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Commit 9aa2fcb8 authored by Ryder Lee's avatar Ryder Lee Committed by Herbert Xu
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crypto: mediatek - make hardware operation flow more efficient



This patch refines data structures, which are used to control engine's
data path, to make it more efficient. Hence current change are:

- gathers the broken pieces of structures 'mtk_aes_ct''mtk_aes_tfm'
into struct mtk_aes_info hence avoiding additional DMA-mapping.

- adds 'keymode' in struct mtk_aes_base_ctx. When .setkey() callback is
called, we store keybit setting in keymode. Doing so, there is no need
to check keylen second time in mtk_aes_info_init() / mtk_aes_gcm_info_init().

Besides, this patch also removes unused macro definitions and adds helper
inline function to write security information(key, IV,...) to info->state.

Signed-off-by: default avatarRyder Lee <ryder.lee@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
parent 98b10235
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+127 −136
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -19,13 +19,10 @@
#define AES_BUF_ORDER		2
#define AES_BUF_SIZE		((PAGE_SIZE << AES_BUF_ORDER) \
				& ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1))
#define AES_MAX_STATE_BUF_SIZE	SIZE_IN_WORDS(AES_KEYSIZE_256 + \
				AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 2)
#define AES_MAX_CT_SIZE		6

/* AES command token size */
#define AES_CT_SIZE_ECB		2
#define AES_CT_SIZE_CBC		3
#define AES_CT_SIZE_CTR		3
#define AES_CT_SIZE_GCM_OUT	5
#define AES_CT_SIZE_GCM_IN	6
#define AES_CT_CTRL_HDR		cpu_to_le32(0x00220000)

/* AES-CBC/ECB/CTR command token */
@@ -50,6 +47,8 @@
#define AES_TFM_128BITS		cpu_to_le32(0xb << 16)
#define AES_TFM_192BITS		cpu_to_le32(0xd << 16)
#define AES_TFM_256BITS		cpu_to_le32(0xf << 16)
#define AES_TFM_GHASH_DIGEST	cpu_to_le32(0x2 << 21)
#define AES_TFM_GHASH		cpu_to_le32(0x4 << 23)
/* AES transform information word 1 fields */
#define AES_TFM_ECB		cpu_to_le32(0x0 << 0)
#define AES_TFM_CBC		cpu_to_le32(0x1 << 0)
@@ -59,10 +58,9 @@
#define AES_TFM_FULL_IV		cpu_to_le32(0xf << 5)	/* using IV 0-3 */
#define AES_TFM_IV_CTR_MODE	cpu_to_le32(0x1 << 10)
#define AES_TFM_ENC_HASH	cpu_to_le32(0x1 << 17)
#define AES_TFM_GHASH_DIG	cpu_to_le32(0x2 << 21)
#define AES_TFM_GHASH		cpu_to_le32(0x4 << 23)

/* AES flags */
#define AES_FLAGS_CIPHER_MSK	GENMASK(2, 0)
#define AES_FLAGS_ECB		BIT(0)
#define AES_FLAGS_CBC		BIT(1)
#define AES_FLAGS_CTR		BIT(2)
@@ -73,18 +71,12 @@
#define AES_AUTH_TAG_ERR	cpu_to_le32(BIT(26))

/**
 * Command token(CT) is a set of hardware instructions that
 * are used to control engine's processing flow of AES.
 *
 * Transform information(TFM) is used to define AES state and
 * contains all keys and initial vectors.
 *
 * The engine requires CT and TFM to do:
 * - Commands decoding and control of the engine's data path.
 * - Coordinating hardware data fetch and store operations.
 * - Result token construction and output.
 * mtk_aes_info - hardware information of AES
 * @cmd:	command token, hardware instruction
 * @tfm:	transform state of cipher algorithm.
 * @state:	contains keys and initial vectors.
 *
 * Memory map of GCM's TFM:
 * Memory layout of GCM buffer:
 * /-----------\
 * |  AES KEY  | 128/196/256 bits
 * |-----------|
@@ -92,14 +84,16 @@
 * |-----------|
 * |    IVs    | 4 * 4 bytes
 * \-----------/
 *
 * The engine requires all these info to do:
 * - Commands decoding and control of the engine's data path.
 * - Coordinating hardware data fetch and store operations.
 * - Result token construction and output.
 */
struct mtk_aes_ct {
	__le32 cmd[AES_CT_SIZE_GCM_IN];
};

struct mtk_aes_tfm {
	__le32 ctrl[2];
	__le32 state[SIZE_IN_WORDS(AES_KEYSIZE_256 + AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 2)];
struct mtk_aes_info {
	__le32 cmd[AES_MAX_CT_SIZE];
	__le32 tfm[2];
	__le32 state[AES_MAX_STATE_BUF_SIZE];
};

struct mtk_aes_reqctx {
@@ -109,11 +103,12 @@ struct mtk_aes_reqctx {
struct mtk_aes_base_ctx {
	struct mtk_cryp *cryp;
	u32 keylen;
	__le32 keymode;

	mtk_aes_fn start;

	struct mtk_aes_ct ct;
	struct mtk_aes_info info;
	dma_addr_t ct_dma;
	struct mtk_aes_tfm tfm;
	dma_addr_t tfm_dma;

	__le32 ct_hdr;
@@ -250,6 +245,22 @@ static inline void mtk_aes_restore_sg(const struct mtk_aes_dma *dma)
	sg->length += dma->remainder;
}

static inline void mtk_aes_write_state_le(__le32 *dst, const u32 *src, u32 size)
{
	int i;

	for (i = 0; i < SIZE_IN_WORDS(size); i++)
		dst[i] = cpu_to_le32(src[i]);
}

static inline void mtk_aes_write_state_be(__be32 *dst, const u32 *src, u32 size)
{
	int i;

	for (i = 0; i < SIZE_IN_WORDS(size); i++)
		dst[i] = cpu_to_be32(src[i]);
}

static inline int mtk_aes_complete(struct mtk_cryp *cryp,
				   struct mtk_aes_rec *aes,
				   int err)
@@ -331,9 +342,7 @@ static void mtk_aes_unmap(struct mtk_cryp *cryp, struct mtk_aes_rec *aes)
{
	struct mtk_aes_base_ctx *ctx = aes->ctx;

	dma_unmap_single(cryp->dev, ctx->ct_dma, sizeof(ctx->ct),
			 DMA_TO_DEVICE);
	dma_unmap_single(cryp->dev, ctx->tfm_dma, sizeof(ctx->tfm),
	dma_unmap_single(cryp->dev, ctx->ct_dma, sizeof(ctx->info),
			 DMA_TO_DEVICE);

	if (aes->src.sg == aes->dst.sg) {
@@ -364,16 +373,14 @@ static void mtk_aes_unmap(struct mtk_cryp *cryp, struct mtk_aes_rec *aes)
static int mtk_aes_map(struct mtk_cryp *cryp, struct mtk_aes_rec *aes)
{
	struct mtk_aes_base_ctx *ctx = aes->ctx;
	struct mtk_aes_info *info = &ctx->info;

	ctx->ct_dma = dma_map_single(cryp->dev, &ctx->ct, sizeof(ctx->ct),
	ctx->ct_dma = dma_map_single(cryp->dev, info, sizeof(*info),
				     DMA_TO_DEVICE);
	if (unlikely(dma_mapping_error(cryp->dev, ctx->ct_dma)))
		goto exit;

	ctx->tfm_dma = dma_map_single(cryp->dev, &ctx->tfm, sizeof(ctx->tfm),
				      DMA_TO_DEVICE);
	if (unlikely(dma_mapping_error(cryp->dev, ctx->tfm_dma)))
		goto tfm_map_err;
	ctx->tfm_dma = ctx->ct_dma + sizeof(info->cmd);

