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Commit bb474664 authored by Mathy Vanhoef's avatar Mathy Vanhoef Committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
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mac80211: prevent mixed key and fragment cache attacks 



commit 94034c40ab4a3fcf581fbc7f8fdf4e29943c4a24 upstream.

Simultaneously prevent mixed key attacks (CVE-2020-24587) and fragment
cache attacks (CVE-2020-24586). This is accomplished by assigning a
unique color to every key (per interface) and using this to track which
key was used to decrypt a fragment. When reassembling frames, it is
now checked whether all fragments were decrypted using the same key.

To assure that fragment cache attacks are also prevented, the ID that is
assigned to keys is unique even over (re)associations and (re)connects.
This means fragments separated by a (re)association or (re)connect will
not be reassembled. Because mac80211 now also prevents the reassembly of
mixed encrypted and plaintext fragments, all cache attacks are prevented.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: default avatarMathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511200110.3f8290e59823.I622a67769ed39257327a362cfc09c812320eb979@changeid


Signed-off-by: default avatarJohannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
parent 29bc5b2b

net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h

+1 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ struct ieee80211_fragment_entry { 
	u8 rx_queue;

	bool check_sequential_pn; /* needed for CCMP/GCMP */

	u8 last_pn[6]; /* PN of the last fragment if CCMP was used */

	unsigned int key_color;

};

net/mac80211/key.c

+7 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -647,6 +647,7 @@ int ieee80211_key_link(struct ieee80211_key *key, 
		       struct sta_info *sta)

{

	struct ieee80211_local *local = sdata->local;

	static atomic_t key_color = ATOMIC_INIT(0);

	struct ieee80211_key *old_key;

	int idx = key->conf.keyidx;

	bool pairwise = key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE;
@@ -658,6 +659,12 @@ int ieee80211_key_link(struct ieee80211_key *key, 
	bool delay_tailroom = sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION;

	int ret;



	/*

	 * Assign a unique ID to every key so we can easily prevent mixed

	 * key and fragment cache attacks.

	 */

	key->color = atomic_inc_return(&key_color);



	mutex_lock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);



	if (sta && pairwise)

net/mac80211/key.h

+2 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -127,6 +127,8 @@ struct ieee80211_key { 
	} debugfs;

#endif



	unsigned int color;



	/*

	 * key config, must be last because it contains key

	 * material as variable length member

net/mac80211/rx.c

+6 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -2004,6 +2004,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) 
			 * next fragment has a sequential PN value.

			 */

			entry->check_sequential_pn = true;

			entry->key_color = rx->key->color;

			memcpy(entry->last_pn,

			       rx->key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue],

			       IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
@@ -2041,6 +2042,11 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) 


		if (!requires_sequential_pn(rx, fc))

			return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;



		/* Prevent mixed key and fragment cache attacks */

		if (entry->key_color != rx->key->color)

			return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;



		memcpy(pn, entry->last_pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);

		for (i = IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN - 1; i >= 0; i--) {

			pn[i]++;