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Commit 5d2a2c59 authored by Mauro Carvalho Chehab's avatar Mauro Carvalho Chehab Committed by Jonathan Corbet
Browse files

docs: speculation.txt: mark example blocks as such 



Identify the example blocks there, in order to avoid Sphinx
warnings.

Signed-off-by: default avatarMauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarJonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
parent 59bc64f0

Documentation/speculation.txt

+4 −4
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ observed to extract secret information. 


For example, in the presence of branch prediction, it is possible for bounds

checks to be ignored by code which is speculatively executed. Consider the

following code:

following code::



	int load_array(int *array, unsigned int index)

	{
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ following code: 
			return array[index];

	}



Which, on arm64, may be compiled to an assembly sequence such as:

Which, on arm64, may be compiled to an assembly sequence such as::



	CMP	<index>, #MAX_ARRAY_ELEMS

	B.LT	less
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ microarchitectural state which can be subsequently measured. 


More complex sequences involving multiple dependent memory accesses may

result in sensitive information being leaked. Consider the following

code, building on the prior example:

code, building on the prior example::



	int load_dependent_arrays(int *arr1, int *arr2, int index)

	{
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ A call to array_index_nospec(index, size) returns a sanitized index 
value that is bounded to [0, size) even under cpu speculation

conditions.



This can be used to protect the earlier load_array() example:

This can be used to protect the earlier load_array() example::



	int load_array(int *array, unsigned int index)

	{