Merge 'File and metadata encryption changes from android-4.19.96-107' into msm-4.19

- The bio's encryption context is programmed into a keyslot in the KSM of the

  request queue that the bio is being submitted to (or the crypto API fallback

  KSM if the request queue doesn't have a KSM), and that the ``processing_ksm``

  KSM if the request queue doesn't have a KSM), and that the ``bc_ksm``

  in the ``bi_crypt_context`` is set to this KSM

- That the bio has its own individual reference to the keyslot in this KSM.

  ensuring that the bio has a valid reference to the keyslot when, for e.g., the

  crypto API fallback KSM in blk-crypto performs crypto on the device's behalf.

  The individual references are ensured by increasing the refcount for the

  keyslot in the ``processing_ksm`` when a bio with a programmed encryption

  keyslot in the ``bc_ksm`` when a bio with a programmed encryption

  context is cloned.

  request queue the bio is being submitted to (and if this KSM does not exist,

  then it will program it into blk-crypto's internal KSM for crypto API

  fallback). The KSM that this encryption context was programmed into is stored

  as the ``processing_ksm`` in the bio's ``bi_crypt_context``.

  as the ``bc_ksm`` in the bio's ``bi_crypt_context``.

**Case 2:** blk-crypto is given a bio whose encryption context has already been

programmed into a keyslot in the *crypto API fallback* KSM.

This way, when a device driver is processing a bio, it can be sure that

the bio's encryption context has been programmed into some KSM (either the

device driver's request queue's KSM, or blk-crypto's crypto API fallback KSM).

It then simply needs to check if the bio's processing_ksm is the device's

It then simply needs to check if the bio's ``bc_ksm`` is the device's

request queue's KSM. If so, then it should proceed with IE. If not, it should

simply do nothing with respect to crypto, because some other KSM (perhaps the

blk-crypto crypto API fallback KSM) is handling the en/decryption.

    struct fscrypt_add_key_arg {

            struct fscrypt_key_specifier key_spec;

            __u32 raw_size;

            __u32 __reserved[9];

            __u32 key_id;

            __u32 __reserved[8];

            __u8 raw[];

    };

            } u;

    };

    struct fscrypt_provisioning_key_payload {

            __u32 type;

            __u32 __reserved;

            __u8 raw[];

    };

:c:type:`struct fscrypt_add_key_arg` must be zeroed, then initialized

as follows:

  ``Documentation/security/keys/core.rst``).

- ``raw_size`` must be the size of the ``raw`` key provided, in bytes.

  Alternatively, if ``key_id`` is nonzero, this field must be 0, since

  in that case the size is implied by the specified Linux keyring key.

- ``key_id`` is 0 if the raw key is given directly in the ``raw``

  field.  Otherwise ``key_id`` is the ID of a Linux keyring key of

  type "fscrypt-provisioning" whose payload is a :c:type:`struct

  fscrypt_provisioning_key_payload` whose ``raw`` field contains the

  raw key and whose ``type`` field matches ``key_spec.type``.  Since

  ``raw`` is variable-length, the total size of this key's payload

  must be ``sizeof(struct fscrypt_provisioning_key_payload)`` plus the

  raw key size.  The process must have Search permission on this key.

  Most users should leave this 0 and specify the raw key directly.

  The support for specifying a Linux keyring key is intended mainly to

  allow re-adding keys after a filesystem is unmounted and re-mounted,

  without having to store the raw keys in userspace memory.

- ``raw`` is a variable-length field which must contain the actual

  key, ``raw_size`` bytes long.

  key, ``raw_size`` bytes long.  Alternatively, if ``key_id`` is

  nonzero, then this field is unused.

For v2 policy keys, the kernel keeps track of which user (identified

by effective user ID) added the key, and only allows the key to be

- ``EACCES``: FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR was specified, but the

  caller does not have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the initial

  user namespace

  user namespace; or the raw key was specified by Linux key ID but the

  process lacks Search permission on the key.

