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Commit 1553cfeb authored by Jan Varho's avatar Jan Varho Committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
Browse files

random: do not split fast init input in add_hwgenerator_randomness() 



commit 527a9867af29ff89f278d037db704e0ed50fb666 upstream.

add_hwgenerator_randomness() tries to only use the required amount of input
for fast init, but credits all the entropy, rather than a fraction of
it. Since it's hard to determine how much entropy is left over out of a
non-unformly random sample, either give it all to fast init or credit
it, but don't attempt to do both. In the process, we can clean up the
injection code to no longer need to return a value.

Signed-off-by: default avatarJan Varho <jan.varho@gmail.com>
[Jason: expanded commit message]
Fixes: 73c7733f122e ("random: do not throw away excess input to crng_fast_load")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.17+, requires af704c856e88
Signed-off-by: default avatarJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
parent c67a110e

drivers/char/random.c

+6 −17
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -437,11 +437,8 @@ static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_state[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)], 
 * This shouldn't be set by functions like add_device_randomness(),

 * where we can't trust the buffer passed to it is guaranteed to be

 * unpredictable (so it might not have any entropy at all).

 *

 * Returns the number of bytes processed from input, which is bounded

 * by CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH if account is true.

 */

static size_t crng_pre_init_inject(const void *input, size_t len, bool account)

static void crng_pre_init_inject(const void *input, size_t len, bool account)

{

	static int crng_init_cnt = 0;

	struct blake2s_state hash;
@@ -452,18 +449,15 @@ static size_t crng_pre_init_inject(const void *input, size_t len, bool account) 
	spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags);

	if (crng_init != 0) {

		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);

		return 0;

		return;

	}



	if (account)

		len = min_t(size_t, len, CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH - crng_init_cnt);



	blake2s_update(&hash, base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key));

	blake2s_update(&hash, input, len);

	blake2s_final(&hash, base_crng.key);



	if (account) {

		crng_init_cnt += len;

		crng_init_cnt += min_t(size_t, len, CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH - crng_init_cnt);

		if (crng_init_cnt >= CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) {

			++base_crng.generation;

			crng_init = 1;
@@ -474,8 +468,6 @@ static size_t crng_pre_init_inject(const void *input, size_t len, bool account) 


	if (crng_init == 1)

		pr_notice("fast init done\n");



	return len;

}



static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
@@ -1133,11 +1125,8 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count, 
				size_t entropy)

{

	if (unlikely(crng_init == 0 && entropy < POOL_MIN_BITS)) {

		size_t ret = crng_pre_init_inject(buffer, count, true);

		mix_pool_bytes(buffer, ret);

		count -= ret;

		buffer += ret;

		if (!count || crng_init == 0)

		crng_pre_init_inject(buffer, count, true);

		mix_pool_bytes(buffer, count);

		return;

	}