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Commit 8e5e42d5 authored by Jeff Vander Stoep's avatar Jeff Vander Stoep Committed by Alistair Strachan
Browse files

ANDROID: security,perf: Allow further restriction of perf_event_open

When kernel.perf_event_open is set to 3 (or greater), disallow all
access to performance events by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
Add a Kconfig symbol CONFIG_SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT that
makes this value the default.

This is based on a similar feature in grsecurity
(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PERF_HARDEN).  This version doesn't include making
the variable read-only.  It also allows enabling further restriction
at run-time regardless of whether the default is changed.

https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/1/11/587

Bug: 29054680
Bug: 120445712
Change-Id: Iff5bff4fc1042e85866df9faa01bce8d04335ab8
[jeffv: Upstream doesn't want it https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/6/17/101

]
Signed-off-by: default avatarBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
parent 6a82b2aa
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+3 −1
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -693,7 +693,8 @@ allowed to execute.
perf_event_paranoid:

Controls use of the performance events system by unprivileged
users (without CAP_SYS_ADMIN).  The default value is 2.
users (without CAP_SYS_ADMIN).  The default value is 3 if
CONFIG_SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT is set, or 2 otherwise.

 -1: Allow use of (almost) all events by all users
     Ignore mlock limit after perf_event_mlock_kb without CAP_IPC_LOCK
@@ -701,6 +702,7 @@ users (without CAP_SYS_ADMIN). The default value is 2.
     Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN
>=1: Disallow CPU event access by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN
>=2: Disallow kernel profiling by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN
>=3: Disallow all event access by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN

==============================================================

+5 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -1179,6 +1179,11 @@ extern int perf_cpu_time_max_percent_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
int perf_event_max_stack_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
				 void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);

static inline bool perf_paranoid_any(void)
{
	return sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 2;
}

static inline bool perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw(void)
{
	return sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1;
+8 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -397,8 +397,13 @@ static cpumask_var_t perf_online_mask;
 *   0 - disallow raw tracepoint access for unpriv
 *   1 - disallow cpu events for unpriv
 *   2 - disallow kernel profiling for unpriv
 *   3 - disallow all unpriv perf event use
 */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT
int sysctl_perf_event_paranoid __read_mostly = 3;
#else
int sysctl_perf_event_paranoid __read_mostly = 2;
#endif

/* Minimum for 512 kiB + 1 user control page */
int sysctl_perf_event_mlock __read_mostly = 512 + (PAGE_SIZE / 1024); /* 'free' kiB per user */
@@ -10410,6 +10415,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
	if (flags & ~PERF_FLAG_ALL)
		return -EINVAL;

	if (perf_paranoid_any() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
		return -EACCES;

	err = perf_copy_attr(attr_uptr, &attr);
	if (err)
		return err;
+9 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -18,6 +18,15 @@ config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT

	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.

config SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT
	bool "Restrict unprivileged use of performance events"
	depends on PERF_EVENTS
	help
	  If you say Y here, the kernel.perf_event_paranoid sysctl
	  will be set to 3 by default, and no unprivileged use of the
	  perf_event_open syscall will be permitted unless it is
	  changed.

config SECURITY
	bool "Enable different security models"
	depends on SYSFS