	if (aes->src.sg == aes->dst.sg) {
		aes->src.sg_len = dma_map_sg(cryp->dev, aes->src.sg,
@@ -400,11 +407,7 @@ static int mtk_aes_map(struct mtk_cryp *cryp, struct mtk_aes_rec *aes)
	return mtk_aes_xmit(cryp, aes);

sg_map_err:
	dma_unmap_single(cryp->dev, ctx->tfm_dma, sizeof(ctx->tfm),
			 DMA_TO_DEVICE);
tfm_map_err:
	dma_unmap_single(cryp->dev, ctx->ct_dma, sizeof(ctx->ct),
			 DMA_TO_DEVICE);
	dma_unmap_single(cryp->dev, ctx->ct_dma, sizeof(*info), DMA_TO_DEVICE);
exit:
	return mtk_aes_complete(cryp, aes, -EINVAL);
}
@@ -415,50 +418,43 @@ static void mtk_aes_info_init(struct mtk_cryp *cryp, struct mtk_aes_rec *aes,
{
	struct ablkcipher_request *req = ablkcipher_request_cast(aes->areq);
	struct mtk_aes_base_ctx *ctx = aes->ctx;
	struct mtk_aes_info *info = &ctx->info;
	u32 cnt = 0;

	ctx->ct_hdr = AES_CT_CTRL_HDR | cpu_to_le32(len);
	ctx->ct.cmd[0] = AES_CMD0 | cpu_to_le32(len);
	ctx->ct.cmd[1] = AES_CMD1;
	info->cmd[cnt++] = AES_CMD0 | cpu_to_le32(len);
	info->cmd[cnt++] = AES_CMD1;

	info->tfm[0] = AES_TFM_SIZE(ctx->keylen) | ctx->keymode;
	if (aes->flags & AES_FLAGS_ENCRYPT)
		ctx->tfm.ctrl[0] = AES_TFM_BASIC_OUT;
	else
		ctx->tfm.ctrl[0] = AES_TFM_BASIC_IN;

	if (ctx->keylen == SIZE_IN_WORDS(AES_KEYSIZE_128))
		ctx->tfm.ctrl[0] |= AES_TFM_128BITS;
	else if (ctx->keylen == SIZE_IN_WORDS(AES_KEYSIZE_256))
		ctx->tfm.ctrl[0] |= AES_TFM_256BITS;
		info->tfm[0] |= AES_TFM_BASIC_OUT;
	else
		ctx->tfm.ctrl[0] |= AES_TFM_192BITS;
		info->tfm[0] |= AES_TFM_BASIC_IN;

	if (aes->flags & AES_FLAGS_CBC) {
		const u32 *iv = (const u32 *)req->info;
		u32 *iv_state = ctx->tfm.state + ctx->keylen;
		int i;

		ctx->tfm.ctrl[0] |= AES_TFM_SIZE(ctx->keylen +
				    SIZE_IN_WORDS(AES_BLOCK_SIZE));
		ctx->tfm.ctrl[1] = AES_TFM_CBC | AES_TFM_FULL_IV;

		for (i = 0; i < SIZE_IN_WORDS(AES_BLOCK_SIZE); i++)
			iv_state[i] = cpu_to_le32(iv[i]);

		ctx->ct.cmd[2] = AES_CMD2;
		ctx->ct_size = AES_CT_SIZE_CBC;
	} else if (aes->flags & AES_FLAGS_ECB) {
		ctx->tfm.ctrl[0] |= AES_TFM_SIZE(ctx->keylen);
		ctx->tfm.ctrl[1] = AES_TFM_ECB;

