Donate to e Foundation | Murena handsets with /e/OS | Own a part of Murena! Learn more

Commit ea156d19 authored by Paolo Bonzini's avatar Paolo Bonzini Committed by Thomas Gleixner
Browse files

x86/speculation: Simplify sysfs report of VMX L1TF vulnerability 



Three changes to the content of the sysfs file:

 - If EPT is disabled, L1TF cannot be exploited even across threads on the
   same core, and SMT is irrelevant.

 - If mitigation is completely disabled, and SMT is enabled, print "vulnerable"
   instead of "vulnerable, SMT vulnerable"

 - Reorder the two parts so that the main vulnerability state comes first
   and the detail on SMT is second.

Signed-off-by: default avatarPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
parent 58331136

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c

+9 −3
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -762,9 +762,15 @@ static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf) 
	if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO)

		return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG);



	return sprintf(buf, "%s; VMX: SMT %s, L1D %s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG,

		       cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED ? "vulnerable" : "disabled",

	if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_EPT_DISABLED ||

	    (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER &&

	     cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED))

		return sprintf(buf, "%s; VMX: %s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG,

			       l1tf_vmx_states[l1tf_vmx_mitigation]);



	return sprintf(buf, "%s; VMX: %s, SMT %s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG,

		       l1tf_vmx_states[l1tf_vmx_mitigation],

		       cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");

}

#else

static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf)