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Commit c6a1fa12 authored by Johannes Berg's avatar Johannes Berg Committed by John W. Linville
Browse files

mac80211: minor code cleanups 



Nothing very interesting, some checkpatch inspired stuff,
some other things.

Signed-off-by: default avatarJohannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: default avatarJohn W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
parent 36ff382d

net/mac80211/rc80211_pid.h

+1 −1
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ 


/* Arithmetic right shift for positive and negative values for ISO C. */

#define RC_PID_DO_ARITH_RIGHT_SHIFT(x, y) \

	(x) < 0 ? -((-(x)) >> (y)) : (x) >> (y)

	((x) < 0 ? -((-(x)) >> (y)) : (x) >> (y))



enum rc_pid_event_type {

	RC_PID_EVENT_TYPE_TX_STATUS,

net/mac80211/rx.c

+13 −11
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -26,9 +26,10 @@ 
#include "tkip.h"

#include "wme.h"



u8 ieee80211_sta_manage_reorder_buf(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,

static u8 ieee80211_sta_manage_reorder_buf(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,

					   struct tid_ampdu_rx *tid_agg_rx,

				struct sk_buff *skb, u16 mpdu_seq_num,

					   struct sk_buff *skb,

					   u16 mpdu_seq_num,

					   int bar_req);

/*

 * monitor mode reception
@@ -1988,17 +1989,17 @@ static void __ieee80211_rx_handle_packet(struct ieee80211_hw *hw, 


static inline int seq_less(u16 sq1, u16 sq2)

{

	return (((sq1 - sq2) & SEQ_MASK) > (SEQ_MODULO >> 1));

	return ((sq1 - sq2) & SEQ_MASK) > (SEQ_MODULO >> 1);

}



static inline u16 seq_inc(u16 sq)

{

	return ((sq + 1) & SEQ_MASK);

	return (sq + 1) & SEQ_MASK;

}



static inline u16 seq_sub(u16 sq1, u16 sq2)

{

	return ((sq1 - sq2) & SEQ_MASK);

	return (sq1 - sq2) & SEQ_MASK;

}
@@ -2006,9 +2007,10 @@ static inline u16 seq_sub(u16 sq1, u16 sq2) 
 * As it function blongs to Rx path it must be called with

 * the proper rcu_read_lock protection for its flow.

 */

u8 ieee80211_sta_manage_reorder_buf(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,

static u8 ieee80211_sta_manage_reorder_buf(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,

					   struct tid_ampdu_rx *tid_agg_rx,

				struct sk_buff *skb, u16 mpdu_seq_num,

					   struct sk_buff *skb,

					   u16 mpdu_seq_num,

					   int bar_req)

{

	struct ieee80211_local *local = hw_to_local(hw);

net/mac80211/wep.c

+13 −13
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -49,17 +49,19 @@ void ieee80211_wep_free(struct ieee80211_local *local) 
	crypto_free_blkcipher(local->wep_rx_tfm);

}



static inline int ieee80211_wep_weak_iv(u32 iv, int keylen)

static inline bool ieee80211_wep_weak_iv(u32 iv, int keylen)

{

	/* Fluhrer, Mantin, and Shamir have reported weaknesses in the

	/*

	 * Fluhrer, Mantin, and Shamir have reported weaknesses in the

	 * key scheduling algorithm of RC4. At least IVs (KeyByte + 3,

	 * 0xff, N) can be used to speedup attacks, so avoid using them. */

	 * 0xff, N) can be used to speedup attacks, so avoid using them.

	 */

	if ((iv & 0xff00) == 0xff00) {

		u8 B = (iv >> 16) & 0xff;

		if (B >= 3 && B < 3 + keylen)

			return 1;

			return true;

	}

	return 0;

	return false;

}
@@ -268,7 +270,7 @@ int ieee80211_wep_decrypt(struct ieee80211_local *local, struct sk_buff *skb, 
}





u8 * ieee80211_wep_is_weak_iv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ieee80211_key *key)

bool ieee80211_wep_is_weak_iv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ieee80211_key *key)

{

	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;

	unsigned int hdrlen;
@@ -276,16 +278,13 @@ u8 * ieee80211_wep_is_weak_iv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ieee80211_key *key) 
	u32 iv;



	if (!ieee80211_has_protected(hdr->frame_control))

		return NULL;

		return false;



	hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);

	ivpos = skb->data + hdrlen;

	iv = (ivpos[0] << 16) | (ivpos[1] << 8) | ivpos[2];



	if (ieee80211_wep_weak_iv(iv, key->conf.keylen))

		return ivpos;



	return NULL;

	return ieee80211_wep_weak_iv(iv, key->conf.keylen);

}



ieee80211_rx_result
@@ -329,6 +328,8 @@ static int wep_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb) 
ieee80211_tx_result

ieee80211_crypto_wep_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)

{

	int i;



	ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);



	if (wep_encrypt_skb(tx, tx->skb) < 0) {
@@ -337,9 +338,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_wep_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) 
	}



	if (tx->extra_frag) {

		int i;

		for (i = 0; i < tx->num_extra_frag; i++) {

			if (wep_encrypt_skb(tx, tx->extra_frag[i]) < 0) {

			if (wep_encrypt_skb(tx, tx->extra_frag[i])) {

				I802_DEBUG_INC(tx->local->

					       tx_handlers_drop_wep);

				return TX_DROP;

net/mac80211/wep.h

+1 −1
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ int ieee80211_wep_encrypt(struct ieee80211_local *local, struct sk_buff *skb, 
			  struct ieee80211_key *key);

int ieee80211_wep_decrypt(struct ieee80211_local *local, struct sk_buff *skb,

			  struct ieee80211_key *key);

u8 *ieee80211_wep_is_weak_iv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ieee80211_key *key);

bool ieee80211_wep_is_weak_iv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ieee80211_key *key);



ieee80211_rx_result

ieee80211_crypto_wep_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx);

net/mac80211/wpa.c

+10 −19
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -49,8 +49,7 @@ ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) 
	    !(tx->flags & IEEE80211_TX_FRAGMENTED) &&

	    !(tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC) &&

	    !wpa_test) {

		/* hwaccel - with no need for preallocated room for Michael MIC

		 */

		/* hwaccel - with no need for preallocated room for MMIC */

		return TX_CONTINUE;

	}
@@ -67,8 +66,6 @@ ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) 
#else

	authenticator = 1;

#endif

	/* At this point we know we're using ALG_TKIP. To get the MIC key

	 * we now will rely on the offset from the ieee80211_key_conf::key */

	key_offset = authenticator ?

		NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY :

		NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_RX_MIC_KEY;
@@ -91,9 +88,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) 
	struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;

	int authenticator = 1, wpa_test = 0;



	/*

	 * No way to verify the MIC if the hardware stripped it

	 */

	/* No way to verify the MIC if the hardware stripped it */

	if (rx->status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_STRIPPED)

		return RX_CONTINUE;
@@ -115,8 +110,6 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) 
#else

	authenticator = 1;

#endif

	/* At this point we know we're using ALG_TKIP. To get the MIC key

	 * we now will rely on the offset from the ieee80211_key_conf::key */

	key_offset = authenticator ?

		NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_RX_MIC_KEY :

		NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY;
@@ -201,6 +194,7 @@ ieee80211_tx_result 
ieee80211_crypto_tkip_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)

{

	struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb;

	int i;



	ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
@@ -208,9 +202,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_tkip_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) 
		return TX_DROP;



	if (tx->extra_frag) {

		int i;

		for (i = 0; i < tx->num_extra_frag; i++) {

			if (tkip_encrypt_skb(tx, tx->extra_frag[i]) < 0)

			if (tkip_encrypt_skb(tx, tx->extra_frag[i]))

				return TX_DROP;

		}

	}
@@ -348,7 +341,7 @@ static inline void ccmp_pn2hdr(u8 *hdr, u8 *pn, int key_id) 
}





static inline int ccmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, u8 *hdr)

static inline void ccmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, u8 *hdr)

{

	pn[0] = hdr[7];

	pn[1] = hdr[6];
@@ -356,7 +349,6 @@ static inline int ccmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, u8 *hdr) 
	pn[3] = hdr[4];

	pn[4] = hdr[1];

	pn[5] = hdr[0];

	return (hdr[3] >> 6) & 0x03;

}
@@ -371,7 +363,7 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb) 


	if ((tx->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE) &&

	    !(tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV)) {

		/* hwaccel - with no need for preallocated room for CCMP "

		/* hwaccel - with no need for preallocated room for CCMP

		 * header or MIC fields */

		info->control.hw_key = &tx->key->conf;

		return 0;
@@ -424,6 +416,7 @@ ieee80211_tx_result 
ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)

{

	struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb;

	int i;



	ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
@@ -431,9 +424,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) 
		return TX_DROP;



	if (tx->extra_frag) {

		int i;

		for (i = 0; i < tx->num_extra_frag; i++) {

			if (ccmp_encrypt_skb(tx, tx->extra_frag[i]) < 0)

			if (ccmp_encrypt_skb(tx, tx->extra_frag[i]))

				return TX_DROP;

		}

	}
@@ -465,7 +457,7 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) 
	    (rx->status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED))

		return RX_CONTINUE;



	(void) ccmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen);

	ccmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen);



	if (memcmp(pn, key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[rx->queue], CCMP_PN_LEN) <= 0) {

		key->u.ccmp.replays++;
@@ -480,10 +472,9 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) 
			    key->u.ccmp.tfm, key->u.ccmp.rx_crypto_buf,

			    skb->data + hdrlen + CCMP_HDR_LEN, data_len,

			    skb->data + skb->len - CCMP_MIC_LEN,

			    skb->data + hdrlen + CCMP_HDR_LEN)) {

			    skb->data + hdrlen + CCMP_HDR_LEN))

			return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;

	}

	}



	memcpy(key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[rx->queue], pn, CCMP_PN_LEN);

net/mac80211/mesh.c

+1 −1

File changed.

Contains only whitespace changes.

net/mac80211/sta_info.c

+2 −2

File changed.

Contains only whitespace changes.

net/mac80211/debugfs_sta.c

+3 −3

File changed.

Contains only whitespace changes.

net/mac80211/main.c

+1 −1

File changed.

Contains only whitespace changes.