		ctx->ct_size = AES_CT_SIZE_ECB;
	} else if (aes->flags & AES_FLAGS_CTR) {
		ctx->tfm.ctrl[0] |= AES_TFM_SIZE(ctx->keylen +
				    SIZE_IN_WORDS(AES_BLOCK_SIZE));
		ctx->tfm.ctrl[1] = AES_TFM_CTR_LOAD | AES_TFM_FULL_IV;
	switch (aes->flags & AES_FLAGS_CIPHER_MSK) {
	case AES_FLAGS_CBC:
		info->tfm[1] = AES_TFM_CBC;
		break;
	case AES_FLAGS_ECB:
		info->tfm[1] = AES_TFM_ECB;
		goto ecb;
	case AES_FLAGS_CTR:
		info->tfm[1] = AES_TFM_CTR_LOAD;
		goto ctr;

		ctx->ct.cmd[2] = AES_CMD2;
		ctx->ct_size = AES_CT_SIZE_CTR;
	default:
		/* Should not happen... */
		return;
	}

	mtk_aes_write_state_le(info->state + ctx->keylen, req->info,
			       AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
ctr:
	info->tfm[0] += AES_TFM_SIZE(SIZE_IN_WORDS(AES_BLOCK_SIZE));
	info->tfm[1] |= AES_TFM_FULL_IV;
	info->cmd[cnt++] = AES_CMD2;
ecb:
	ctx->ct_size = cnt;
}

static int mtk_aes_dma(struct mtk_cryp *cryp, struct mtk_aes_rec *aes,
@@ -572,8 +568,7 @@ static int mtk_aes_ctr_transfer(struct mtk_cryp *cryp, struct mtk_aes_rec *aes)
	struct mtk_aes_ctr_ctx *cctx = mtk_aes_ctr_ctx_cast(ctx);
	struct ablkcipher_request *req = ablkcipher_request_cast(aes->areq);
	struct scatterlist *src, *dst;
	int i;
	u32 start, end, ctr, blocks, *iv_state;
	u32 start, end, ctr, blocks;
	size_t datalen;
	bool fragmented = false;

@@ -602,9 +597,8 @@ static int mtk_aes_ctr_transfer(struct mtk_cryp *cryp, struct mtk_aes_rec *aes)
	       scatterwalk_ffwd(cctx->dst, req->dst, cctx->offset));

	/* Write IVs into transform state buffer. */
	iv_state = ctx->tfm.state + ctx->keylen;
	for (i = 0; i < SIZE_IN_WORDS(AES_BLOCK_SIZE); i++)
		iv_state[i] = cpu_to_le32(cctx->iv[i]);
	mtk_aes_write_state_le(ctx->info.state + ctx->keylen, cctx->iv,
			       AES_BLOCK_SIZE);

	if (unlikely(fragmented)) {
	/*
@@ -639,21 +633,25 @@ static int mtk_aes_setkey(struct crypto_ablkcipher *tfm,
			  const u8 *key, u32 keylen)
{
	struct mtk_aes_base_ctx *ctx = crypto_ablkcipher_ctx(tfm);
	const u32 *aes_key = (const u32 *)key;
	u32 *key_state = ctx->tfm.state;
	int i;

	if (keylen != AES_KEYSIZE_128 &&
	    keylen != AES_KEYSIZE_192 &&
	    keylen != AES_KEYSIZE_256) {
	switch (keylen) {
	case AES_KEYSIZE_128:
		ctx->keymode = AES_TFM_128BITS;
		break;
	case AES_KEYSIZE_192:
		ctx->keymode = AES_TFM_192BITS;
		break;
	case AES_KEYSIZE_256:
		ctx->keymode = AES_TFM_256BITS;
		break;

	default:
		crypto_ablkcipher_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
		return -EINVAL;
	}

	ctx->keylen = SIZE_IN_WORDS(keylen);

	for (i = 0; i < ctx->keylen; i++)
		key_state[i] = cpu_to_le32(aes_key[i]);
	mtk_aes_write_state_le(ctx->info.state, (const u32 *)key, keylen);

