CRED: Prettify commoncap.c

		return -EPERM;

	return 0;

}

EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv);

/*

/**

 * cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability

 * @tsk: The task to query

 * @cap: The capability to check for

 * @audit: Whether to write an audit message or not

 *

 * Determine whether the nominated task has the specified capability amongst

 * its effective set, returning 0 if it does, -ve if it does not.

 *

 * NOTE WELL: cap_capable() cannot be used like the kernel's capable()

 * function.  That is, it has the reverse semantics: cap_capable()

 * returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the kernel's capable()

 * returns 1 for this case.

 * function.  That is, it has the reverse semantics: cap_capable() returns 0

 * when a task has a capability, but the kernel's capable() returns 1 for this

 * case.

 */

int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap, int audit)

{

	return cap_raised ? 0 : -EPERM;

}

/**

 * cap_settime - Determine whether the current process may set the system clock

 * @ts: The time to set

 * @tz: The timezone to set

 *

 * Determine whether the current process may set the system clock and timezone

 * information, returning 0 if permission granted, -ve if denied.

 */

int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz)

{

	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_TIME))

	return 0;

}

/**

 * cap_ptrace_may_access - Determine whether the current process may access

 *			   another

 * @child: The process to be accessed

 * @mode: The mode of attachment.

 *

 * Determine whether a process may access another, returning 0 if permission

 * granted, -ve if denied.

 */

int cap_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)

{

	int ret = 0;

	return ret;

}

/**

 * cap_ptrace_traceme - Determine whether another process may trace the current

 * @parent: The task proposed to be the tracer

 *

 * Determine whether the nominated task is permitted to trace the current

 * process, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied.

 */

int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)

{

	int ret = 0;

	return ret;

}

/**

 * cap_capget - Retrieve a task's capability sets

 * @target: The task from which to retrieve the capability sets

 * @effective: The place to record the effective set

 * @inheritable: The place to record the inheritable set

 * @permitted: The place to record the permitted set

 *

 * This function retrieves the capabilities of the nominated task and returns

 * them to the caller.

 */

int cap_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,

	       kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)

{

	return 0;

}

#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES

static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void)

{

/*

	 * Return 1 if changes to the inheritable set are limited

	 * to the old permitted set. That is, if the current task

	 * does *not* possess the CAP_SETPCAP capability.

 * Determine whether the inheritable capabilities are limited to the old

 * permitted set.  Returns 1 if they are limited, 0 if they are not.

 */

	return cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0;

}

static inline int cap_limit_ptraced_target(void) { return 1; }

#else /* ie., ndef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */

static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void) { return 1; }

static inline int cap_limit_ptraced_target(void)

static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void)

{

	return !capable(CAP_SETPCAP);

}

#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES

#endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */

	/* they are so limited unless the current task has the CAP_SETPCAP

	 * capability

	 */

	if (cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0)

		return 0;

#endif

	return 1;

}

/**

 * cap_capset - Validate and apply proposed changes to current's capabilities

 * @new: The proposed new credentials; alterations should be made here

 * @old: The current task's current credentials

 * @effective: A pointer to the proposed new effective capabilities set

 * @inheritable: A pointer to the proposed new inheritable capabilities set

 * @permitted: A pointer to the proposed new permitted capabilities set

 *

 * This function validates and applies a proposed mass change to the current

 * process's capability sets.  The changes are made to the proposed new

 * credentials, and assuming no error, will be committed by the caller of LSM.

 */

int cap_capset(struct cred *new,

	       const struct cred *old,

	       const kernel_cap_t *effective,

	return 0;

}

/*

 * Clear proposed capability sets for execve().

 */

static inline void bprm_clear_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)

{

	cap_clear(bprm->cred->cap_permitted);

#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES

/**

 * cap_inode_need_killpriv - Determine if inode change affects privileges

 * @dentry: The inode/dentry in being changed with change marked ATTR_KILL_PRIV

 *

 * Determine if an inode having a change applied that's marked ATTR_KILL_PRIV

 * affects the security markings on that inode, and if it is, should

 * inode_killpriv() be invoked or the change rejected?

 *

 * Returns 0 if granted; +ve if granted, but inode_killpriv() is required; and

 * -ve to deny the change.

