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Commit c6d2e202 authored by Jarkko Sakkinen's avatar Jarkko Sakkinen Committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
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tpm: fix response size validation in tpm_get_random()



commit 84b59f6487d82d3ab4247a099aba66d4d17e8b08 upstream.

When checking whether the response is large enough to be able to contain
the received random bytes in tpm_get_random() and tpm2_get_random(),
they fail to take account the header size, which should be added to the
minimum size. This commit fixes this issue.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: c659af78 ("tpm: Check size of response before accessing data")
Signed-off-by: default avatarJarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
parent e6d2f788
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+2 −1
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -1322,7 +1322,8 @@ int tpm_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *out, size_t max)
		}

		rlength = be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.header.out.length);
		if (rlength < offsetof(struct tpm_getrandom_out, rng_data) +
		if (rlength < TPM_HEADER_SIZE +
			      offsetof(struct tpm_getrandom_out, rng_data) +
			      recd) {
			total = -EFAULT;
			break;
+3 −1
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -329,7 +329,9 @@ int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max)
			&buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE];
		recd = min_t(u32, be16_to_cpu(out->size), num_bytes);
		if (tpm_buf_length(&buf) <
		    offsetof(struct tpm2_get_random_out, buffer) + recd) {
		    TPM_HEADER_SIZE +
		    offsetof(struct tpm2_get_random_out, buffer) +
		    recd) {
			err = -EFAULT;
			goto out;
		}