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Commit c01b171c authored by Greg Kroah-Hartman's avatar Greg Kroah-Hartman
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Merge 5.4.217 into android11-5.4-lts 



Changes in 5.4.217
	Revert "x86/speculation: Add RSB VM Exit protections"
	Revert "x86/cpu: Add a steppings field to struct x86_cpu_id"
	x86/devicetable: Move x86 specific macro out of generic code
	x86/cpu: Add consistent CPU match macros
	x86/cpu: Add a steppings field to struct x86_cpu_id
	x86/kvm/vmx: Make noinstr clean
	x86/cpufeatures: Move RETPOLINE flags to word 11
	x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability
	x86/bugs: Add AMD retbleed= boot parameter
	x86/bugs: Keep a per-CPU IA32_SPEC_CTRL value
	x86/entry: Remove skip_r11rcx
	x86/entry: Add kernel IBRS implementation
	x86/bugs: Optimize SPEC_CTRL MSR writes
	x86/speculation: Add spectre_v2=ibrs option to support Kernel IBRS
	x86/bugs: Split spectre_v2_select_mitigation() and spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation()
	x86/bugs: Report Intel retbleed vulnerability
	intel_idle: Disable IBRS during long idle
	x86/speculation: Change FILL_RETURN_BUFFER to work with objtool
	x86/speculation: Fix RSB filling with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n
	x86/speculation: Fix firmware entry SPEC_CTRL handling
	x86/speculation: Fix SPEC_CTRL write on SMT state change
	x86/speculation: Use cached host SPEC_CTRL value for guest entry/exit
	x86/speculation: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_mask
	KVM/VMX: Use TEST %REG,%REG instead of CMP $0,%REG in vmenter.S
	KVM/nVMX: Use __vmx_vcpu_run in nested_vmx_check_vmentry_hw
	KVM: VMX: Flatten __vmx_vcpu_run()
	KVM: VMX: Convert launched argument to flags
	KVM: VMX: Prevent guest RSB poisoning attacks with eIBRS
	KVM: VMX: Fix IBRS handling after vmexit
	x86/speculation: Fill RSB on vmexit for IBRS
	x86/common: Stamp out the stepping madness
	x86/cpu/amd: Enumerate BTC_NO
	x86/bugs: Add Cannon lake to RETBleed affected CPU list
	x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behavior
	x86/speculation: Use DECLARE_PER_CPU for x86_spec_ctrl_current
	x86/bugs: Warn when "ibrs" mitigation is selected on Enhanced IBRS parts
	x86/speculation: Add RSB VM Exit protections
	xfs: fix misuse of the XFS_ATTR_INCOMPLETE flag
	xfs: introduce XFS_MAX_FILEOFF
	xfs: truncate should remove all blocks, not just to the end of the page cache
	xfs: fix s_maxbytes computation on 32-bit kernels
	xfs: fix IOCB_NOWAIT handling in xfs_file_dio_aio_read
	xfs: refactor remote attr value buffer invalidation
	xfs: fix memory corruption during remote attr value buffer invalidation
	xfs: move incore structures out of xfs_da_format.h
	xfs: streamline xfs_attr3_leaf_inactive
	xfs: fix uninitialized variable in xfs_attr3_leaf_inactive
	xfs: remove unused variable 'done'
	Revert "drm/amdgpu: use dirty framebuffer helper"
	Makefile.extrawarn: Move -Wcast-function-type-strict to W=1
	docs: update mediator information in CoC docs
	Linux 5.4.217

Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@google.com>
Change-Id: I105690ca9b48507da0590cb62dd60db2a95698e6
parents 3e781994 6e150d60

Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt

+13 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -4304,6 +4304,18 @@ 


	retain_initrd	[RAM] Keep initrd memory after extraction



	retbleed=	[X86] Control mitigation of RETBleed (Arbitrary

			Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions)

			vulnerability.



			off         - unconditionally disable

			auto        - automatically select a migitation



			Selecting 'auto' will choose a mitigation method at run

			time according to the CPU.