- ``EDQUOT``: the key quota for this user would be exceeded by adding

  the key

- ``EINVAL``: invalid key size or key specifier type, or reserved bits

  were set

- ``EKEYREJECTED``: the raw key was specified by Linux key ID, but the

  key has the wrong type

- ``ENOKEY``: the raw key was specified by Linux key ID, but no key

  exists with that ID

- ``ENOTTY``: this type of filesystem does not implement encryption

- ``EOPNOTSUPP``: the kernel was not configured with encryption

  support for this filesystem, or the filesystem superblock has not

config BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION

	bool "Enable inline encryption support in block layer"

	help

	  Build the blk-crypto subsystem. Enabling this lets the

	  block layer handle encryption, so users can take

	  advantage of inline encryption hardware if present.

config BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION_FALLBACK

	bool "Enable crypto API fallback for blk-crypto"

	depends on BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION

	select CRYPTO

	select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER

	help

	  Build the blk-crypto subsystem.

	  Enabling this lets the block layer handle encryption,

	  so users can take advantage of inline encryption

	  hardware if present.

	  Enabling this lets the block layer handle inline encryption

	  by falling back to the kernel crypto API when inline

	  encryption hardware is not present.

menu "Partition Types"

obj-$(CONFIG_BLK_SED_OPAL)	+= sed-opal.o

obj-$(CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION)	+= keyslot-manager.o bio-crypt-ctx.o \

					   blk-crypto.o

obj-$(CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION_FALLBACK)	+= blk-crypto-fallback.o

 No newline at end of file

#include <linux/bio.h>

#include <linux/blkdev.h>

#include <linux/slab.h>

#include <linux/keyslot-manager.h>

#include <linux/module.h>

#include <linux/slab.h>

#include "blk-crypto-internal.h"

static int num_prealloc_crypt_ctxs = 128;

module_param(num_prealloc_crypt_ctxs, int, 0444);

MODULE_PARM_DESC(num_prealloc_crypt_ctxs,

		"Number of bio crypto contexts to preallocate");

static struct kmem_cache *bio_crypt_ctx_cache;

static mempool_t *bio_crypt_ctx_pool;

int bio_crypt_ctx_init(void)

int __init bio_crypt_ctx_init(void)

{

	size_t i;

	bio_crypt_ctx_cache = KMEM_CACHE(bio_crypt_ctx, 0);

	if (!bio_crypt_ctx_cache)

		return -ENOMEM;

	bio_crypt_ctx_pool = mempool_create_slab_pool(

					num_prealloc_crypt_ctxs,

	bio_crypt_ctx_pool = mempool_create_slab_pool(num_prealloc_crypt_ctxs,

						      bio_crypt_ctx_cache);

	if (!bio_crypt_ctx_pool)

		return -ENOMEM;

	/* This is assumed in various places. */

	BUILD_BUG_ON(BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_INVALID != 0);

	/* Sanity check that no algorithm exceeds the defined limits. */

	for (i = 0; i < BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_MAX; i++) {

		BUG_ON(blk_crypto_modes[i].keysize > BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_KEY_SIZE);

		BUG_ON(blk_crypto_modes[i].ivsize > BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_IV_SIZE);

	}

	return 0;

}

{

	return mempool_alloc(bio_crypt_ctx_pool, gfp_mask);

}

EXPORT_SYMBOL(bio_crypt_alloc_ctx);

EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bio_crypt_alloc_ctx);

void bio_crypt_free_ctx(struct bio *bio)

{

	mempool_free(bio->bi_crypt_context, bio_crypt_ctx_pool);

	bio->bi_crypt_context = NULL;

}

EXPORT_SYMBOL(bio_crypt_free_ctx);

int bio_crypt_clone(struct bio *dst, struct bio *src, gfp_t gfp_mask)

void bio_crypt_clone(struct bio *dst, struct bio *src, gfp_t gfp_mask)

{

	const struct bio_crypt_ctx *src_bc = src->bi_crypt_context;

	bio_clone_skip_dm_default_key(dst, src);

	/*

	 * If a bio is swhandled, then it will be decrypted when bio_endio

	 * is called. As we only want the data to be decrypted once, copies

	 * of the bio must not have have a crypt context.

	 * If a bio is fallback_crypted, then it will be decrypted when

	 * bio_endio is called. As we only want the data to be decrypted once,

	 * copies of the bio must not have have a crypt context.

