Merge android-4.4.112 (5f6325b1) into msm-4.4

			- WriteBack: data is written only to the cache line and

				     the modified cache line is written to main

				     memory only when it is replaced

What:		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities

		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown

		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1

		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2

Date:		January 2018

Contact:	Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>

Description:	Information about CPU vulnerabilities

		The files are named after the code names of CPU

		vulnerabilities. The output of those files reflects the

		state of the CPUs in the system. Possible output values:

		"Not affected"	  CPU is not affected by the vulnerability

		"Vulnerable"	  CPU is affected and no mitigation in effect

		"Mitigation: $M"  CPU is affected and mitigation $M is in effect

	nojitter	[IA-64] Disables jitter checking for ITC timers.

	nopti		[X86-64] Disable KAISER isolation of kernel from user.

	no-kvmclock	[X86,KVM] Disable paravirtualized KVM clock driver

	no-kvmapf	[X86,KVM] Disable paravirtualized asynchronous page

	pt.		[PARIDE]

			See Documentation/blockdev/paride.txt.

	pti=		[X86_64]

			Control KAISER user/kernel address space isolation:

			on - enable

			off - disable

			auto - default setting

	pti=		[X86_64] Control Page Table Isolation of user and

			kernel address spaces.  Disabling this feature

			removes hardening, but improves performance of

			system calls and interrupts.

			on   - unconditionally enable

			off  - unconditionally disable

			auto - kernel detects whether your CPU model is

			       vulnerable to issues that PTI mitigates

			Not specifying this option is equivalent to pti=auto.

	nopti		[X86_64]

			Equivalent to pti=off

	pty.legacy_count=

			[KNL] Number of legacy pty's. Overwrites compiled-in

=============

TEE subsystem

=============

This document describes the TEE subsystem in Linux.

A TEE (Trusted Execution Environment) is a trusted OS running in some

TEE API.

Picture of the relationship between the different components in the

OP-TEE architecture.

OP-TEE architecture::

      User space                  Kernel                   Secure world

      ~~~~~~~~~~                  ~~~~~~                   ~~~~~~~~~~~~

tee-supplicant without further involvement of the driver, except switching

shared memory buffer representation.

References:

References

==========

[1] https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os

[2] http://infocenter.arm.com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.den0028a/index.html

[3] drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h

[4] drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h

[5] http://www.globalplatform.org/specificationsdevice.asp look for

    "TEE Client API Specification v1.0" and click download.

Overview

========

Page Table Isolation (pti, previously known as KAISER[1]) is a

countermeasure against attacks on the shared user/kernel address

space such as the "Meltdown" approach[2].

To mitigate this class of attacks, we create an independent set of

page tables for use only when running userspace applications.  When

the kernel is entered via syscalls, interrupts or exceptions, the

page tables are switched to the full "kernel" copy.  When the system

switches back to user mode, the user copy is used again.

The userspace page tables contain only a minimal amount of kernel

data: only what is needed to enter/exit the kernel such as the

entry/exit functions themselves and the interrupt descriptor table

(IDT).  There are a few strictly unnecessary things that get mapped

such as the first C function when entering an interrupt (see

comments in pti.c).

This approach helps to ensure that side-channel attacks leveraging

the paging structures do not function when PTI is enabled.  It can be

enabled by setting CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y at compile time.

Once enabled at compile-time, it can be disabled at boot with the

'nopti' or 'pti=' kernel parameters (see kernel-parameters.txt).

Page Table Management

=====================

When PTI is enabled, the kernel manages two sets of page tables.

The first set is very similar to the single set which is present in

kernels without PTI.  This includes a complete mapping of userspace

that the kernel can use for things like copy_to_user().

Although _complete_, the user portion of the kernel page tables is

crippled by setting the NX bit in the top level.  This ensures

that any missed kernel->user CR3 switch will immediately crash

userspace upon executing its first instruction.

The userspace page tables map only the kernel data needed to enter

and exit the kernel.  This data is entirely contained in the 'struct

cpu_entry_area' structure which is placed in the fixmap which gives

each CPU's copy of the area a compile-time-fixed virtual address.

For new userspace mappings, the kernel makes the entries in its

page tables like normal.  The only difference is when the kernel

makes entries in the top (PGD) level.  In addition to setting the

entry in the main kernel PGD, a copy of the entry is made in the

userspace page tables' PGD.

This sharing at the PGD level also inherently shares all the lower

layers of the page tables.  This leaves a single, shared set of

userspace page tables to manage.  One PTE to lock, one set of

accessed bits, dirty bits, etc...

Overhead

========

Protection against side-channel attacks is important.  But,

this protection comes at a cost:

1. Increased Memory Use

  a. Each process now needs an order-1 PGD instead of order-0.

     (Consumes an additional 4k per process).

  b. The 'cpu_entry_area' structure must be 2MB in size and 2MB

     aligned so that it can be mapped by setting a single PMD

     entry.  This consumes nearly 2MB of RAM once the kernel

     is decompressed, but no space in the kernel image itself.

