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Commit 79619817 authored by Helge Deller's avatar Helge Deller Committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
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parisc: Fix kernel panic due invalid values in IAOQ0 or IAOQ1 

commit 10835c854685393a921b68f529bf740fa7c9984d upstream.

On parisc the privilege level of a process is stored in the lowest two bits of
the instruction pointers (IAOQ0 and IAOQ1). On Linux we use privilege level 0
for the kernel and privilege level 3 for user-space. So userspace should not be
allowed to modify IAOQ0 or IAOQ1 of a ptraced process to change it's privilege
level to e.g. 0 to try to gain kernel privileges.

This patch prevents such modifications by always setting the two lowest bits to
one (which relates to privilege level 3 for user-space) if IAOQ0 or IAOQ1 are
modified via ptrace calls in the native and compat ptrace paths.

Link: https://bugs.gentoo.org/481768


Reported-by: default avatarJeroen Roovers <jer@gentoo.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Tested-by: default avatarRolf Eike Beer <eike-kernel@sf-tec.de>
Signed-off-by: default avatarHelge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
parent a6a0daa7

arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c

+18 −10
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -167,6 +167,9 @@ long arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, long request, 
		if ((addr & (sizeof(unsigned long)-1)) ||

		     addr >= sizeof(struct pt_regs))

			break;

		if (addr == PT_IAOQ0 || addr == PT_IAOQ1) {

			data |= 3; /* ensure userspace privilege */

		}

		if ((addr >= PT_GR1 && addr <= PT_GR31) ||

				addr == PT_IAOQ0 || addr == PT_IAOQ1 ||

				(addr >= PT_FR0 && addr <= PT_FR31 + 4) ||
@@ -228,16 +231,18 @@ long arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, long request, 


static compat_ulong_t translate_usr_offset(compat_ulong_t offset)

{

	if (offset < 0)

		return sizeof(struct pt_regs);

	else if (offset <= 32*4)	/* gr[0..31] */

		return offset * 2 + 4;

	else if (offset <= 32*4+32*8)	/* gr[0..31] + fr[0..31] */

		return offset + 32*4;

	else if (offset < sizeof(struct pt_regs)/2 + 32*4)

		return offset * 2 + 4 - 32*8;

	compat_ulong_t pos;



	if (offset < 32*4)	/* gr[0..31] */

		pos = offset * 2 + 4;

	else if (offset < 32*4+32*8)	/* fr[0] ... fr[31] */

		pos = (offset - 32*4) + PT_FR0;

	else if (offset < sizeof(struct pt_regs)/2 + 32*4) /* sr[0] ... ipsw */

		pos = (offset - 32*4 - 32*8) * 2 + PT_SR0 + 4;

	else

		return sizeof(struct pt_regs);

		pos = sizeof(struct pt_regs);



	return pos;

}



long compat_arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, compat_long_t request,
@@ -281,9 +286,12 @@ long compat_arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, compat_long_t request, 
			addr = translate_usr_offset(addr);

			if (addr >= sizeof(struct pt_regs))

				break;

			if (addr == PT_IAOQ0+4 || addr == PT_IAOQ1+4) {

				data |= 3; /* ensure userspace privilege */

			}

			if (addr >= PT_FR0 && addr <= PT_FR31 + 4) {

				/* Special case, fp regs are 64 bits anyway */

				*(__u64 *) ((char *) task_regs(child) + addr) = data;

				*(__u32 *) ((char *) task_regs(child) + addr) = data;

				ret = 0;

			}

			else if ((addr >= PT_GR1+4 && addr <= PT_GR31+4) ||