	return 0;
}
@@ -825,45 +823,35 @@ static void mtk_aes_gcm_info_init(struct mtk_cryp *cryp,
	struct aead_request *req = aead_request_cast(aes->areq);
	struct mtk_aes_base_ctx *ctx = aes->ctx;
	struct mtk_aes_gcm_ctx *gctx = mtk_aes_gcm_ctx_cast(ctx);
	const u32 *iv = (const u32 *)req->iv;
	u32 *iv_state = ctx->tfm.state + ctx->keylen +
			SIZE_IN_WORDS(AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
	struct mtk_aes_info *info = &ctx->info;
	u32 ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(crypto_aead_reqtfm(req));
	int i;
	u32 cnt = 0;

	ctx->ct_hdr = AES_CT_CTRL_HDR | len;

	ctx->ct.cmd[0] = AES_GCM_CMD0 | cpu_to_le32(req->assoclen);
	ctx->ct.cmd[1] = AES_GCM_CMD1 | cpu_to_le32(req->assoclen);
	ctx->ct.cmd[2] = AES_GCM_CMD2;
	ctx->ct.cmd[3] = AES_GCM_CMD3 | cpu_to_le32(gctx->textlen);
	info->cmd[cnt++] = AES_GCM_CMD0 | cpu_to_le32(req->assoclen);
	info->cmd[cnt++] = AES_GCM_CMD1 | cpu_to_le32(req->assoclen);
	info->cmd[cnt++] = AES_GCM_CMD2;
	info->cmd[cnt++] = AES_GCM_CMD3 | cpu_to_le32(gctx->textlen);

	if (aes->flags & AES_FLAGS_ENCRYPT) {
		ctx->ct.cmd[4] = AES_GCM_CMD4 | cpu_to_le32(gctx->authsize);
		ctx->ct_size = AES_CT_SIZE_GCM_OUT;
		ctx->tfm.ctrl[0] = AES_TFM_GCM_OUT;
		info->cmd[cnt++] = AES_GCM_CMD4 | cpu_to_le32(gctx->authsize);
		info->tfm[0] = AES_TFM_GCM_OUT;
	} else {
		ctx->ct.cmd[4] = AES_GCM_CMD5 | cpu_to_le32(gctx->authsize);
		ctx->ct.cmd[5] = AES_GCM_CMD6 | cpu_to_le32(gctx->authsize);
		ctx->ct_size = AES_CT_SIZE_GCM_IN;
		ctx->tfm.ctrl[0] = AES_TFM_GCM_IN;
		info->cmd[cnt++] = AES_GCM_CMD5 | cpu_to_le32(gctx->authsize);
		info->cmd[cnt++] = AES_GCM_CMD6 | cpu_to_le32(gctx->authsize);
		info->tfm[0] = AES_TFM_GCM_IN;
	}
	ctx->ct_size = cnt;

	if (ctx->keylen == SIZE_IN_WORDS(AES_KEYSIZE_128))
		ctx->tfm.ctrl[0] |= AES_TFM_128BITS;
	else if (ctx->keylen == SIZE_IN_WORDS(AES_KEYSIZE_256))
		ctx->tfm.ctrl[0] |= AES_TFM_256BITS;
	else
		ctx->tfm.ctrl[0] |= AES_TFM_192BITS;
	info->tfm[0] |= AES_TFM_GHASH_DIGEST | AES_TFM_GHASH | AES_TFM_SIZE(
			ctx->keylen + SIZE_IN_WORDS(AES_BLOCK_SIZE + ivsize)) |
			ctx->keymode;
	info->tfm[1] = AES_TFM_CTR_INIT | AES_TFM_IV_CTR_MODE | AES_TFM_3IV |
		       AES_TFM_ENC_HASH;

	ctx->tfm.ctrl[0] |= AES_TFM_GHASH_DIG | AES_TFM_GHASH |
			    AES_TFM_SIZE(ctx->keylen + SIZE_IN_WORDS(
			    AES_BLOCK_SIZE + ivsize));
	ctx->tfm.ctrl[1] = AES_TFM_CTR_INIT | AES_TFM_IV_CTR_MODE |
			   AES_TFM_3IV | AES_TFM_ENC_HASH;