 */

int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)

{

	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;

	return 1;

}

/**

 * cap_inode_killpriv - Erase the security markings on an inode

 * @dentry: The inode/dentry to alter

 *

 * Erase the privilege-enhancing security markings on an inode.

 *

 * Returns 0 if successful, -ve on error.

 */

int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)

{

	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;

	return inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS);

}

/*

 * Calculate the new process capability sets from the capability sets attached

 * to a file.

 */

static inline int bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *caps,

					  struct linux_binprm *bprm,

					  bool *effective)

	return *effective ? ret : 0;

}

/*

 * Extract the on-exec-apply capability sets for an executable file.

 */

int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps)

{

	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;

	return 0;

}

/* Locate any VFS capabilities: */

/*

 * Attempt to get the on-exec apply capability sets for an executable file from

 * its xattrs and, if present, apply them to the proposed credentials being

 * constructed by execve().

 */

static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective)

{

	struct dentry *dentry;

#endif

/*

 * set up the new credentials for an exec'd task

 * Determine whether a exec'ing process's new permitted capabilities should be

 * limited to just what it already has.

 *

 * This prevents processes that are being ptraced from gaining access to

 * CAP_SETPCAP, unless the process they're tracing already has it, and the

 * binary they're executing has filecaps that elevate it.

 *

 *  Returns 1 if they should be limited, 0 if they are not.

 */

static inline int cap_limit_ptraced_target(void)

{

#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES

	if (capable(CAP_SETPCAP))

		return 0;

#endif

	return 1;

}

/**

 * cap_bprm_set_creds - Set up the proposed credentials for execve().

 * @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds

 *

 * Set up the proposed credentials for a new execution context being

 * constructed by execve().  The proposed creds in @bprm->cred is altered,

 * which won't take effect immediately.  Returns 0 if successful, -ve on error.

 */

int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)

{

	return 0;

}

/*

 * determine whether a secure execution is required

 * - the creds have been committed at this point, and are no longer available

 *   through bprm

/**

 * cap_bprm_secureexec - Determine whether a secure execution is required

 * @bprm: The execution parameters

 *

 * Determine whether a secure execution is required, return 1 if it is, and 0

 * if it is not.

 *

 * The credentials have been committed by this point, and so are no longer

 * available through @bprm->cred.

 */

int cap_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)

{

		cred->egid != cred->gid);

}

/**

 * cap_inode_setxattr - Determine whether an xattr may be altered

 * @dentry: The inode/dentry being altered

 * @name: The name of the xattr to be changed

 * @value: The value that the xattr will be changed to

 * @size: The size of value

 * @flags: The replacement flag

 *

 * Determine whether an xattr may be altered or set on an inode, returning 0 if

 * permission is granted, -ve if denied.

 *

 * This is used to make sure security xattrs don't get updated or set by those

 * who aren't privileged to do so.

 */

int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,

		       const void *value, size_t size, int flags)

{

		if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))

			return -EPERM;

		return 0;

	} else if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,

	}

	if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,

		     sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1)  &&

	    !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))

		return -EPERM;

	return 0;

}

/**

 * cap_inode_removexattr - Determine whether an xattr may be removed

 * @dentry: The inode/dentry being altered

 * @name: The name of the xattr to be changed

 *

 * Determine whether an xattr may be removed from an inode, returning 0 if

 * permission is granted, -ve if denied.

 *

 * This is used to make sure security xattrs don't get removed by those who

 * aren't privileged to remove them.

 */

int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)

{

	if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {

		if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))

			return -EPERM;

		return 0;

	} else if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,

	}

	if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,

		     sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1)  &&

	    !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))

		return -EPERM;

	return 0;

}

/* moved from kernel/sys.c. */

/*

 * cap_emulate_setxuid() fixes the effective / permitted capabilities of

 * a process after a call to setuid, setreuid, or setresuid.

		new->cap_effective = new->cap_permitted;

}

/**

 * cap_task_fix_setuid - Fix up the results of setuid() call

 * @new: The proposed credentials

 * @old: The current task's current credentials

 * @flags: Indications of what has changed

 *

 * Fix up the results of setuid() call before the credential changes are

 * actually applied, returning 0 to grant the changes, -ve to deny them.

