Merge pull request #60 from derfelot/lineage-19.0_bpf (6836081f) · Commits · e / devices / android_kernel_sony_msm8998

Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt

+35 −0

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel:
		- panic_on_warn
		- perf_cpu_time_max_percent
		- perf_event_paranoid
		- perf_event_max_stack
		- pid_max
		- powersave-nap [ PPC only ]
		- printk
		@@ -88,6 +89,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel:
		- sysctl_writes_strict
		- tainted
		- threads-max
		- unprivileged_bpf_disabled
		- unknown_nmi_panic
		- watchdog
		- watchdog_thresh
		@@ -665,6 +667,19 @@ CONFIG_SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT is set, or 1 otherwise.

		==============================================================

		perf_event_max_stack:

		Controls maximum number of stack frames to copy for (attr.sample_type &
		PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN) configured events, for instance, when using
		'perf record -g' or 'perf trace --call-graph fp'.

		This can only be done when no events are in use that have callchains
		enabled, otherwise writing to this file will return -EBUSY.

		The default value is 127.

		==============================================================

		pid_max:

		PID allocation wrap value. When the kernel's next PID value
		@@ -944,6 +959,26 @@ available RAM pages threads-max is reduced accordingly.

		==============================================================

		unprivileged_bpf_disabled:

		Writing 1 to this entry will disable unprivileged calls to bpf();
		once disabled, calling bpf() without CAP_SYS_ADMIN will return
		-EPERM. Once set to 1, this can't be cleared from the running kernel
		anymore.

		Writing 2 to this entry will also disable unprivileged calls to bpf(),
		however, an admin can still change this setting later on, if needed, by
		writing 0 or 1 to this entry.

		If BPF_UNPRIV_DEFAULT_OFF is enabled in the kernel config, then this
		entry will default to 2 instead of 0.

		0 - Unprivileged calls to bpf() are enabled
		1 - Unprivileged calls to bpf() are disabled without recovery
		2 - Unprivileged calls to bpf() are disabled

		==============================================================

		unknown_nmi_panic:

		The value in this file affects behavior of handling NMI. When the

Documentation/sysctl/net.txt

+19 −0

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -43,6 +43,25 @@ Values :
		1 - enable the JIT
		2 - enable the JIT and ask the compiler to emit traces on kernel log.

		bpf_jit_harden
		--------------

		This enables hardening for the Berkeley Packet Filter Just in Time compiler.
		Supported are eBPF JIT backends. Enabling hardening trades off performance,
		but can mitigate JIT spraying.
		Values :
		0 - disable JIT hardening (default value)
		1 - enable JIT hardening for unprivileged users only
		2 - enable JIT hardening for all users

		bpf_jit_limit
		-------------

		This enforces a global limit for memory allocations to the BPF JIT
		compiler in order to reject unprivileged JIT requests once it has
		been surpassed. bpf_jit_limit contains the value of the global limit
		in bytes.

		dev_weight
		--------------

arch/alpha/include/uapi/asm/socket.h

+3 −0

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -92,4 +92,7 @@
		#define SO_ATTACH_BPF 50
		#define SO_DETACH_BPF SO_DETACH_FILTER

		#define SO_ATTACH_REUSEPORT_CBPF 51
		#define SO_ATTACH_REUSEPORT_EBPF 52

		#endif /* _UAPI_ASM_SOCKET_H */

arch/arc/kernel/perf_event.c

+3 −3

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ struct arc_callchain_trace {
		static int callchain_trace(unsigned int addr, void *data)
		{
		struct arc_callchain_trace *ctrl = data;
		struct perf_callchain_entry *entry = ctrl->perf_stuff;
		struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx *entry = ctrl->perf_stuff;
		perf_callchain_store(entry, addr);

		if (ctrl->depth++ < 3)
		@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ static int callchain_trace(unsigned int addr, void *data)
		}

		void
		perf_callchain_kernel(struct perf_callchain_entry entry, struct pt_regs regs)
		perf_callchain_kernel(struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx entry, struct pt_regs regs)
		{
		struct arc_callchain_trace ctrl = {
		.depth = 0,
		@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ perf_callchain_kernel(struct perf_callchain_entry entry, struct pt_regs regs)
		}

		void
		perf_callchain_user(struct perf_callchain_entry entry, struct pt_regs regs)
		perf_callchain_user(struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx entry, struct pt_regs regs)
		{
		/*
		* User stack can't be unwound trivially with kernel dwarf unwinder

arch/arm/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c

+8 −17

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -631,7 +631,7 @@ int arch_validate_hwbkpt_settings(struct perf_event *bp)
		info->address &= ~alignment_mask;
		info->ctrl.len <<= offset;

		if (!bp->overflow_handler) {
		if (is_default_overflow_handler(bp)) {
		/*
		* Mismatch breakpoints are required for single-stepping
		* breakpoints.
		@@ -688,12 +688,6 @@ static void disable_single_step(struct perf_event *bp)
		arch_install_hw_breakpoint(bp);
		}

		static int watchpoint_fault_on_uaccess(struct pt_regs *regs,
		struct arch_hw_breakpoint *info)
		{
		return !user_mode(regs) && info->ctrl.privilege == ARM_BREAKPOINT_USER;
		}

		static void watchpoint_handler(unsigned long addr, unsigned int fsr,
		struct pt_regs *regs)
		{
		@@ -760,19 +754,16 @@ static void watchpoint_handler(unsigned long addr, unsigned int fsr,
		* can't help us with this.
		*/
		if (watchpoint_fault_on_uaccess(regs, info))
		goto step;
		enable_single_step(wp, instruction_pointer(regs));

		perf_bp_event(wp, regs);

		/*
		* Defer stepping to the overflow handler if one is installed.
		* Otherwise, insert a temporary mismatch breakpoint so that
		* we can single-step over the watchpoint trigger.
		* If no overflow handler is present, insert a temporary
		* mismatch breakpoint so we can single-step over the
		* watchpoint trigger.
		*/
		if (wp->overflow_handler)
		goto unlock;

		step:
		if (is_default_overflow_handler(wp))
		enable_single_step(wp, instruction_pointer(regs));
		unlock:
		rcu_read_unlock();