
			Formt: { "sha1" | "md5" }

			default: "sha1"



	ima_tcb		[IMA]

			Load a policy which meets the needs of the Trusted

			Computing Base.  This means IMA will measure all

			programs exec'd, files mmap'd for exec, and all files

			opened for read by uid=0.



	in2000=		[HW,SCSI]

			See header of drivers/scsi/in2000.c.

Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt

+11 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel: 
- kstack_depth_to_print       [ X86 only ]

- l2cr                        [ PPC only ]

- modprobe                    ==> Documentation/debugging-modules.txt

- modules_disabled

- msgmax

- msgmnb

- msgmni
@@ -184,6 +185,16 @@ kernel stack. 


==============================================================



modules_disabled:



A toggle value indicating if modules are allowed to be loaded

in an otherwise modular kernel.  This toggle defaults to off

(0), but can be set true (1).  Once true, modules can be

neither loaded nor unloaded, and the toggle cannot be set back

to false.



==============================================================



osrelease, ostype & version:



# cat osrelease

fs/compat.c

+3 −3
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -1488,7 +1488,7 @@ int compat_do_execve(char * filename, 
	if (!bprm)

		goto out_files;



	retval = mutex_lock_interruptible(&current->cred_exec_mutex);

	retval = mutex_lock_interruptible(&current->cred_guard_mutex);

	if (retval < 0)

		goto out_free;

	current->in_execve = 1;
@@ -1550,7 +1550,7 @@ int compat_do_execve(char * filename, 
	/* execve succeeded */

	current->fs->in_exec = 0;

	current->in_execve = 0;

	mutex_unlock(&current->cred_exec_mutex);

	mutex_unlock(&current->cred_guard_mutex);

	acct_update_integrals(current);

	free_bprm(bprm);

	if (displaced)
@@ -1573,7 +1573,7 @@ int compat_do_execve(char * filename, 


out_unlock:

	current->in_execve = 0;

	mutex_unlock(&current->cred_exec_mutex);

	mutex_unlock(&current->cred_guard_mutex);



out_free:

	free_bprm(bprm);

fs/exec.c

+5 −5
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -1016,7 +1016,7 @@ void install_exec_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) 
	commit_creds(bprm->cred);

	bprm->cred = NULL;



	/* cred_exec_mutex must be held at least to this point to prevent

	/* cred_guard_mutex must be held at least to this point to prevent

	 * ptrace_attach() from altering our determination of the task's

	 * credentials; any time after this it may be unlocked */
@@ -1026,7 +1026,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(install_exec_creds); 


/*

 * determine how safe it is to execute the proposed program

 * - the caller must hold current->cred_exec_mutex to protect against

 * - the caller must hold current->cred_guard_mutex to protect against

 *   PTRACE_ATTACH

 */

int check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
@@ -1268,7 +1268,7 @@ int do_execve(char * filename, 
	if (!bprm)

		goto out_files;



	retval = mutex_lock_interruptible(&current->cred_exec_mutex);

	retval = mutex_lock_interruptible(&current->cred_guard_mutex);

	if (retval < 0)

		goto out_free;

	current->in_execve = 1;
@@ -1331,7 +1331,7 @@ int do_execve(char * filename, 
	/* execve succeeded */

	current->fs->in_exec = 0;

	current->in_execve = 0;

	mutex_unlock(&current->cred_exec_mutex);

	mutex_unlock(&current->cred_guard_mutex);

	acct_update_integrals(current);

	free_bprm(bprm);

	if (displaced)
@@ -1354,7 +1354,7 @@ int do_execve(char * filename, 


out_unlock:

	current->in_execve = 0;

	mutex_unlock(&current->cred_exec_mutex);

	mutex_unlock(&current->cred_guard_mutex);



out_free:

	free_bprm(bprm);