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Commit 0f15adbb authored by Will Deacon's avatar Will Deacon Committed by Catalin Marinas
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arm64: Add skeleton to harden the branch predictor against aliasing attacks



Aliasing attacks against CPU branch predictors can allow an attacker to
redirect speculative control flow on some CPUs and potentially divulge
information from one context to another.

This patch adds initial skeleton code behind a new Kconfig option to
enable implementation-specific mitigations against these attacks for
CPUs that are affected.

Co-developed-by: default avatarMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
parent 95e3de35
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+17 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -874,6 +874,23 @@ config UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0

	  If unsure, say Y.

config HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
	bool "Harden the branch predictor against aliasing attacks" if EXPERT
	default y
	help
	  Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors rely on
	  being able to manipulate the branch predictor for a victim context by
	  executing aliasing branches in the attacker context.  Such attacks
	  can be partially mitigated against by clearing internal branch
	  predictor state and limiting the prediction logic in some situations.

	  This config option will take CPU-specific actions to harden the
	  branch predictor against aliasing attacks and may rely on specific
	  instruction sequences or control bits being set by the system
	  firmware.

	  If unsure, say Y.

menuconfig ARMV8_DEPRECATED
	bool "Emulate deprecated/obsolete ARMv8 instructions"
	depends on COMPAT
+2 −1
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -42,7 +42,8 @@
#define ARM64_HAS_DCPOP				21
#define ARM64_SVE				22
#define ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0		23
#define ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR		24

#define ARM64_NCAPS				24
#define ARM64_NCAPS				25

#endif /* __ASM_CPUCAPS_H */
+37 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -41,6 +41,43 @@ static inline bool arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0(void)
	       cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0);
}

typedef void (*bp_hardening_cb_t)(void);

struct bp_hardening_data {
	int			hyp_vectors_slot;
	bp_hardening_cb_t	fn;
};

#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
extern char __bp_harden_hyp_vecs_start[], __bp_harden_hyp_vecs_end[];

DECLARE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct bp_hardening_data, bp_hardening_data);

static inline struct bp_hardening_data *arm64_get_bp_hardening_data(void)
{
	return this_cpu_ptr(&bp_hardening_data);
}

static inline void arm64_apply_bp_hardening(void)
{
	struct bp_hardening_data *d;

	if (!cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR))
		return;

	d = arm64_get_bp_hardening_data();
	if (d->fn)
		d->fn();
}
#else
static inline struct bp_hardening_data *arm64_get_bp_hardening_data(void)
{
	return NULL;
}

static inline void arm64_apply_bp_hardening(void)	{ }
#endif	/* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR */

extern void paging_init(void);
extern void bootmem_init(void);
extern void __iomem *early_io_map(phys_addr_t phys, unsigned long virt);
+1 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -439,6 +439,7 @@

/* id_aa64pfr0 */
#define ID_AA64PFR0_CSV3_SHIFT		60
#define ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT		56
#define ID_AA64PFR0_SVE_SHIFT		32
#define ID_AA64PFR0_GIC_SHIFT		24
#define ID_AA64PFR0_ASIMD_SHIFT		20
+4 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -53,6 +53,10 @@ arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_ARM64_RELOC_TEST) += arm64-reloc-test.o
arm64-reloc-test-y := reloc_test_core.o reloc_test_syms.o
arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP)		+= crash_dump.o

ifeq ($(CONFIG_KVM),y)
arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR)	+= bpi.o
endif

obj-y					+= $(arm64-obj-y) vdso/ probes/
obj-m					+= $(arm64-obj-m)
head-y					:= head.o
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