			Not specifying this option is equivalent to retbleed=auto.



	rfkill.default_state=

		0	"airplane mode".  All wifi, bluetooth, wimax, gps, fm,

			etc. communication is blocked by default.
@@ -4547,6 +4559,7 @@ 
			eibrs		  - enhanced IBRS

			eibrs,retpoline   - enhanced IBRS + Retpolines

			eibrs,lfence      - enhanced IBRS + LFENCE

			ibrs		  - use IBRS to protect kernel



			Not specifying this option is equivalent to

			spectre_v2=auto.

Documentation/process/code-of-conduct-interpretation.rst

+1 −1
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ the Technical Advisory Board (TAB) or other maintainers if you're 
uncertain how to handle situations that come up.  It will not be

considered a violation report unless you want it to be.  If you are

uncertain about approaching the TAB or any other maintainers, please

reach out to our conflict mediator, Mishi Choudhary <mishi@linux.com>.

reach out to our conflict mediator, Joanna Lee <joanna.lee@gesmer.com>.



In the end, "be kind to each other" is really what the end goal is for

everybody.  We know everyone is human and we all fail at times, but the

Makefile

+1 −1
Original line number Diff line number Diff line 
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0

VERSION = 5

PATCHLEVEL = 4

SUBLEVEL = 216

SUBLEVEL = 217

EXTRAVERSION =

NAME = Kleptomaniac Octopus

arch/x86/entry/calling.h

+59 −9
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ 
#include <asm/percpu.h>

#include <asm/asm-offsets.h>

#include <asm/processor-flags.h>

#include <asm/msr.h>

#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>



/*
@@ -146,27 +148,19 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with 


.endm



.macro POP_REGS pop_rdi=1 skip_r11rcx=0

.macro POP_REGS pop_rdi=1

	popq %r15

	popq %r14

	popq %r13

	popq %r12

	popq %rbp

	popq %rbx

	.if \skip_r11rcx

	popq %rsi

	.else

	popq %r11

	.endif

	popq %r10

	popq %r9

	popq %r8

	popq %rax

	.if \skip_r11rcx

	popq %rsi

	.else

	popq %rcx

	.endif

	popq %rdx

	popq %rsi

	.if \pop_rdi
@@ -316,6 +310,62 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with 


#endif



/*

 * IBRS kernel mitigation for Spectre_v2.

 *

 * Assumes full context is established (PUSH_REGS, CR3 and GS) and it clobbers

 * the regs it uses (AX, CX, DX). Must be called before the first RET

 * instruction (NOTE! UNTRAIN_RET includes a RET instruction)

 *

 * The optional argument is used to save/restore the current value,

 * which is used on the paranoid paths.

 *

 * Assumes x86_spec_ctrl_{base,current} to have SPEC_CTRL_IBRS set.

 */

.macro IBRS_ENTER save_reg

	ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS

	movl	$MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx



.ifnb \save_reg

	rdmsr

	shl	$32, %rdx

	or	%rdx, %rax

	mov	%rax, \save_reg

	test	$SPEC_CTRL_IBRS, %eax

	jz	.Ldo_wrmsr_\@

	lfence

	jmp	.Lend_\@

.Ldo_wrmsr_\@:

.endif



	movq	PER_CPU_VAR(x86_spec_ctrl_current), %rdx

	movl	%edx, %eax

	shr	$32, %rdx

	wrmsr

.Lend_\@:

.endm



/*

 * Similar to IBRS_ENTER, requires KERNEL GS,CR3 and clobbers (AX, CX, DX)

 * regs. Must be called after the last RET.

 */

.macro IBRS_EXIT save_reg

	ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS

	movl	$MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx



.ifnb \save_reg

	mov	\save_reg, %rdx

.else

	movq	PER_CPU_VAR(x86_spec_ctrl_current), %rdx

	andl	$(~SPEC_CTRL_IBRS), %edx

.endif



	movl	%edx, %eax

	shr	$32, %rdx

	wrmsr

.Lend_\@:

.endm



/*

 * Mitigate Spectre v1 for conditional swapgs code paths.

 *

arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S

+0 −2
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -750,7 +750,6 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to_asm) 
	movl	%ebx, PER_CPU_VAR(stack_canary)+stack_canary_offset

#endif



#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE

	/*

	 * When switching from a shallower to a deeper call stack

	 * the RSB may either underflow or use entries populated
@@ -759,7 +758,6 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to_asm) 
	 * speculative execution to prevent attack.

	 */

	FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %ebx, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW

#endif



	/* restore callee-saved registers */

	popfl