Merge tag 'spi-nor/for-4.21' of git://git.infradead.org/linux-mtd into mtd/next

D: Soundblaster driver fixes, ISAPnP quirk

S: California, USA

N: Jarkko Lavinen

E: jarkko.lavinen@nokia.com

D: OMAP MMC support

N: Jonathan Layes

D: ARPD support

S: North Little Rock, Arkansas 72115

S: USA

N: Christopher Li

E: sparse@chrisli.org

D: Sparse maintainer 2009 - 2018

N: Stephan Linz

E: linz@mazet.de

E: Stephan.Linz@gmx.de

			causing system reset or hang due to sending

			INIT from AP to BSP.

	disable_counter_freezing [HW]

	perf_v4_pmi=	[X86,INTEL]

			Format: <bool>

			Disable Intel PMU counter freezing feature.

			The feature only exists starting from

			Arch Perfmon v4 (Skylake and newer).

			before loading.

			See Documentation/blockdev/ramdisk.txt.

	psi=		[KNL] Enable or disable pressure stall information

			tracking.

			Format: <bool>

	psmouse.proto=	[HW,MOUSE] Highest PS2 mouse protocol extension to

			probe for; one of (bare|imps|exps|lifebook|any).

	psmouse.rate=	[HW,MOUSE] Set desired mouse report rate, in reports

	spectre_v2=	[X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2

			(indirect branch speculation) vulnerability.

			The default operation protects the kernel from

			user space attacks.

			on   - unconditionally enable

			off  - unconditionally disable

			on   - unconditionally enable, implies

			       spectre_v2_user=on

			off  - unconditionally disable, implies

			       spectre_v2_user=off

			auto - kernel detects whether your CPU model is

			       vulnerable

			CONFIG_RETPOLINE configuration option, and the

			compiler with which the kernel was built.

			Selecting 'on' will also enable the mitigation

			against user space to user space task attacks.

			Selecting 'off' will disable both the kernel and

			the user space protections.

			Specific mitigations can also be selected manually:

			retpoline	  - replace indirect branches

			Not specifying this option is equivalent to

			spectre_v2=auto.

	spectre_v2_user=

			[X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2

		        (indirect branch speculation) vulnerability between

		        user space tasks

			on	- Unconditionally enable mitigations. Is

				  enforced by spectre_v2=on

			off     - Unconditionally disable mitigations. Is

				  enforced by spectre_v2=off

			prctl   - Indirect branch speculation is enabled,

				  but mitigation can be enabled via prctl

				  per thread.  The mitigation control state

				  is inherited on fork.

			prctl,ibpb

				- Like "prctl" above, but only STIBP is

				  controlled per thread. IBPB is issued

				  always when switching between different user

				  space processes.

			seccomp

				- Same as "prctl" above, but all seccomp

				  threads will enable the mitigation unless

				  they explicitly opt out.

			seccomp,ibpb

				- Like "seccomp" above, but only STIBP is

				  controlled per thread. IBPB is issued

				  always when switching between different

				  user space processes.

			auto    - Kernel selects the mitigation depending on

				  the available CPU features and vulnerability.

			Default mitigation:

			If CONFIG_SECCOMP=y then "seccomp", otherwise "prctl"

			Not specifying this option is equivalent to

			spectre_v2_user=auto.

	spec_store_bypass_disable=

			[HW] Control Speculative Store Bypass (SSB) Disable mitigation

			(Speculative Store Bypass vulnerability)

					prevent spurious wakeup);

				n = USB_QUIRK_DELAY_CTRL_MSG (Device needs a

					pause after every control message);

				o = USB_QUIRK_HUB_SLOW_RESET (Hub needs extra

					delay after resetting its port);

			Example: quirks=0781:5580:bk,0a5c:5834:gij

	usbhid.mousepoll=

a governor ``sysfs`` interface to it.  Next, the governor is started by

invoking its ``->start()`` callback.

That callback it expected to register per-CPU utilization update callbacks for

That callback is expected to register per-CPU utilization update callbacks for

all of the online CPUs belonging to the given policy with the CPU scheduler.

The utilization update callbacks will be invoked by the CPU scheduler on

important events, like task enqueue and dequeue, on every iteration of the

The security list is not a disclosure channel.  For that, see Coordination

below.

Once a robust fix has been developed, our preference is to release the

fix in a timely fashion, treating it no differently than any of the other

thousands of changes and fixes the Linux kernel project releases every

month.

However, at the request of the reporter, we will postpone releasing the

fix for up to 5 business days after the date of the report or after the

embargo has lifted; whichever comes first.  The only exception to that

rule is if the bug is publicly known, in which case the preference is to

release the fix as soon as it's available.

Once a robust fix has been developed, the release process starts.  Fixes

for publicly known bugs are released immediately.

Although our preference is to release fixes for publicly undisclosed bugs

as soon as they become available, this may be postponed at the request of

the reporter or an affected party for up to 7 calendar days from the start

of the release process, with an exceptional extension to 14 calendar days

if it is agreed that the criticality of the bug requires more time.  The

only valid reason for deferring the publication of a fix is to accommodate

the logistics of QA and large scale rollouts which require release

coordination.

Whilst embargoed information may be shared with trusted individuals in

order to develop a fix, such information will not be published alongside

| ARM            | Cortex-A73      | #858921         | ARM64_ERRATUM_858921        |

| ARM            | Cortex-A55      | #1024718        | ARM64_ERRATUM_1024718       |

| ARM            | Cortex-A76      | #1188873        | ARM64_ERRATUM_1188873       |

| ARM            | Cortex-A76      | #1286807        | ARM64_ERRATUM_1286807       |

| ARM            | MMU-500         | #841119,#826419 | N/A                         |

|                |                 |                 |                             |

| Cavium         | ThunderX ITS    | #22375, #24313  | CAVIUM_ERRATUM_22375        |