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Commit 9520628e authored by Kees Cook's avatar Kees Cook Committed by Linus Torvalds
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fs: make dumpable=2 require fully qualified path 



When the suid_dumpable sysctl is set to "2", and there is no core dump
pipe defined in the core_pattern sysctl, a local user can cause core files
to be written to root-writable directories, potentially with
user-controlled content.

This means an admin can unknowningly reintroduce a variation of
CVE-2006-2451, allowing local users to gain root privileges.

  $ cat /proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable
  2
  $ cat /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern
  core
  $ ulimit -c unlimited
  $ cd /
  $ ls -l core
  ls: cannot access core: No such file or directory
  $ touch core
  touch: cannot touch `core': Permission denied
  $ OHAI="evil-string-here" ping localhost >/dev/null 2>&1 &
  $ pid=$!
  $ sleep 1
  $ kill -SEGV $pid
  $ ls -l core
  -rw------- 1 root kees 458752 Jun 21 11:35 core
  $ sudo strings core | grep evil
  OHAI=evil-string-here

While cron has been fixed to abort reading a file when there is any
parse error, there are still other sensitive directories that will read
any file present and skip unparsable lines.

Instead of introducing a suid_dumpable=3 mode and breaking all users of
mode 2, this only disables the unsafe portion of mode 2 (writing to disk
via relative path).  Most users of mode 2 (e.g.  Chrome OS) already use
a core dump pipe handler, so this change will not break them.  For the
situations where a pipe handler is not defined but mode 2 is still
active, crash dumps will only be written to fully qualified paths.  If a
relative path is defined (e.g.  the default "core" pattern), dump
attempts will trigger a printk yelling about the lack of a fully
qualified path.

Signed-off-by: default avatarKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
parent 779302e6

Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt

+12 −6
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -163,16 +163,22 @@ This value can be used to query and set the core dump mode for setuid 
or otherwise protected/tainted binaries. The modes are



0 - (default) - traditional behaviour. Any process which has changed

	privilege levels or is execute only will not be dumped

	privilege levels or is execute only will not be dumped.

1 - (debug) - all processes dump core when possible. The core dump is

	owned by the current user and no security is applied. This is

	intended for system debugging situations only. Ptrace is unchecked.

	This is insecure as it allows regular users to examine the memory

	contents of privileged processes.

2 - (suidsafe) - any binary which normally would not be dumped is dumped

	readable by root only. This allows the end user to remove

	such a dump but not access it directly. For security reasons

	core dumps in this mode will not overwrite one another or

	other files. This mode is appropriate when administrators are

	attempting to debug problems in a normal environment.

	anyway, but only if the "core_pattern" kernel sysctl is set to

	either a pipe handler or a fully qualified path. (For more details

	on this limitation, see CVE-2006-2451.) This mode is appropriate

	when administrators are attempting to debug problems in a normal

	environment, and either have a core dump pipe handler that knows

	to treat privileged core dumps with care, or specific directory

	defined for catching core dumps. If a core dump happens without

	a pipe handler or fully qualifid path, a message will be emitted

	to syslog warning about the lack of a correct setting.



==============================================================

fs/exec.c

+14 −3
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -2111,6 +2111,7 @@ void do_coredump(long signr, int exit_code, struct pt_regs *regs) 
	int retval = 0;

	int flag = 0;

	int ispipe;

	bool need_nonrelative = false;

	static atomic_t core_dump_count = ATOMIC_INIT(0);

	struct coredump_params cprm = {

		.signr = signr,
@@ -2136,14 +2137,16 @@ void do_coredump(long signr, int exit_code, struct pt_regs *regs) 
	if (!cred)

		goto fail;

	/*

	 *	We cannot trust fsuid as being the "true" uid of the

	 *	process nor do we know its entire history. We only know it

	 *	was tainted so we dump it as root in mode 2.

	 * We cannot trust fsuid as being the "true" uid of the process

	 * nor do we know its entire history. We only know it was tainted

	 * so we dump it as root in mode 2, and only into a controlled

	 * environment (pipe handler or fully qualified path).

	 */

	if (__get_dumpable(cprm.mm_flags) == 2) {

		/* Setuid core dump mode */

		flag = O_EXCL;		/* Stop rewrite attacks */

		cred->fsuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;	/* Dump root private */

		need_nonrelative = true;

	}



	retval = coredump_wait(exit_code, &core_state);
@@ -2223,6 +2226,14 @@ void do_coredump(long signr, int exit_code, struct pt_regs *regs) 
		if (cprm.limit < binfmt->min_coredump)

			goto fail_unlock;



		if (need_nonrelative && cn.corename[0] != '/') {

			printk(KERN_WARNING "Pid %d(%s) can only dump core "\

				"to fully qualified path!\n",

				task_tgid_vnr(current), current->comm);

			printk(KERN_WARNING "Skipping core dump\n");

			goto fail_unlock;

		}



		cprm.file = filp_open(cn.corename,

				 O_CREAT | 2 | O_NOFOLLOW | O_LARGEFILE | flag,

				 0600);