	for (i = 0; i < SIZE_IN_WORDS(ivsize); i++)
		iv_state[i] = cpu_to_le32(iv[i]);
	mtk_aes_write_state_le(info->state + ctx->keylen + SIZE_IN_WORDS(
			       AES_BLOCK_SIZE), (const u32 *)req->iv, ivsize);
}

static int mtk_aes_gcm_dma(struct mtk_cryp *cryp, struct mtk_aes_rec *aes,
@@ -979,24 +967,26 @@ static int mtk_aes_gcm_setkey(struct crypto_aead *aead, const u8 *key,
		struct scatterlist sg[1];
		struct skcipher_request req;
	} *data;
	const u32 *aes_key;
	u32 *key_state, *hash_state;
	int err, i;
	int err;

	if (keylen != AES_KEYSIZE_256 &&
	    keylen != AES_KEYSIZE_192 &&
	    keylen != AES_KEYSIZE_128) {
	switch (keylen) {
	case AES_KEYSIZE_128:
		ctx->keymode = AES_TFM_128BITS;
		break;
	case AES_KEYSIZE_192:
		ctx->keymode = AES_TFM_192BITS;
		break;
	case AES_KEYSIZE_256:
		ctx->keymode = AES_TFM_256BITS;
		break;

	default:
		crypto_aead_set_flags(aead, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
		return -EINVAL;
	}

	key_state = ctx->tfm.state;
	aes_key = (u32 *)key;
	ctx->keylen = SIZE_IN_WORDS(keylen);

	for (i = 0; i < ctx->keylen; i++)
		ctx->tfm.state[i] = cpu_to_le32(aes_key[i]);

	/* Same as crypto_gcm_setkey() from crypto/gcm.c */
	crypto_skcipher_clear_flags(ctr, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
	crypto_skcipher_set_flags(ctr, crypto_aead_get_flags(aead) &
@@ -1031,10 +1021,11 @@ static int mtk_aes_gcm_setkey(struct crypto_aead *aead, const u8 *key,
	if (err)
		goto out;

	hash_state = key_state + ctx->keylen;

	for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
		hash_state[i] = cpu_to_be32(data->hash[i]);
	/* Write key into state buffer */
	mtk_aes_write_state_le(ctx->info.state, (const u32 *)key, keylen);
	/* Write key(H) into state buffer */
	mtk_aes_write_state_be(ctx->info.state + ctx->keylen, data->hash,
			       AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
out:
	kzfree(data);
	return err;
+38 −52
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
#define SHA_OP_FINAL		2

#define SHA_DATA_LEN_MSK	cpu_to_le32(GENMASK(16, 0))
#define SHA_MAX_DIGEST_BUF_SIZE	32

/* SHA command token */
#define SHA_CT_SIZE		5
@@ -33,7 +34,6 @@

/* SHA transform information */
#define SHA_TFM_HASH		cpu_to_le32(0x2 << 0)
#define SHA_TFM_INNER_DIG	cpu_to_le32(0x1 << 21)
#define SHA_TFM_SIZE(x)		cpu_to_le32((x) << 8)
#define SHA_TFM_START		cpu_to_le32(0x1 << 4)
#define SHA_TFM_CONTINUE	cpu_to_le32(0x1 << 5)
@@ -60,31 +60,17 @@
#define SHA_FLAGS_PAD		BIT(10)

/**
 * mtk_sha_ct is a set of hardware instructions(command token)
 * that are used to control engine's processing flow of SHA,
 * and it contains the first two words of transform state.
 * mtk_sha_info - hardware information of AES
 * @cmd:	command token, hardware instruction
 * @tfm:	transform state of cipher algorithm.
 * @state:	contains keys and initial vectors.
 *
 */
struct mtk_sha_ct {
struct mtk_sha_info {
	__le32 ctrl[2];
	__le32 cmd[3];
};

