Merge android-4.19-q.65 (03d5ba40) into msm-4.19

The following CVE entries describe Spectre variants:

   =============   =======================  =================

   =============   =======================  ==========================

   CVE-2017-5753   Bounds check bypass      Spectre variant 1

   CVE-2017-5715   Branch target injection  Spectre variant 2

   =============   =======================  =================

   CVE-2019-1125   Spectre v1 swapgs        Spectre variant 1 (swapgs)

   =============   =======================  ==========================

Problem

-------

over the network, see :ref:`[12] <spec_ref12>`. However such attacks

are difficult, low bandwidth, fragile, and are considered low risk.

Note that, despite "Bounds Check Bypass" name, Spectre variant 1 is not

only about user-controlled array bounds checks.  It can affect any

conditional checks.  The kernel entry code interrupt, exception, and NMI

handlers all have conditional swapgs checks.  Those may be problematic

in the context of Spectre v1, as kernel code can speculatively run with

a user GS.

Spectre variant 2 (Branch Target Injection)

-------------------------------------------

1. A user process attacking the kernel

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

Spectre variant 1

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

   The attacker passes a parameter to the kernel via a register or

   via a known address in memory during a syscall. Such parameter may

   be used later by the kernel as an index to an array or to derive

   potentially be influenced for Spectre attacks, new "nospec" accessor

   macros are used to prevent speculative loading of data.

   Spectre variant 2 attacker can :ref:`poison <poison_btb>` the branch

Spectre variant 1 (swapgs)

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

   An attacker can train the branch predictor to speculatively skip the

   swapgs path for an interrupt or exception.  If they initialize

   the GS register to a user-space value, if the swapgs is speculatively

   skipped, subsequent GS-related percpu accesses in the speculation

   window will be done with the attacker-controlled GS value.  This

   could cause privileged memory to be accessed and leaked.

   For example:

   ::

     if (coming from user space)

         swapgs

     mov %gs:<percpu_offset>, %reg

     mov (%reg), %reg1

   When coming from user space, the CPU can speculatively skip the

   swapgs, and then do a speculative percpu load using the user GS

   value.  So the user can speculatively force a read of any kernel

   value.  If a gadget exists which uses the percpu value as an address

   in another load/store, then the contents of the kernel value may

   become visible via an L1 side channel attack.

   A similar attack exists when coming from kernel space.  The CPU can

   speculatively do the swapgs, causing the user GS to get used for the

   rest of the speculative window.

Spectre variant 2

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

   A spectre variant 2 attacker can :ref:`poison <poison_btb>` the branch

   target buffer (BTB) before issuing syscall to launch an attack.

   After entering the kernel, the kernel could use the poisoned branch

   target buffer on indirect jump and jump to gadget code in speculative

The possible values in this file are:

  =======================================  =================================

  'Mitigation: __user pointer sanitation'  Protection in kernel on a case by

                                           case base with explicit pointer

                                           sanitation.

  =======================================  =================================

  .. list-table::

     * - 'Not affected'

       - The processor is not vulnerable.

     * - 'Vulnerable: __user pointer sanitization and usercopy barriers only; no swapgs barriers'

       - The swapgs protections are disabled; otherwise it has

         protection in the kernel on a case by case base with explicit

         pointer sanitation and usercopy LFENCE barriers.

     * - 'Mitigation: usercopy/swapgs barriers and __user pointer sanitization'

       - Protection in the kernel on a case by case base with explicit

         pointer sanitation, usercopy LFENCE barriers, and swapgs LFENCE

         barriers.

However, the protections are put in place on a case by case basis,

and there is no guarantee that all possible attack vectors for Spectre

1. Kernel mitigation

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

Spectre variant 1

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

   For the Spectre variant 1, vulnerable kernel code (as determined

   by code audit or scanning tools) is annotated on a case by case

   basis to use nospec accessor macros for bounds clipping :ref:`[2]

   <spec_ref2>` to avoid any usable disclosure gadgets. However, it may

   not cover all attack vectors for Spectre variant 1.