 */

int cap_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags)

{

	switch (flags) {

	case LSM_SETID_RE:

	case LSM_SETID_ID:

	case LSM_SETID_RES:

		/* Copied from kernel/sys.c:setreuid/setuid/setresuid. */

		/* juggle the capabilities to follow [RES]UID changes unless

		 * otherwise suppressed */

		if (!issecure(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP))

			cap_emulate_setxuid(new, old);

		break;

	case LSM_SETID_FS:

		/* Copied from kernel/sys.c:setfsuid. */

		/*

	case LSM_SETID_FS:

		/* juggle the capabilties to follow FSUID changes, unless

		 * otherwise suppressed

		 *

		 * FIXME - is fsuser used for all CAP_FS_MASK capabilities?

		 *          if not, we might be a bit too harsh here.

		 */

		if (!issecure(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) {

			if (old->fsuid == 0 && new->fsuid != 0) {

			if (old->fsuid == 0 && new->fsuid != 0)

				new->cap_effective =

					cap_drop_fs_set(new->cap_effective);

			}

			if (old->fsuid != 0 && new->fsuid == 0) {

			if (old->fsuid != 0 && new->fsuid == 0)

				new->cap_effective =

					cap_raise_fs_set(new->cap_effective,

							 new->cap_permitted);

		}

		}

		break;

	default:

		return -EINVAL;

	}

	return 0;

}

/**

 * cap_task_setscheduler - Detemine if scheduler policy change is permitted

 * @p: The task to affect

 * @policy: The policy to effect

 * @lp: The parameters to the scheduling policy

 *

 * Detemine if the requested scheduler policy change is permitted for the

 * specified task, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied.

 */

int cap_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy,

			   struct sched_param *lp)

{

	return cap_safe_nice(p);

}

/**

 * cap_task_ioprio - Detemine if I/O priority change is permitted

 * @p: The task to affect

 * @ioprio: The I/O priority to set

 *

 * Detemine if the requested I/O priority change is permitted for the specified

 * task, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied.

 */

int cap_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)

{

	return cap_safe_nice(p);

}

/**

 * cap_task_ioprio - Detemine if task priority change is permitted

 * @p: The task to affect

 * @nice: The nice value to set

 *

 * Detemine if the requested task priority change is permitted for the

 * specified task, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied.

 */

int cap_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)

{

	return cap_safe_nice(p);

}

/*

 * called from kernel/sys.c for prctl(PR_CABSET_DROP)

 * done without task_capability_lock() because it introduces

 * no new races - i.e. only another task doing capget() on

 * this task could get inconsistent info.  There can be no

 * racing writer bc a task can only change its own caps.

 * Implement PR_CAPBSET_DROP.  Attempt to remove the specified capability from

 * the current task's bounding set.  Returns 0 on success, -ve on error.

 */

static long cap_prctl_drop(struct cred *new, unsigned long cap)

{

}

#endif

/**

 * cap_task_prctl - Implement process control functions for this security module

 * @option: The process control function requested

 * @arg2, @arg3, @arg4, @arg5: The argument data for this function

 *

 * Allow process control functions (sys_prctl()) to alter capabilities; may

 * also deny access to other functions not otherwise implemented here.

 *

 * Returns 0 or +ve on success, -ENOSYS if this function is not implemented

 * here, other -ve on error.  If -ENOSYS is returned, sys_prctl() and other LSM

 * modules will consider performing the function.

 */

int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,

		   unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)

{

	return error;

}

/**

 * cap_syslog - Determine whether syslog function is permitted

 * @type: Function requested

 *

 * Determine whether the current process is permitted to use a particular

 * syslog function, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if not.

 */

int cap_syslog(int type)

{

	if ((type != 3 && type != 10) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))

	return 0;

}

/**

 * cap_vm_enough_memory - Determine whether a new virtual mapping is permitted

 * @mm: The VM space in which the new mapping is to be made

 * @pages: The size of the mapping

 *

 * Determine whether the allocation of a new virtual mapping by the current

 * task is permitted, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if not.

 */

int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)

{

	int cap_sys_admin = 0;