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Commit e7691a1c authored by Linus Torvalds's avatar Linus Torvalds
Browse files
* 'for-linus' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-security: (32 commits)
  ima: fix invalid memory reference
  ima: free duplicate measurement memory
  security: update security_file_mmap() docs
  selinux: Casting (void *) value returned by kmalloc is useless
  apparmor: fix module parameter handling
  Security: tomoyo: add .gitignore file
  tomoyo: add missing rcu_dereference()
  apparmor: add missing rcu_dereference()
  evm: prevent racing during tfm allocation
  evm: key must be set once during initialization
  mpi/mpi-mpow: NULL dereference on allocation failure
  digsig: build dependency fix
  KEYS: Give key types their own lockdep class for key->sem
  TPM: fix transmit_cmd error logic
  TPM: NSC and TIS drivers X86 dependency fix
  TPM: Export wait_for_stat for other vendor specific drivers
  TPM: Use vendor specific function for status probe
  tpm_tis: add delay after aborting command
  tpm_tis: Check return code from getting timeouts/durations
  tpm: Introduce function to poll for result of self test
  ...

Fix up trivial conflict in lib/Makefile due to addition of CONFIG_MPI
and SIGSIG next to CONFIG_DQL addition.
parents 5cd9599b 8fcc9954
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Digital Signature Verification API

CONTENTS

1. Introduction
2. API
3. User-space utilities


1. Introduction

Digital signature verification API provides a method to verify digital signature.
Currently digital signatures are used by the IMA/EVM integrity protection subsystem.

Digital signature verification is implemented using cut-down kernel port of
GnuPG multi-precision integers (MPI) library. The kernel port provides
memory allocation errors handling, has been refactored according to kernel
coding style, and checkpatch.pl reported errors and warnings have been fixed.

Public key and signature consist of header and MPIs.

struct pubkey_hdr {
	uint8_t		version;	/* key format version */
	time_t		timestamp;	/* key made, always 0 for now */
	uint8_t		algo;
	uint8_t		nmpi;
	char		mpi[0];
} __packed;

struct signature_hdr {
	uint8_t		version;	/* signature format version */
	time_t		timestamp;	/* signature made */
	uint8_t		algo;
	uint8_t		hash;
	uint8_t		keyid[8];
	uint8_t		nmpi;
	char		mpi[0];
} __packed;

keyid equals to SHA1[12-19] over the total key content.
Signature header is used as an input to generate a signature.
Such approach insures that key or signature header could not be changed.
It protects timestamp from been changed and can be used for rollback
protection.

2. API

API currently includes only 1 function:

	digsig_verify() - digital signature verification with public key


/**
 * digsig_verify() - digital signature verification with public key
 * @keyring:	keyring to search key in
 * @sig:	digital signature
 * @sigen:	length of the signature
 * @data:	data
 * @datalen:	length of the data
 * @return:	0 on success, -EINVAL otherwise
 *
 * Verifies data integrity against digital signature.
 * Currently only RSA is supported.
 * Normally hash of the content is used as a data for this function.
 *
 */
int digsig_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig, int siglen,
						const char *data, int datalen);

3. User-space utilities

The signing and key management utilities evm-utils provide functionality
to generate signatures, to load keys into the kernel keyring.
Keys can be in PEM or converted to the kernel format.
When the key is added to the kernel keyring, the keyid defines the name
of the key: 5D2B05FC633EE3E8 in the example bellow.

Here is example output of the keyctl utility.

$ keyctl show
Session Keyring
       -3 --alswrv      0     0  keyring: _ses
603976250 --alswrv      0    -1   \_ keyring: _uid.0
817777377 --alswrv      0     0       \_ user: kmk
891974900 --alswrv      0     0       \_ encrypted: evm-key
170323636 --alswrv      0     0       \_ keyring: _module
548221616 --alswrv      0     0       \_ keyring: _ima
128198054 --alswrv      0     0       \_ keyring: _evm

$ keyctl list 128198054
1 key in keyring:
620789745: --alswrv     0     0 user: 5D2B05FC633EE3E8


Dmitry Kasatkin
06.10.2011
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00-INDEX
	- this file.
LSM.txt
	- description of the Linux Security Module framework.
SELinux.txt
	- how to get started with the SELinux security enhancement.
Smack.txt
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Linux Security Module framework
-------------------------------

The Linux Security Module (LSM) framework provides a mechanism for
various security checks to be hooked by new kernel extensions. The name
"module" is a bit of a misnomer since these extensions are not actually
loadable kernel modules. Instead, they are selectable at build-time via
CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY and can be overridden at boot-time via the
"security=..." kernel command line argument, in the case where multiple
LSMs were built into a given kernel.

The primary users of the LSM interface are Mandatory Access Control
(MAC) extensions which provide a comprehensive security policy. Examples
include SELinux, Smack, Tomoyo, and AppArmor. In addition to the larger
MAC extensions, other extensions can be built using the LSM to provide
specific changes to system operation when these tweaks are not available
in the core functionality of Linux itself.

Without a specific LSM built into the kernel, the default LSM will be the
Linux capabilities system. Most LSMs choose to extend the capabilities
system, building their checks on top of the defined capability hooks.
For more details on capabilities, see capabilities(7) in the Linux
man-pages project.

Based on http://kerneltrap.org/Linux/Documenting_Security_Module_Intent,
a new LSM is accepted into the kernel when its intent (a description of
what it tries to protect against and in what cases one would expect to
use it) has been appropriately documented in Documentation/security/.
This allows an LSM's code to be easily compared to its goals, and so
that end users and distros can make a more informed decision about which
LSMs suit their requirements.

For extensive documentation on the available LSM hook interfaces, please
see include/linux/security.h.
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@@ -221,10 +221,10 @@ The Linux kernel supports the following types of credentials:
 (5) LSM

     The Linux Security Module allows extra controls to be placed over the
     operations that a task may do.  Currently Linux supports two main
     alternate LSM options: SELinux and Smack.
     operations that a task may do.  Currently Linux supports several LSM
     options.

     Both work by labelling the objects in a system and then applying sets of
     Some work by labelling the objects in a system and then applying sets of
     rules (policies) that say what operations a task with one label may do to
     an object with another label.

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@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ if TCG_TPM

config TCG_TIS
	tristate "TPM Interface Specification 1.2 Interface"
	depends on X86
	---help---
	  If you have a TPM security chip that is compliant with the
	  TCG TIS 1.2 TPM specification say Yes and it will be accessible
@@ -35,6 +36,7 @@ config TCG_TIS

config TCG_NSC
	tristate "National Semiconductor TPM Interface"
	depends on X86
	---help---
	  If you have a TPM security chip from National Semiconductor 
	  say Yes and it will be accessible from within Linux.  To 
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