2. Runtime Cost

  a. CR3 manipulation to switch between the page table copies

     must be done at interrupt, syscall, and exception entry

     and exit (it can be skipped when the kernel is interrupted,

     though.)  Moves to CR3 are on the order of a hundred

     cycles, and are required at every entry and exit.

  b. A "trampoline" must be used for SYSCALL entry.  This

     trampoline depends on a smaller set of resources than the

     non-PTI SYSCALL entry code, so requires mapping fewer

     things into the userspace page tables.  The downside is

     that stacks must be switched at entry time.

  d. Global pages are disabled for all kernel structures not

     mapped into both kernel and userspace page tables.  This

     feature of the MMU allows different processes to share TLB

     entries mapping the kernel.  Losing the feature means more

     TLB misses after a context switch.  The actual loss of

     performance is very small, however, never exceeding 1%.

  d. Process Context IDentifiers (PCID) is a CPU feature that

     allows us to skip flushing the entire TLB when switching page

     tables by setting a special bit in CR3 when the page tables

     are changed.  This makes switching the page tables (at context

     switch, or kernel entry/exit) cheaper.  But, on systems with

     PCID support, the context switch code must flush both the user

     and kernel entries out of the TLB.  The user PCID TLB flush is

     deferred until the exit to userspace, minimizing the cost.

     See intel.com/sdm for the gory PCID/INVPCID details.

  e. The userspace page tables must be populated for each new

     process.  Even without PTI, the shared kernel mappings

     are created by copying top-level (PGD) entries into each

     new process.  But, with PTI, there are now *two* kernel

     mappings: one in the kernel page tables that maps everything

     and one for the entry/exit structures.  At fork(), we need to

     copy both.

  f. In addition to the fork()-time copying, there must also

     be an update to the userspace PGD any time a set_pgd() is done

     on a PGD used to map userspace.  This ensures that the kernel

     and userspace copies always map the same userspace

     memory.

  g. On systems without PCID support, each CR3 write flushes

     the entire TLB.  That means that each syscall, interrupt

     or exception flushes the TLB.

  h. INVPCID is a TLB-flushing instruction which allows flushing

     of TLB entries for non-current PCIDs.  Some systems support

     PCIDs, but do not support INVPCID.  On these systems, addresses

     can only be flushed from the TLB for the current PCID.  When

     flushing a kernel address, we need to flush all PCIDs, so a

     single kernel address flush will require a TLB-flushing CR3

     write upon the next use of every PCID.

Possible Future Work

====================

1. We can be more careful about not actually writing to CR3

   unless its value is actually changed.

2. Allow PTI to be enabled/disabled at runtime in addition to the

   boot-time switching.

Testing

========

To test stability of PTI, the following test procedure is recommended,

ideally doing all of these in parallel:

1. Set CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY=y

2. Run several copies of all of the tools/testing/selftests/x86/ tests

   (excluding MPX and protection_keys) in a loop on multiple CPUs for

   several minutes.  These tests frequently uncover corner cases in the

   kernel entry code.  In general, old kernels might cause these tests

   themselves to crash, but they should never crash the kernel.

3. Run the 'perf' tool in a mode (top or record) that generates many

   frequent performance monitoring non-maskable interrupts (see "NMI"

   in /proc/interrupts).  This exercises the NMI entry/exit code which

   is known to trigger bugs in code paths that did not expect to be

   interrupted, including nested NMIs.  Using "-c" boosts the rate of

   NMIs, and using two -c with separate counters encourages nested NMIs

   and less deterministic behavior.

	while true; do perf record -c 10000 -e instructions,cycles -a sleep 10; done

4. Launch a KVM virtual machine.

5. Run 32-bit binaries on systems supporting the SYSCALL instruction.

   This has been a lightly-tested code path and needs extra scrutiny.

Debugging

=========

Bugs in PTI cause a few different signatures of crashes

that are worth noting here.

 * Failures of the selftests/x86 code.  Usually a bug in one of the

   more obscure corners of entry_64.S

 * Crashes in early boot, especially around CPU bringup.  Bugs

   in the trampoline code or mappings cause these.

 * Crashes at the first interrupt.  Caused by bugs in entry_64.S,

   like screwing up a page table switch.  Also caused by

   incorrectly mapping the IRQ handler entry code.

 * Crashes at the first NMI.  The NMI code is separate from main

   interrupt handlers and can have bugs that do not affect

   normal interrupts.  Also caused by incorrectly mapping NMI

   code.  NMIs that interrupt the entry code must be very

   careful and can be the cause of crashes that show up when

   running perf.

 * Kernel crashes at the first exit to userspace.  entry_64.S

   bugs, or failing to map some of the exit code.

 * Crashes at first interrupt that interrupts userspace. The paths

   in entry_64.S that return to userspace are sometimes separate

   from the ones that return to the kernel.

 * Double faults: overflowing the kernel stack because of page

   faults upon page faults.  Caused by touching non-pti-mapped

   data in the entry code, or forgetting to switch to kernel

   CR3 before calling into C functions which are not pti-mapped.

 * Userspace segfaults early in boot, sometimes manifesting

   as mount(8) failing to mount the rootfs.  These have

   tended to be TLB invalidation issues.  Usually invalidating

   the wrong PCID, or otherwise missing an invalidation.

1. https://gruss.cc/files/kaiser.pdf

2. https://meltdownattack.com/meltdown.pdf

VERSION = 4

PATCHLEVEL = 4

SUBLEVEL = 111

SUBLEVEL = 112

EXTRAVERSION =

NAME = Blurry Fish Butt