/**
 * mtk_sha_tfm is used to define SHA transform state
 * and store result digest that produced by engine.
 */
struct mtk_sha_tfm {
	__le32 ctrl[2];
	__le32 digest[SIZE_IN_WORDS(SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE)];
};

/**
 * mtk_sha_info consists of command token and transform state
 * of SHA, its role is similar to mtk_aes_info.
 */
struct mtk_sha_info {
	struct mtk_sha_ct ct;
	struct mtk_sha_tfm tfm;
	__le32 tfm[2];
	__le32 digest[SHA_MAX_DIGEST_BUF_SIZE];
};

struct mtk_sha_reqctx {
@@ -93,7 +79,6 @@ struct mtk_sha_reqctx {
	unsigned long op;

	u64 digcnt;
	bool start;
	size_t bufcnt;
	dma_addr_t dma_addr;

@@ -265,7 +250,9 @@ static void mtk_sha_fill_padding(struct mtk_sha_reqctx *ctx, u32 len)
	bits[1] = cpu_to_be64(size << 3);
	bits[0] = cpu_to_be64(size >> 61);

	if (ctx->flags & (SHA_FLAGS_SHA384 | SHA_FLAGS_SHA512)) {
	switch (ctx->flags & SHA_FLAGS_ALGO_MSK) {
	case SHA_FLAGS_SHA384:
	case SHA_FLAGS_SHA512:
		index = ctx->bufcnt & 0x7f;
		padlen = (index < 112) ? (112 - index) : ((128 + 112) - index);
		*(ctx->buffer + ctx->bufcnt) = 0x80;
@@ -273,7 +260,9 @@ static void mtk_sha_fill_padding(struct mtk_sha_reqctx *ctx, u32 len)
		memcpy(ctx->buffer + ctx->bufcnt + padlen, bits, 16);
		ctx->bufcnt += padlen + 16;
		ctx->flags |= SHA_FLAGS_PAD;
	} else {
		break;

	default:
		index = ctx->bufcnt & 0x3f;
		padlen = (index < 56) ? (56 - index) : ((64 + 56) - index);
		*(ctx->buffer + ctx->bufcnt) = 0x80;
@@ -281,36 +270,35 @@ static void mtk_sha_fill_padding(struct mtk_sha_reqctx *ctx, u32 len)
		memcpy(ctx->buffer + ctx->bufcnt + padlen, &bits[1], 8);
		ctx->bufcnt += padlen + 8;
		ctx->flags |= SHA_FLAGS_PAD;
		break;
	}
}

/* Initialize basic transform information of SHA */
static void mtk_sha_info_init(struct mtk_sha_reqctx *ctx)
{
	struct mtk_sha_ct *ct = &ctx->info.ct;
	struct mtk_sha_tfm *tfm = &ctx->info.tfm;
	struct mtk_sha_info *info = &ctx->info;

	ctx->ct_hdr = SHA_CT_CTRL_HDR;
	ctx->ct_size = SHA_CT_SIZE;

	tfm->ctrl[0] = SHA_TFM_HASH | SHA_TFM_INNER_DIG |
		       SHA_TFM_SIZE(SIZE_IN_WORDS(ctx->ds));
	info->tfm[0] = SHA_TFM_HASH | SHA_TFM_SIZE(SIZE_IN_WORDS(ctx->ds));

	switch (ctx->flags & SHA_FLAGS_ALGO_MSK) {
	case SHA_FLAGS_SHA1:
		tfm->ctrl[0] |= SHA_TFM_SHA1;
		info->tfm[0] |= SHA_TFM_SHA1;
		break;
	case SHA_FLAGS_SHA224:
		tfm->ctrl[0] |= SHA_TFM_SHA224;
		info->tfm[0] |= SHA_TFM_SHA224;
		break;
	case SHA_FLAGS_SHA256:
		tfm->ctrl[0] |= SHA_TFM_SHA256;
		info->tfm[0] |= SHA_TFM_SHA256;
		break;
	case SHA_FLAGS_SHA384:
		tfm->ctrl[0] |= SHA_TFM_SHA384;
		info->tfm[0] |= SHA_TFM_SHA384;
		break;
	case SHA_FLAGS_SHA512:
		tfm->ctrl[0] |= SHA_TFM_SHA512;
		info->tfm[0] |= SHA_TFM_SHA512;
		break;

