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Commit 95a69ada authored by Tomas Hozza's avatar Tomas Hozza Committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
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tools: hv: Netlink source address validation allows DoS 



The source code without this patch caused hypervkvpd to exit when it processed
a spoofed Netlink packet which has been sent from an untrusted local user.
Now Netlink messages with a non-zero nl_pid source address are ignored
and a warning is printed into the syslog.

Signed-off-by: default avatarTomas Hozza <thozza@redhat.com>
Acked-by: default avatarK. Y. Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
parent aeba4a06

tools/hv/hv_kvp_daemon.c

+7 −1
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -1486,13 +1486,19 @@ int main(void) 
		len = recvfrom(fd, kvp_recv_buffer, sizeof(kvp_recv_buffer), 0,

				addr_p, &addr_l);



		if (len < 0 || addr.nl_pid) {

		if (len < 0) {

			syslog(LOG_ERR, "recvfrom failed; pid:%u error:%d %s",

					addr.nl_pid, errno, strerror(errno));

			close(fd);

			return -1;

		}



		if (addr.nl_pid) {

			syslog(LOG_WARNING, "Received packet from untrusted pid:%u",

					addr.nl_pid);

			continue;

		}



		incoming_msg = (struct nlmsghdr *)kvp_recv_buffer;

		incoming_cn_msg = (struct cn_msg *)NLMSG_DATA(incoming_msg);

		hv_msg = (struct hv_kvp_msg *)incoming_cn_msg->data;