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Commit 73fbad28 authored by James Morris's avatar James Morris
Browse files

Merge branch 'next' into for-linus

parents 769f3e8c 35f2c2f6
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+18 −2
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -184,8 +184,9 @@ length. Single character labels using special characters, that being anything
other than a letter or digit, are reserved for use by the Smack development
team. Smack labels are unstructured, case sensitive, and the only operation
ever performed on them is comparison for equality. Smack labels cannot
contain unprintable characters or the "/" (slash) character. Smack labels
cannot begin with a '-', which is reserved for special options.
contain unprintable characters, the "/" (slash), the "\" (backslash), the "'"
(quote) and '"' (double-quote) characters.
Smack labels cannot begin with a '-', which is reserved for special options.

There are some predefined labels:

@@ -523,3 +524,18 @@ Smack supports some mount options:

These mount options apply to all file system types.

Smack auditing

If you want Smack auditing of security events, you need to set CONFIG_AUDIT
in your kernel configuration.
By default, all denied events will be audited. You can change this behavior by
writing a single character to the /smack/logging file :
0 : no logging
1 : log denied (default)
2 : log accepted
3 : log denied & accepted

Events are logged as 'key=value' pairs, for each event you at least will get
the subjet, the object, the rights requested, the action, the kernel function
that triggered the event, plus other pairs depending on the type of event
audited.
+6 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -916,6 +916,12 @@ and is between 256 and 4096 characters. It is defined in the file
			Formt: { "sha1" | "md5" }
			default: "sha1"

	ima_tcb		[IMA]
			Load a policy which meets the needs of the Trusted
			Computing Base.  This means IMA will measure all
			programs exec'd, files mmap'd for exec, and all files
			opened for read by uid=0.

	in2000=		[HW,SCSI]
			See header of drivers/scsi/in2000.c.

+11 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel:
- kstack_depth_to_print       [ X86 only ]
- l2cr                        [ PPC only ]
- modprobe                    ==> Documentation/debugging-modules.txt
- modules_disabled
- msgmax
- msgmnb
- msgmni
@@ -184,6 +185,16 @@ kernel stack.

==============================================================

modules_disabled:

A toggle value indicating if modules are allowed to be loaded
in an otherwise modular kernel.  This toggle defaults to off
(0), but can be set true (1).  Once true, modules can be
neither loaded nor unloaded, and the toggle cannot be set back
to false.

==============================================================

osrelease, ostype & version:

# cat osrelease
+3 −3
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -1488,7 +1488,7 @@ int compat_do_execve(char * filename,
	if (!bprm)
		goto out_files;

	retval = mutex_lock_interruptible(&current->cred_exec_mutex);
	retval = mutex_lock_interruptible(&current->cred_guard_mutex);
	if (retval < 0)
		goto out_free;
	current->in_execve = 1;
@@ -1550,7 +1550,7 @@ int compat_do_execve(char * filename,
	/* execve succeeded */
	current->fs->in_exec = 0;
	current->in_execve = 0;
	mutex_unlock(&current->cred_exec_mutex);
	mutex_unlock(&current->cred_guard_mutex);
	acct_update_integrals(current);
	free_bprm(bprm);
	if (displaced)
@@ -1573,7 +1573,7 @@ int compat_do_execve(char * filename,

out_unlock:
	current->in_execve = 0;
	mutex_unlock(&current->cred_exec_mutex);
	mutex_unlock(&current->cred_guard_mutex);

out_free:
	free_bprm(bprm);
+5 −5
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -1016,7 +1016,7 @@ void install_exec_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
	commit_creds(bprm->cred);
	bprm->cred = NULL;

	/* cred_exec_mutex must be held at least to this point to prevent
	/* cred_guard_mutex must be held at least to this point to prevent
	 * ptrace_attach() from altering our determination of the task's
	 * credentials; any time after this it may be unlocked */

@@ -1026,7 +1026,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(install_exec_creds);

/*
 * determine how safe it is to execute the proposed program
 * - the caller must hold current->cred_exec_mutex to protect against
 * - the caller must hold current->cred_guard_mutex to protect against
 *   PTRACE_ATTACH
 */
int check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
@@ -1268,7 +1268,7 @@ int do_execve(char * filename,
	if (!bprm)
		goto out_files;

	retval = mutex_lock_interruptible(&current->cred_exec_mutex);
	retval = mutex_lock_interruptible(&current->cred_guard_mutex);
	if (retval < 0)
		goto out_free;
	current->in_execve = 1;
@@ -1331,7 +1331,7 @@ int do_execve(char * filename,
	/* execve succeeded */
	current->fs->in_exec = 0;
	current->in_execve = 0;
	mutex_unlock(&current->cred_exec_mutex);
	mutex_unlock(&current->cred_guard_mutex);
	acct_update_integrals(current);
	free_bprm(bprm);
	if (displaced)
@@ -1354,7 +1354,7 @@ int do_execve(char * filename,

out_unlock:
	current->in_execve = 0;
	mutex_unlock(&current->cred_exec_mutex);
	mutex_unlock(&current->cred_guard_mutex);

out_free:
	free_bprm(bprm);
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