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Commit c50e81fe authored by Thomas Gleixner's avatar Thomas Gleixner Committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
Browse files

x86/speculation/mds: Add mitigation mode VMWERV 



commit 22dd8365088b6403630b82423cf906491859b65e upstream

In virtualized environments it can happen that the host has the microcode
update which utilizes the VERW instruction to clear CPU buffers, but the
hypervisor is not yet updated to expose the X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR CPUID bit
to guests.

Introduce an internal mitigation mode VMWERV which enables the invocation
of the CPU buffer clearing even if X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR is not set. If the
system has no updated microcode this results in a pointless execution of
the VERW instruction wasting a few CPU cycles. If the microcode is updated,
but not exposed to a guest then the CPU buffers will be cleared.

That said: Virtual Machines Will Eventually Receive Vaccine

Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: default avatarBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: default avatarJon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Tested-by: default avatarJon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
parent 8230c202

Documentation/x86/mds.rst

+27 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -93,11 +93,38 @@ The kernel provides a function to invoke the buffer clearing: 
The mitigation is invoked on kernel/userspace, hypervisor/guest and C-state

(idle) transitions.



As a special quirk to address virtualization scenarios where the host has

the microcode updated, but the hypervisor does not (yet) expose the

MD_CLEAR CPUID bit to guests, the kernel issues the VERW instruction in the

hope that it might actually clear the buffers. The state is reflected

accordingly.



According to current knowledge additional mitigations inside the kernel

itself are not required because the necessary gadgets to expose the leaked

data cannot be controlled in a way which allows exploitation from malicious

user space or VM guests.



Kernel internal mitigation modes

--------------------------------



 ======= ============================================================

 off      Mitigation is disabled. Either the CPU is not affected or

          mds=off is supplied on the kernel command line



 full     Mitigation is eanbled. CPU is affected and MD_CLEAR is

          advertised in CPUID.



 vmwerv	  Mitigation is enabled. CPU is affected and MD_CLEAR is not

	  advertised in CPUID. That is mainly for virtualization

	  scenarios where the host has the updated microcode but the

	  hypervisor does not expose MD_CLEAR in CPUID. It's a best

	  effort approach without guarantee.

 ======= ============================================================



If the CPU is affected and mds=off is not supplied on the kernel command

line then the kernel selects the appropriate mitigation mode depending on

the availability of the MD_CLEAR CPUID bit.



Mitigation points

-----------------

arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h

+1 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -1000,6 +1000,7 @@ extern enum l1tf_mitigations l1tf_mitigation; 
enum mds_mitigations {

	MDS_MITIGATION_OFF,

	MDS_MITIGATION_FULL,

	MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV,

};



#endif /* _ASM_X86_PROCESSOR_H */

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c

+12 −6
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -222,7 +222,8 @@ static enum mds_mitigations mds_mitigation __ro_after_init = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL 


static const char * const mds_strings[] = {

	[MDS_MITIGATION_OFF]	= "Vulnerable",

	[MDS_MITIGATION_FULL]	= "Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers"

	[MDS_MITIGATION_FULL]	= "Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers",

	[MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV]	= "Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode",

};



static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void)
@@ -233,10 +234,9 @@ static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void) 
	}



	if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_FULL) {

		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))

		if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))

			mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV;

		static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear);

		else

			mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_OFF;

	}

	pr_info("%s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation]);

}
@@ -690,8 +690,14 @@ void arch_smt_update(void) 
		break;

	}



	if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_FULL)

	switch (mds_mitigation) {

	case MDS_MITIGATION_FULL:

	case MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV:

		update_mds_branch_idle();

		break;

	case MDS_MITIGATION_OFF:

		break;

	}



	mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);

}