	 */

	if (!bio_has_crypt_ctx(src) || bio_crypt_swhandled(src))

		return 0;

	if (!src_bc || bio_crypt_fallback_crypted(src_bc))

		return;

	dst->bi_crypt_context = bio_crypt_alloc_ctx(gfp_mask);

	if (!dst->bi_crypt_context)

		return -ENOMEM;

	*dst->bi_crypt_context = *src->bi_crypt_context;

	*dst->bi_crypt_context = *src_bc;

	if (bio_crypt_has_keyslot(src))

		keyslot_manager_get_slot(src->bi_crypt_context->processing_ksm,

					 src->bi_crypt_context->keyslot);

	return 0;

	if (src_bc->bc_keyslot >= 0)

		keyslot_manager_get_slot(src_bc->bc_ksm, src_bc->bc_keyslot);

}

EXPORT_SYMBOL(bio_crypt_clone);

EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bio_crypt_clone);

bool bio_crypt_should_process(struct bio *bio, struct request_queue *q)

bool bio_crypt_should_process(struct request *rq)

{

	if (!bio_has_crypt_ctx(bio))

		return false;

	struct bio *bio = rq->bio;

	if (q->ksm != bio->bi_crypt_context->processing_ksm)

	if (!bio || !bio->bi_crypt_context)

		return false;

	WARN_ON(!bio_crypt_has_keyslot(bio));

	return true;

	return rq->q->ksm == bio->bi_crypt_context->bc_ksm;

}

EXPORT_SYMBOL(bio_crypt_should_process);

EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bio_crypt_should_process);

/*

 * Checks that two bio crypt contexts are compatible - i.e. that

	struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc1 = b_1->bi_crypt_context;

	struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc2 = b_2->bi_crypt_context;

	if (bio_has_crypt_ctx(b_1) != bio_has_crypt_ctx(b_2))

		return false;

	if (!bio_has_crypt_ctx(b_1))

		return true;

	return bc1->keyslot == bc2->keyslot &&

	       bc1->data_unit_size_bits == bc2->data_unit_size_bits;

	if (!bc1)

		return !bc2;

	return bc2 && bc1->bc_key == bc2->bc_key;

}

/*

 * Checks that two bio crypt contexts are compatible, and also

 * that their data_unit_nums are continuous (and can hence be merged)

 * in the order b_1 followed by b_2.

 */

bool bio_crypt_ctx_back_mergeable(struct bio *b_1,

				  unsigned int b1_sectors,

bool bio_crypt_ctx_mergeable(struct bio *b_1, unsigned int b1_bytes,

			     struct bio *b_2)

{

	struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc1 = b_1->bi_crypt_context;

	if (!bio_crypt_ctx_compatible(b_1, b_2))

		return false;

	return !bio_has_crypt_ctx(b_1) ||

		(bc1->data_unit_num +

		(b1_sectors >> (bc1->data_unit_size_bits - 9)) ==

		bc2->data_unit_num);

	return !bc1 || bio_crypt_dun_is_contiguous(bc1, b1_bytes, bc2->bc_dun);

}

void bio_crypt_ctx_release_keyslot(struct bio *bio)

void bio_crypt_ctx_release_keyslot(struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc)

{

	struct bio_crypt_ctx *crypt_ctx = bio->bi_crypt_context;

	keyslot_manager_put_slot(crypt_ctx->processing_ksm, crypt_ctx->keyslot);

	bio->bi_crypt_context->processing_ksm = NULL;

	bio->bi_crypt_context->keyslot = -1;

	keyslot_manager_put_slot(bc->bc_ksm, bc->bc_keyslot);

	bc->bc_ksm = NULL;

	bc->bc_keyslot = -1;

}

int bio_crypt_ctx_acquire_keyslot(struct bio *bio, struct keyslot_manager *ksm)

int bio_crypt_ctx_acquire_keyslot(struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc,

				  struct keyslot_manager *ksm)

{

	int slot;

	enum blk_crypto_mode_num crypto_mode = bio_crypto_mode(bio);

	if (!ksm)

		return -ENOMEM;

	int slot = keyslot_manager_get_slot_for_key(ksm, bc->bc_key);

	slot = keyslot_manager_get_slot_for_key(ksm,

			bio_crypt_raw_key(bio), crypto_mode,

			1 << bio->bi_crypt_context->data_unit_size_bits);

	if (slot < 0)

		return slot;

	bio_crypt_set_keyslot(bio, slot, ksm);

	bc->bc_keyslot = slot;

	bc->bc_ksm = ksm;

	return 0;

}