Commit f34af323 authored Apr 18, 2022 by Jason A. Donenfeld Committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman Jun 25, 2022

random: document crng_fast_key_erasure() destination possibility



commit 8717627d6ac53251ee012c3c7aca392f29f38a42 upstream.

This reverts 35a33ff3807d ("random: use memmove instead of memcpy for
remaining 32 bytes"), which was made on a totally bogus basis. The thing
it was worried about overlapping came from the stack, not from one of
its arguments, as Eric pointed out.

But the fact that this confusion even happened draws attention to the
fact that it's a bit non-obvious that the random_data parameter can
alias chacha_state, and in fact should do so when the caller can't rely
on the stack being cleared in a timely manner. So this commit documents
that.

Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

parent 419800cf

drivers/char/random.c

+7 −0

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -318,6 +318,13 @@ static void crng_reseed(void)
		* the resultant ChaCha state to the user, along with the second
		* half of the block containing 32 bytes of random data that may
		* be used; random_data_len may not be greater than 32.
		*
		* The returned ChaCha state contains within it a copy of the old
		* key value, at index 4, so the state should always be zeroed out
		* immediately after using in order to maintain forward secrecy.
		* If the state cannot be erased in a timely manner, then it is
		* safer to set the random_data parameter to &chacha_state[4] so
		* that this function overwrites it before returning.
		*/
		static void crng_fast_key_erasure(u8 key[CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE],
		u32 chacha_state[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)],