   Copy-from-user code has an LFENCE barrier to prevent the access_ok()

   check from being mis-speculated.  The barrier is done by the

   barrier_nospec() macro.

   For the swapgs variant of Spectre variant 1, LFENCE barriers are

   added to interrupt, exception and NMI entry where needed.  These

   barriers are done by the FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY and

   FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY macros.

Spectre variant 2

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

   For Spectre variant 2 mitigation, the compiler turns indirect calls or

   jumps in the kernel into equivalent return trampolines (retpolines)

   :ref:`[3] <spec_ref3>` :ref:`[9] <spec_ref9>` to go to the target

Spectre variant 2 mitigation can be disabled or force enabled at the

kernel command line.

	nospectre_v1

		[X86,PPC] Disable mitigations for Spectre Variant 1

		(bounds check bypass). With this option data leaks are

		possible in the system.

	nospectre_v2

		[X86] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2

				Equivalent to: nopti [X86,PPC]

					       nospectre_v1 [PPC]

					       nobp=0 [S390]

					       nospectre_v1 [X86]

					       nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390]

					       spectre_v2_user=off [X86]

					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]

			nosmt=force: Force disable SMT, cannot be undone

				     via the sysfs control file.

	nospectre_v1	[PPC] Disable mitigations for Spectre Variant 1 (bounds

			check bypass). With this option data leaks are possible

			in the system.

	nospectre_v1	[X66, PPC] Disable mitigations for Spectre Variant 1

			(bounds check bypass). With this option data leaks

			are possible in the system.

	nospectre_v2	[X86,PPC_FSL_BOOK3E] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2

			(indirect branch prediction) vulnerability. System may

# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0

VERSION = 4

PATCHLEVEL = 19

SUBLEVEL = 64

SUBLEVEL = 65

EXTRAVERSION =

NAME = "People's Front"

KBUILD_LDFLAGS_MODULE := -T $(srctree)/scripts/module-common.lds

KBUILD_LDFLAGS :=

GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS :=

CLANG_FLAGS :=

export ARCH SRCARCH CONFIG_SHELL HOSTCC KBUILD_HOSTCFLAGS CROSS_COMPILE AS LD CC

export CPP AR NM STRIP OBJCOPY OBJDUMP KBUILD_HOSTLDFLAGS KBUILD_HOSTLDLIBS

ifeq ($(cc-name),clang)

ifneq ($(CROSS_COMPILE),)

CLANG_TRIPLE	?= $(CROSS_COMPILE)

CLANG_FLAGS	:= --target=$(notdir $(CLANG_TRIPLE:%-=%))

CLANG_FLAGS	+= --target=$(notdir $(CLANG_TRIPLE:%-=%))

ifeq ($(shell $(srctree)/scripts/clang-android.sh $(CC) $(CLANG_FLAGS)), y)

$(error "Clang with Android --target detected. Did you specify CLANG_TRIPLE?")

endif

config ARC_SMP_HALT_ON_RESET

	bool "Enable Halt-on-reset boot mode"

	default y if ARC_UBOOT_SUPPORT

	help

	  In SMP configuration cores can be configured as Halt-on-reset

	  or they could all start at same time. For Halt-on-reset, non

endif

config ARC_UBOOT_SUPPORT

	bool "Support uboot arg Handling"

	default n

	help

	  ARC Linux by default checks for uboot provided args as pointers to

	  external cmdline or DTB. This however breaks in absence of uboot,

	  when booting from Metaware debugger directly, as the registers are

	  not zeroed out on reset by mdb and/or ARCv2 based cores. The bogus

	  registers look like uboot args to kernel which then chokes.

	  So only enable the uboot arg checking/processing if users are sure

	  of uboot being in play.

config ARC_BUILTIN_DTB_NAME

	string "Built in DTB"

	help

# CONFIG_ARC_HAS_LLSC is not set

CONFIG_ARC_KVADDR_SIZE=402

CONFIG_ARC_EMUL_UNALIGNED=y

CONFIG_ARC_UBOOT_SUPPORT=y

CONFIG_PREEMPT=y

CONFIG_NET=y

CONFIG_UNIX=y