	default:
@@ -318,13 +306,13 @@ static void mtk_sha_info_init(struct mtk_sha_reqctx *ctx)
		return;
	}

	tfm->ctrl[1] = SHA_TFM_HASH_STORE;
	ct->ctrl[0] = tfm->ctrl[0] | SHA_TFM_CONTINUE | SHA_TFM_START;
	ct->ctrl[1] = tfm->ctrl[1];
	info->tfm[1] = SHA_TFM_HASH_STORE;
	info->ctrl[0] = info->tfm[0] | SHA_TFM_CONTINUE | SHA_TFM_START;
	info->ctrl[1] = info->tfm[1];

	ct->cmd[0] = SHA_CMD0;
	ct->cmd[1] = SHA_CMD1;
	ct->cmd[2] = SHA_CMD2 | SHA_TFM_DIGEST(SIZE_IN_WORDS(ctx->ds));
	info->cmd[0] = SHA_CMD0;
	info->cmd[1] = SHA_CMD1;
	info->cmd[2] = SHA_CMD2 | SHA_TFM_DIGEST(SIZE_IN_WORDS(ctx->ds));
}

/*
@@ -337,17 +325,15 @@ static int mtk_sha_info_update(struct mtk_cryp *cryp,
{
	struct mtk_sha_reqctx *ctx = ahash_request_ctx(sha->req);
	struct mtk_sha_info *info = &ctx->info;
	struct mtk_sha_ct *ct = &info->ct;

	if (ctx->start)
		ctx->start = false;
	else
		ct->ctrl[0] &= ~SHA_TFM_START;

	ctx->ct_hdr &= ~SHA_DATA_LEN_MSK;
	ctx->ct_hdr |= cpu_to_le32(len1 + len2);
	ct->cmd[0] &= ~SHA_DATA_LEN_MSK;
	ct->cmd[0] |= cpu_to_le32(len1 + len2);
	info->cmd[0] &= ~SHA_DATA_LEN_MSK;
	info->cmd[0] |= cpu_to_le32(len1 + len2);

	/* Setting SHA_TFM_START only for the first iteration */
	if (ctx->digcnt)
		info->ctrl[0] &= ~SHA_TFM_START;

	ctx->digcnt += len1;

@@ -357,7 +343,8 @@ static int mtk_sha_info_update(struct mtk_cryp *cryp,
		dev_err(cryp->dev, "dma %zu bytes error\n", sizeof(*info));
		return -EINVAL;
	}
	ctx->tfm_dma = ctx->ct_dma + sizeof(*ct);

	ctx->tfm_dma = ctx->ct_dma + sizeof(info->ctrl) + sizeof(info->cmd);

	return 0;
}
@@ -422,7 +409,6 @@ static int mtk_sha_init(struct ahash_request *req)
	ctx->bufcnt = 0;
	ctx->digcnt = 0;
	ctx->buffer = tctx->buf;
	ctx->start = true;

	if (tctx->flags & SHA_FLAGS_HMAC) {
		struct mtk_sha_hmac_ctx *bctx = tctx->base;
@@ -635,7 +621,7 @@ static int mtk_sha_final_req(struct mtk_cryp *cryp,
static int mtk_sha_finish(struct ahash_request *req)
{
	struct mtk_sha_reqctx *ctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
	u32 *digest = ctx->info.tfm.digest;
	__le32 *digest = ctx->info.digest;
	u32 *result = (u32 *)req->result;
	int i;