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Commit 8c1e3d2b authored by Jeremy Linton's avatar Jeremy Linton Committed by Will Deacon
Browse files

arm64: Always enable spectre-v2 vulnerability detection



Ensure we are always able to detect whether or not the CPU is affected
by Spectre-v2, so that we can later advertise this to userspace.

Signed-off-by: default avatarJeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarAndre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Tested-by: default avatarStefan Wahren <stefan.wahren@i2se.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
parent 517953c2
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+8 −7
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -109,7 +109,6 @@ cpu_enable_trap_ctr_access(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)

atomic_t arm64_el2_vector_last_slot = ATOMIC_INIT(-1);

#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
#include <asm/cacheflush.h>

@@ -270,11 +269,11 @@ static int detect_harden_bp_fw(void)
	    ((midr & MIDR_CPU_MODEL_MASK) == MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR_V1))
		cb = qcom_link_stack_sanitization;

	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR))
		install_bp_hardening_cb(cb, smccc_start, smccc_end);

	return 1;
}
#endif	/* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR */

#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD
DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(u64, arm64_ssbd_callback_required);
@@ -513,7 +512,6 @@ cpu_enable_cache_maint_trap(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
	.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM,			\
	CAP_MIDR_RANGE_LIST(midr_list)

#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
/*
 * List of CPUs that do not need any Spectre-v2 mitigation at all.
 */
@@ -545,6 +543,12 @@ check_branch_predictor(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope)
	if (!need_wa)
		return false;

	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR)) {
		pr_warn_once("spectrev2 mitigation disabled by kernel configuration\n");
		__hardenbp_enab = false;
		return false;
	}

	/* forced off */
	if (__nospectre_v2) {
		pr_info_once("spectrev2 mitigation disabled by command line option\n");
@@ -556,7 +560,6 @@ check_branch_predictor(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope)

	return (need_wa > 0);
}
#endif

#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS

@@ -731,13 +734,11 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[] = {
		ERRATA_MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A73),
	},
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
	{
		.capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR,
		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM,
		.matches = check_branch_predictor,
	},
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS
	{
		.desc = "EL2 vector hardening",